In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement
By H.E. Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the IAEA and other International Organizations in Vienna
at the Second Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee
Cluster II - on Non-Proliferation
Geneva, 29 April 2013

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to associate my delegation with the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on this cluster.

The first and the most important short message is: Non-proliferation should not be dealt with in isolation. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the coin. Under the pretext of “Non-proliferation”, the Nuclear Weapon States have derailed the attention of international community from their continuous nuclear armament. The 4-decade failure of NPT, non-compliance of Article VI, as well as Article IV on undertakings to cooperate in peaceful use of nuclear energy, proves this assertion.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is always a risk for their use and vertical or horizontal proliferation. By maintaining nuclear arsenals and their horizontal proliferation through the transfer of nuclear technologies and weapons-grade materials to non-parties to the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States have also contributed to the emergence of new nuclear weapons possessors. It is considered as a clear violation of non-proliferation obligations under article I of the Treaty by the certain nuclear weapon states. Therefore non proliferation shall not be attributed only to the non-nuclear weapon states. History shows that nuclear proliferation has happened as the result of the development, testing and use of nuclear weapons by the United States in the past and in the present. Today the existence of tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons and the risk to use them constitute the greatest threat to the human civilization and the peace and security of all. Given such threats and risks, nothing can justify the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of States.

Against this backdrop, the compliance by non-nuclear-weapon States with their commitment to non-proliferation has greatly enabled the NPT to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, peaceful nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty as long as they are under the full scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pose no proliferation risks. Therefore as a responsible non-nuclear-weapon State, the Islamic Republic of Iran, having exclusively peaceful nuclear activities is strongly committed to the non-proliferation objective of the NPT in all its aspects.

We are of the view that full and non-discriminatory implementation of the NPT plays an essential role in enhancing international peace and security. We are far behind implementation of the provisions of the NPT in a balanced manner. To this end my delegation proposes that the 2015 NPT Review Conference should, inter alia:

- To call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to fully implement their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
- To establish a strong mechanism to verify the implementation of article I by the Nuclear Weapon States, regarding the transfer of nuclear material and technology to non-nuclear weapon states.
- To make a decision on the prohibition of any nuclear assistance to non-parties to the Treaty.
- To identify cases of non-compliance by the Nuclear Weapon States with their obligations under the Treaty, specifically with Article-I, and to find ways and means how to deal with such violations including preventive measures.

Let me further elaborate on the alarming facts as well as the main tasks presumed for the 2015 Review Conference as highlighted above:
One of the major challenges facing the NPT is the cases of non-compliance by US, UK, and France with their Treaty obligations including the non-proliferation provisions. While there is an established mechanism to verify and enforce the obligations under Articles II and III of the Treaty for the non-nuclear-weapon States, no similar mechanism has been designed to internationally verify and address the non-compliances by the Nuclear Weapon States with their obligations under Articles I, III (2), IV (2) and VI of the NPT.

Under the terms of the article I of the Treaty, the Nuclear Weapon States are committed not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon technology and materials to others. Accordingly, the Nuclear Weapon States should refrain from nuclear sharing, under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States Parties and those not parties to the Treaty. Full materialization of non-proliferation objective requires the implementation of article I of the Treaty by the Nuclear Weapon States. Therefore, the Review Conference should establish a strong mechanism to verify the implementation of article I by the Nuclear Weapon States.

By transferring hundreds of nuclear weapons to certain non-nuclear-weapon States under the NATO umbrella in the EU territories, the US, for a long time, has been in non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty, which provides in its article I "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons." The deployed tactical nuclear weapons in the EU countries are extremely integrated into the military infrastructure of the hosting countries, the fighter bomber pilots of the hosting countries have been trained to handle and deliver the United States nuclear bombs against the nuclear as well as the non-nuclear-weapon States. It constitutes clear non-compliance with the Treaty not only by sending country but also by the hosting States namely some members of the European Union. We call upon the US and the EU to come back into compliance with their Treaty obligations and abandoned double-standard and discriminatory policies.

The IAEA has to verify safeguards obligations of the European countries hosting US nuclear weapons in their territories. The Director General of the IAEA has to report the detailed information on weapon grade nuclear material, including high enriched weapons and
plutonium, their locations and contiguous accountancy of material balance. In this context Iran propose to all like minded non-nuclear weapon states party to NPT to pursue this in the IAEA. The Agency shall report to the next prep-com and the Review Conference a progress report.

