Mr. Chair,

The primary objective for all state parties to the NPT must be to ensure the realization of its goals and its full implementation. In our previous interventions in this meeting, we have pointed out that the humanitarian impact of nuclear detonations should motivate the full implementation of the NPT agenda and the 2010 Action Plan. Thus, the relevance of the humanitarian perspective is not limited to disarmament, but is of course equally relevant in issues pertaining to non-proliferation, nuclear security and nuclear safety.

Today, it is fair to say that the NPT is under strain, with pressing proliferation concerns related to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Norway urges these countries to heed the calls by the international community, expressed through the UN Security Council and the IAEA, and fully comply with their obligations. We strongly condemn the recent missile launch and nuclear test undertaken by the DPRK, in direct violation of several Security Council resolutions and accompanied by reckless threats to use nuclear weapons. Aggressive acts such as these are not in the interest of the DPRK or in the interest of the North Korean people. It constitutes grave challenges of the norm established by the CTBT and of the non-proliferation regime itself. We urge the DPRK to not take further provocative and destabilizing actions and to comply with all its international obligations including the most recent SCR 2094, adopted unanimously the 7th of March.

In relation to Iran’s nuclear programme, we note that Iran has still not made it possible for the IAEA to state that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only, in spite of numerous efforts by the IAEA to have the outstanding issues in this regard clarified. Iran has also continued its enrichment and
reprocessing activities, being in breach with its international obligations, including Security Council resolution 1696. The right to *peaceful* use of nuclear technology is clearly recognized by Norway. However, the continued lack of progress on issues related to possible military uses are of very serious concern. The IAEA and the Security Council are tasked to verify that peaceful uses are precisely that. We therefore sincerely hope that the meeting scheduled for May 15th between the IAEA and Iran, will finally enable us to see a way forward towards a solution to the outstanding issues between Iran and the international community in this field.

Mr Chair,

Safeguards should continue to be at the centre of our efforts in the pursuit of an efficient non-proliferation architecture. Safeguards are essential to ensure that all nuclear activities are devoted to peaceful activities only.

Norway reaffirms that the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol constitute the verification norm. Indeed, it is high time that we fully universalise these instruments. Great progress has been made in this regard in recent years. 119 countries now have in force the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. But we are not quite there. 13 countries do not even have in place a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Norway remains convinced that it is in the interest of every country to conclude safeguards agreements, including an Additional Protocol, also because it will make them better positioned to take part in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

We would also use this opportunity to express our support to the evolution of safeguards implementation to a State level concept, based on the consideration of all credible and safeguards relevant information about a State. In our view, this would ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the face of the ever-increasing quantities of nuclear material that needs to be safeguarded. We want the IAEA
to work, and we want it to spend its time and resources in the manner that best serves the purposes of the agency, in the interest of us all.

Mr Chair,

We need to continue working on the nuclear security agenda. Our achievements, as well as the work still to be done, were highlighted at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul last year, giving new political impetus to our efforts in this regard.

Norway has for some years advocated that minimising the use of highly enriched uranium will strengthen our overall non-proliferation efforts, not least in preventing non-state actors from acquiring material which may be used in a crude nuclear device.

We are convinced that it is possible from both a technological and financial perspective to convert most of existing nuclear installations to use low enriched uranium. Indeed, very many civilian research reactors have already been converted from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as fuel.

We should utilize this momentum. We would suggest looking more actively into nuclear fuel cycle approaches with a view to finding solutions which accommodate our non-proliferation concerns, while at the same time facilitating peaceful uses. Enhanced multilateral fuel cycle cooperation would serve all pillars of the NPT.

Mr Chair,

Today, there is growing recognition all over the world that global security and non-proliferation would be enhanced by the elimination of nuclear weapons – and by a comprehensive ban on testing them. Recent developments have reminded us all too clearly about this necessity. Although the CTBT has not
formally entered into force, it has already established a fundamental norm of non-testing. Yet, a test moratorium can never be a substitute for a comprehensive, universally binding legal agreement. Norway urges those States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so without further delay, in particular the eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 to the CTBT.

Export control regimes and mechanisms are another important area to promote the global non-proliferation norm. That is the intention of the NSG and the Zangger Committee. Norway calls on all states parties to adopt and enforce adequate national export control legislation, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

The existing regional nuclear weapons free zones are important contributors to effective non-proliferation, and efforts to expand existing zones and promote the establishment of new ones should be intensified. Norway reiterates its support to the work done towards establishing a zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. We express our sincere hope that the current obstacles be overcome and progress made towards this end.

Mr. Chair,

As a member of the Vienna Group of 10 countries I would also like to take this opportunity to highlight the three working papers submitted by the Group relating to cluster II, on the topics CTBT, Verification and Compliance, and Export controls.

Thank you