Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

14 March 2014

Original: English

Third session
New York, 28 April-9 May 2014

Addressing “Vienna issues”: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; compliance and verification; export controls; cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety; and nuclear security

Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)

1. The Vienna Group of Ten reconfirms its full commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and fundamentally contributes to international peace and security. The Vienna Group of Ten places great importance on the universalization of the Treaty, and encourages all States that have not acceded to the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

2. This working paper on the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty is designed to bring the so-called Vienna issues — the peaceful issues of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, security and safeguards, export controls and nuclear testing — into focus for participants at the 2014 Preparatory Committee and aims to ensure that these issues are given appropriate weight at the 2015 Review Conference. It begins with an overview of the key issues in the order they are set out in the 2010 Review Conference outcomes document, submits a series of proposals for the Preparatory Committee’s consideration, and provides more detailed analysis of the issues in annexes I to VI.

3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty plays a unique role in providing a framework that fosters international confidence and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. By aiming to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, technology and facilities do not contribute to nuclear proliferation, the Treaty creates the necessary basis for technological transfer and cooperation.

4. Following the success of the 2010 Review Conference, progress has been made, but much work remains to be done to take its 64-point action plan forward.
Slow progress on the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, the lack of universality and a number of pressing non-compliance challenges have had the net effect of undermining confidence in the Treaty itself.

5. The three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remain equally important and mutually reinforcing. The Vienna Group of Ten calls on all States, including those outside the Treaty, to redouble their efforts towards the fundamental goals of the Treaty, including full and irreversible disarmament.

6. The Vienna Group of Ten reaffirms the pivotal role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a verifiable ban on nuclear test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. Even before the Treaty has entered into force, it has established a significant norm against testing and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization plays a valuable role in monitoring that States are not conducting nuclear tests, including through its network of monitoring stations. By building confidence, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes a core element of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and is vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Vienna Group of Ten strongly encourages all States yet to do so to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, in particular the eight remaining Annex 2 States, and to recognize the value of the Treaty for regional and international security.

7. The Vienna Group of Ten stresses that full confidence in the peaceful nature of State nuclear programmes requires all States parties to apply both a comprehensive safeguards agreement as well as an additional protocol, to submit all relevant materials and activities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, to cooperate fully with IAEA to address all safeguards issues in a timely and appropriate manner in order to validate the correctness and completeness of their declarations, and to provide early design information on all planned nuclear facilities. In order for IAEA to effectively and efficiently implement safeguards, the Vienna Group of Ten welcomes the continuing progress being made on the conceptualization of the State-level concept and encourages all member States to support this important advancement in the application of safeguards.

8. The Vienna Group of Ten underlines the responsibility that all States parties have to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Effective export controls are also central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence regarding non-proliferation. The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, represents the current verification standard pursuant to article III.1 of the Treaty. This verification standard should be a condition for new supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States.

9. The Vienna Group of Ten notes the numerous peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including in areas such as human health, water management, agriculture, food security and nutrition, energy and environmental protection. All States parties have a right to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. IAEA plays an essential role in this regard, helping member States use nuclear techniques, where they offer an advantage over conventional methods, to address important development challenges, supporting the development of
instruments, standards and codes of conduct to minimize harmful effects, as well as by helping States parties improve their scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities.

10. The Vienna Group of Ten recognizes the right for any State to decide upon its own energy policy, but emphasizes that safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle is a prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that continuous efforts are needed to prevent complacency and ensure that all elements of safety culture are maintained at the optimal level. The Group reinforces the importance of ongoing international efforts to improve the global nuclear safety regime, including adherence to and development of the necessary non-binding and legally binding instruments, and the robust implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. In this regard, the Group notes the central and ongoing role of IAEA in the sharing and applying the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and the importance of States continuing to take active steps to fulfil the actions contained in the Plan as a matter of priority and to help identify where it can be further strengthened.

11. The Vienna Group of Ten recalls that article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology. This relates not only to diversion risks at the State level, but also to the risk that individuals or subnational groups gain uncontrolled access to nuclear material, equipment and technology. Physical protection and measures to combat illicit trafficking are fundamental parts of a national nuclear security regime. The existence of an effective and sustainable national nuclear security regime should be a precondition for the transfer of nuclear material, sensitive equipment and technology.

**Proposals to the Preparatory Committee**

12. The Vienna Group of Ten therefore proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference.

13. **On the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**, that the Review Conference:

   (a) *Affirm* that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and constitutes a core element of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime;

   (b) *Underline* that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost urgency as it provides the global community a permanent, non-discriminatory, and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions;

   (c) *Urge* all States that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular those remaining eight Annex 2 States necessary for the Treaty’s entry into force;

   (d) *Urge* all States to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, pending its entry into force;
(e) **Recognize** that the continued development of the Treaty’s verification regime is vital to the effectiveness of the Treaty and to maintaining the norm that existing signatures and ratifications establish against nuclear testing; and

(f) **Urge** State Signatories to support the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat to ensure that the technical aspects of the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization continue to move ahead so the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at its entry into force and to sustain political progress towards entry into force.

