Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. As recognized in the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as in the action plan agreed upon at the 2010 Review Conference, increased transparency is an important precondition for further progress in nuclear disarmament.

2. As a part of its efforts to promote the implementation of the 2010 action plan, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted to the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference a working paper entitled “Transparency of Nuclear Weapons: the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative”. The working paper contained a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form with specific items on which the nuclear-weapon States could provide information, including the quantity, types and status of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems, the quantity of fissile material produced for military purposes in the past as well as presently, and the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. The aim of this proposal was to provide the nuclear-weapon States with a template with which to implement action 21.

3. Noting the call in action 5 for the nuclear-weapon States to report on their nuclear disarmament undertakings at the 2014 Preparatory Committee meetings, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative is submitting the present working paper to make four specific recommendations on this important subject.

Three principles of nuclear disarmament

4. Action 2 of the 2010 action plan acknowledged the three principles of nuclear disarmament, namely, irreversibility, verifiability and transparency. The principle of transparency underpins the other two principles. Without transparency, nuclear
disarmament cannot be verified, nor would States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have complete confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an irreversible manner.

**Reporting and transparency**

5. Reporting is a practical and effective tool to achieve greater transparency. Reporting has been a method for strengthening accountability since the Preparatory Committee for the 1985 Review Conference first invited the nuclear-weapon States to “provide information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty, including especially article VI”, as mentioned in the Final Document of the 1985 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/I). A number of transparency efforts exist in other forums, for example, the 1998 IAEA Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549).

6. “Information” provided by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, where the issue of the extension of the Treaty was discussed and agreed upon, was quite significant in terms of its scope and contents. However, after the 1995 Conference, even though “regular reporting” on the implementation of article VI was included as one of the 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference, the actual reporting by the nuclear-weapon States has been sporadic and informal. Against this backdrop, the 2010 Review Conference agreed upon the need for a standard reporting form.

7. The 2010 action plan refers to reporting on three occasions. However, the relationship between the three references requires further clarification.

**Strengthening the review process and transparency**

8. Strengthening the review process was first agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as an integral part of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The essential significance of this issue was that it ensured, among other things, accountability, in particular of nuclear-weapon States, in exchange for indefinitely extending the Treaty.

9. Reporting is an effective instrument both for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities and for greater accountability as a part of the strengthened review process. Indeed, “regular reports” were agreed upon at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences “within the framework of the strengthened review process”, which demonstrates the relationship between reporting and strengthening the review process.

10. Action 20 calls for “regular reports” not just by the nuclear-weapon States, but by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and not just on nuclear disarmament, but on all three pillars of the Treaty. However, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative re-emphasizes the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to report on their nuclear disarmament activities and the fulfilment of their obligations and commitments under the Treaty.

11. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recommends that the 2015 Review Conference:

   (a) In relation to three principles of nuclear disarmament, reiterate the importance of the realization of nuclear disarmament measures under strict
observance of the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility. The 2015 Review Conference should also recognize that the principle of transparency underpins the principles of verification and irreversibility;

(b) In relation to reporting, call on the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form, as recommended under action 21 of the action plan of 2010, and to utilize the form in implementing action 20 (regular reports) and action 5 (reporting on nuclear disarmament efforts at the 2014 Preparatory Committee);

(c) In relation to strengthening the review process, highlight the relationship between increased transparency through regular reporting utilizing a standard reporting form and the objective of accountability that is at the core of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process. In this context of a strengthened review process, the 2015 Review Conference should urge the nuclear-weapon States to make regular reports, as an important confidence-building measure, for instance, annually, on their nuclear disarmament activities, utilizing a standard reporting form, and to continuously work to improve the quantity and quality of information provided in the agreed standard form during the 2020 review cycle;

(d) Call upon all States parties, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, to submit regular reports on their fulfilment of their obligations and commitments under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.