Mr. Chairman,

The Non-proliferation pillar of the treaty, and in particular the IAEA safeguards system has been challenged frequently in the past and continue, in some cases, to fail to provide the required assurance on the exclusive peaceful nature of nuclear activities in some states.

There is no question that States developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses should fully adhere to comprehensive safeguards obligations; fully cooperate with the IAEA; and take required steps to fully address all international concerns and obligations including those of relevant IAEA and UNSC resolutions.

The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is designed to provide a credible assurance of the peaceful nature of all declared activities. However without bringing in force an Additional Protocol, the issue of possible undeclared activities is not addressed. Therefore it is essential to enhance the assertions provided by the Safeguards Agreement through utilizing the tools supplied by the Additional Protocol.

Implementing an Additional Protocol as an integral part of the safeguards system, will provide the confidence in the exclusive peaceful nature of national nuclear activities both declared and undeclared and will facilitate the full support and confidence of the international community. We welcome the increase in number of states that have implemented an AP, reaching 119 states, a substantive progress since 2010 NPT RevCon. However there are still a number of states that have not signed or brought into force an AP. We urge all states that have not yet concluded an AP with the IAEA to do so as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman,

It is regrettable that the IAEA, after years of efforts, has not been able to report any substantive progress on addressing outstanding issues including those related to the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear programme.

The international community has stressed that it is essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all outstanding issues concerning its nuclear program and to exclude the existence of a possible military dimension. This was affirmed by multiple resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council, which called on Iran to take the required steps by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, personnel and documents requested by the Agency.

The lack of substantive progress, and the absence of any agreement on an approach to address all outstanding issues is a matter of a serious concern, and constitute a great challenge to the NPT non-proliferation pillar in general and SG system in particular.

Concrete results are needed to build confidence in the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We are concerned that the lack of progress can have an adverse effect. An effect that instead of building mutual confidence and trust can raise uncertainty and elevate concerns.

We therefore continue to call on Iran to fully address the Agency's serious concerns regarding the possible military dimension, and to engage with the Agency substantively on all outstanding issues. We encourage Iran to spare no effort in building confidence in its nuclear activities, and to work closely with the IAEA to achieve such objective.

We further encourage all parties involved to seek a solution within the context of international law, diplomacy and dialogue. We regard this as the only way for a long-term solution to Iran's nuclear issue. The UAE further encourages all Member States to contribute positively to that effect.

Mr. Chairman,

Given the importance of non-proliferation pillar to the objective of the treaty, it is imperative that the NPT review process addresses such challenges, including non-compliance issues. States should fulfill their international obligations and fully address the international concerns. Safeguards system credibility must be maintained and strengthened in line with the of NPT objectives.