14. **On compliance and verification,** that the Review Conference:

   (a) **Underline** the importance of building and maintaining confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States;

   (b) **Call** on all States to submit all relevant materials and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards;

   (c) **Call** for the universal application of IAEA safeguards by all States parties, and urge those States parties that have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement;

   (d) **Recognize** the Additional Protocol as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, affirm that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, represents the verification standard pursuant to article III(1) of the Treaty, and urge all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible;

   (e) **Urge** all States to cooperate fully with IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies, and questions identified by IAEA to inform annual safeguards conclusions with respect to the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations;

   (f) **Note** that, in order to draw well-founded safeguards conclusions, IAEA needs to receive early design information, in accordance with the 1992 decision of the IAEA Board of Governors (IAEA document GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev.2), and stress the need for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to provide this information to the Agency on a timely basis; and

   (g) **Welcome** the important work being undertaken by IAEA in the conceptualization of the State-level concept and the further implementation of State-level approaches to additional States parties in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

15. **On export controls,** that the Review Conference:

   (a) **Reaffirm** that all States parties are responsible for ensuring their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty;

   (b) **Urge** all States to apply in their export control regimes the Understandings of the Zangger Committee, which are designed to implement the obligations under article III of the Treaty, and make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings;
(c) **Stress** that effective export controls are central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(d) **Reaffirm** that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, should be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices;

(e) **Welcome** the increasing adherence to export controls, encourage further progress in this regard, and call on all States parties to examine opportunities offered by the increasing adherence to export controls with a view to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime;

(f) **Reaffirm** that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, and urge all States to require an additional protocol based on the model INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) as a condition for new supply arrangements.

16. **On cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy**, that the Review Conference:

   (a) **Recognize** the benefits that can be obtained from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques and acknowledge the right of all States parties to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty;

   (b) **Stress** that adherence to, and compliance with, the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty is a precondition for cooperation in this field, and that the use of nuclear energy must also be accompanied by adherence to the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle; and

   (c) **Underline** the essential role of IAEA in assisting developing States parties in engaging in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques, including through the further development of instruments, standards and codes of conduct to ensure human safety and environmental protection.

17. **On nuclear safety**, that the Review Conference:

   (a) **Emphasize** the importance for States and international organizations to continue to take active steps to enhance safety measures for all fuel cycle activities;

   (b) **Underline** the central role of IAEA in enhancing the global nuclear safety regime, and in sharing and encouraging the application of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and emphasize the importance of States continuing to take active steps to fulfil the actions contained in the Nuclear Safety Action Plan as a matter of priority and to identify further scope for enhancing nuclear safety;

   (c) **Emphasize** the need for States embarking on nuclear energy programmes to develop an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure to ensure safety and security for all fuel cycle activities in line with international standards, guidelines and recommendations at a very early stage of the process; and
(d) Emphasize the importance for all States, in particular those with nuclear fuel cycle activities, to become parties to all conventions and agreements relevant to safety and support the further development as necessary of legally binding instruments to ensure a better global safety and security framework.

18. On nuclear security, that the Review Conference:

(a) Underline the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection;

(b) Call for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response;

(c) Urge States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible;

(d) Underline the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and urge all States to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible;

(e) Note with serious concern the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, equipment and technology;

(f) Recognize the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts on improving existing control and cooperation mechanisms, including through membership of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database;

(g) Encourage States concerned to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and to further minimize their use, including by converting radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets and other non-highly enriched uranium technologies, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes; and

(h) Welcome other initiatives, such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and encourage participating States to effectively follow-up their outcomes.
Annex I

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

   (a) **Affirm** that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and constitutes a core element of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime;

   (b) **Underline** that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of the utmost urgency as it provides the global community a permanent, non-discriminatory, and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions;

   (c) **Urge** all States that have not yet to done so to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, in particular those remaining eight Annex 2 States necessary for the Treaty’s entry into force;

   (d) **Urge** all States to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force;

   (e) **Recognize** that the continued development of the Treaty’s verification regime is vital to the effectiveness of the Treaty and to maintaining the norm that existing signatures and ratifications establish against nuclear testing; and

   (f) **Urge** State Signatories to support the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat to ensure that the technical aspects of the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization continue to move ahead so the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the treaty at its entry into force and to sustain political progress towards entry into force.

2. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was an integral part of the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Once in effect, it will provide the global community a permanent, non-discriminatory, and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions. It constrains the development of nuclear weapons and their qualitative improvement, which combats both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. The provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted in this light.

3. Almost two decades after it was opened for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has yet to enter into force. There has been progress in ratification and there are continued efforts to that end: the Treaty has now been signed by 183 States, of which 162 have ratified, including 36 whose ratification is necessary for entry into force. Recalling the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, including the 2010 action plan, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains of the utmost urgency.