By the same token, France, the US and the UK by transfer of nuclear technologies and materials to non-parties to the Treaty including the Zionist regime of Israel, not only have created impediments towards achievement of universality of the Treaty but also have greatly contributed to the emergence of new nuclear weapon possessors. This is a clear breach of non-proliferation obligation under article I of the Treaty, particularly by France as the founder of Israeli secret nuclear program.

The unprecedented decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an exclusive and nontransparent club that claims to have been established so as to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, has already damaged the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a decision, by facilitating the transfer of nuclear material to a non-party that has an active nuclear-weapons programme, is a clear violation of article III (2) of the Treaty, which stipulates that cooperation by each State party to the Treaty in providing equipment or material for peaceful purposes is not permitted unless the source or special fissionable material is subjected to the safeguards required under the Treaty. The NSG decision, which was made under pressure exerted by the US and supported by the EU members, is also a violation of the commitment of the Nuclear Weapon States under the decision on principles and objectives of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference for promoting universalization of the Treaty. When a country outside the Treaty easily and unconditionally enjoys nuclear assistance from NSG members, it will never have incentives to accede to the Treaty. The Review Conference should make a decision on the prohibition of any nuclear assistance to non-parties to the Treaty.

Furthermore, it seems that in the view of a few nuclear weapon States and the EU members, clandestine development of nuclear weapons by those outside the Treaty is justifiable, and that such a nuclear programme can be supported through cooperation and transferring nuclear technology, material and equipment. It is a matter of great concern that such an approach has been applied by the United States and the EU to the underground nuclear weapons programme
of the Israeli regime. Permitting such a regime to continue to produce nuclear weapons with impunity will bring about grave consequences for regional and international peace and security.

To this effect, the outcome of the 2015 Review Conference, based on the full implementation of the obligations of the Nuclear Weapon States on non-proliferation, should be designed in a way to cover several key issues as follows:

(a) The proliferation by certain nuclear-weapon States is the most immediate and essential risk threatening the non-proliferation regime;

(b) Article I of the Treaty and its implementation by the Nuclear Weapon States should be strengthened by establishing a verification mechanism similar to the one under article III of the Treaty;

(c) It is essential that all proliferation cases made by certain Nuclear Weapon States be thoroughly examined by the IAEA;

(d) The Nuclear Weapon States must reiterate their commitment not to transfer any nuclear material, equipment, information, knowledge and technology to them;

(e) Undeniable interrelation between non-proliferation and disarmament has to be reaffirmed and ways and means for their practical intertwined impacts be identified and actions to that end be adopted.

Mr. Chairman,
I have to warn that the extension of full nuclear cooperation to non-parties, exemption from strict export regulations of nuclear material and technology, such as NSG, which is an indication of admiration for non-adherence to the NPT, is a crystal clear non-compliance of the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty by western countries specifically the US and the EU. In the meantime their hostile policy turning the NPT forum into a battlefield against parties to
NPT, as we normally witnessed, are clear evidences of double standard policy, lack of any valuable principle. The last but not the least the instrumental use of Board of Governor of the IAEA and the United Nations Security Council, followed by political pressures and sanctions against parties to the NPT have serious consequences for the integrity and universality of the NPT, a spectrum from discouragement to withdrawal. The 2015 Review Conference has to deal with such serious threats to the Treaty and to address the non-compliances of western countries, with provision of non-proliferation.

Mr. Chairman,

In conclusion, on behalf of my Government, I declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to NPT and the comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/214) and considers the IAEA, as the sole competent authority in verifying nuclear activities of the states parties to the NPT. Iran already discouraged the US and couple of other western countries, miscalculating by anticipation, perhaps hopes, that Iran will withdraw the NPT after the involvement of the UN Security Council and imposing sanctions. The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to principles which prevented it from retaliating Saddam by chemical weapons despite losing thousands of love ones as chemical weapon victims.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be active party to NPT and member state of the IAEA is fully determined to challenge violations by specifically few western countries, remedy the treaty shortcomings, and put both the IAEA and the NPT back in right track.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.