4. Pending the Treaty’s entry into force, States should refrain from any action that would defeat its object and purpose. Development of new types of nuclear weapons, for example, may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions and any
other nuclear explosions must be maintained, but such moratoriums cannot serve as a substitute for ratifying the Treaty.

5. The eighth Article XIV Conference, held in September 2013 in New York, confirmed the continuing commitment of the international community to the Treaty and highlighted the importance of its earliest possible entry into force. The Ministerial Conference on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to be held in New York in September 2014, provides an opportunity to reaffirm strong political support for the early entry into force of the Treaty.

6. The nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009 and 2013, which were detected by the Treaty’s verification system and internationally condemned, undermine the international non-proliferation regimes and the object and purpose of the Treaty. These events further underlined the need for a universal and effective international monitoring and verification system for detecting nuclear explosions and highlight the importance of bringing the Treaty into force as soon as possible.

7. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is making progress building the system to verify compliance with the Treaty at its entry into force. The goal of this work should be an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach. All major components of the verification system, including the capability to conduct an on-site inspection, should be ready to meet the verification requirements of the Treaty by the time of its entry into force. An integrated field exercise, to be held later in 2014 in Jordan, should help develop, test and refine the procedures and tools to conduct on-site inspections, as well as provide inspectors with hands-on experience.

8. In order to enable the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission to complete its mandate, State Signatories should provide adequate resources and political support, as well as relevant expertise, and make every effort to ensure the technical aspects of its work sustain progress towards entry into force.

9. Widespread advocacy, outreach and capacity-building have the potential to support further ratifications of the Treaty. States that have recently ratified have a unique ability to engage countries yet to ratify, by sharing their experiences of ratification. The recently established Group of Eminent Persons also contributes to this process.

10. Extensive training courses in the framework of the Capacity Development Initiative as well as the Pilot Project have brought relevant experts from developing countries to technical meetings. These capacity-building activities contribute to enhanced awareness of the Treaty, help enable State Signatories to fulfil their verification responsibilities and address possible technical, scientific and legal challenges.

11. Data from the international monitoring and verification system should continue to be used for civil and scientific purposes, especially in the context of natural disasters and other emergency situations. There has recently been enhanced cooperation with other international organizations in this regard.
Annex II

Compliance and verification

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On compliance and verification, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

(a) Underline the importance of building and maintaining confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States;

(b) Call on all States to submit all relevant materials and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards;

(c) Call for the universal application of IAEA safeguards by all States parties and urge those States parties that have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement;

(d) Recognize the Additional Protocol as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, affirm that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, represents the verification standard pursuant to article III(1) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and urge all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible;

(e) Urge all States to cooperate fully with IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies, and questions identified by IAEA to inform annual safeguards conclusions with respect to the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations;

(f) Note that, in order to draw well-founded safeguards conclusions, IAEA needs to receive early design information, in accordance with the 1992 decision of the IAEA Board of Governors (IAEA document GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev.2), and stress the need for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to provide this information to the Agency on a timely basis; and

(g) Welcome the important work being undertaken by IAEA in the conceptualization of the State-level concept and the further implementation of State-level approaches to additional States parties in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

2. Full compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty, including with relevant safeguards agreements and subsidiary arrangements, remains fundamentally important. The integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty depends upon full respect for the set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights of States parties conferred by the Treaty.

3. Article III(1) of the Treaty requires each non-nuclear-weapons State party to accept safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. A State’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, based on document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), embodies the obligation that the State account for and control all nuclear material subject to safeguards and provide the required design information and reports to IAEA. The Agency, as the competent authority designated under article III to apply safeguards, verifies the correctness and completeness of a State’s declarations with a view to providing assurances of the
non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

4. While a comprehensive safeguards agreement is essential in providing measures for verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, such measures alone are not sufficient for the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It is therefore necessary for a comprehensive safeguards agreement to be complemented by an additional protocol based on document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). The implementation of an additional protocol provides increased confidence about a State’s compliance with article II of the Treaty. The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, represents the current verification standard pursuant to article III.1 of the Treaty.

5. States parties which have not yet done so should conclude and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements without further delay; all States should submit all nuclear material and activities, both current and future, to IAEA safeguards; and States parties which have not yet done so should conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible and implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

6. Annual safeguards conclusions drawn by IAEA are of critical importance to assess States’ compliance with their related obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States should cooperate fully with IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies and questions identified by IAEA with a view to obtaining and maintaining the required conclusions. The full use of all tools at the Agency’s disposal for resolution of safeguards issues, including special inspections when deemed necessary, remains important.

7. Despite the widespread implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, 12 States have yet to fulfil their respective obligation under the Treaty. One hundred and forty-three States have signed additional protocols, and such protocols are in force for 122 States. Thus, a majority of States have accepted the verification standard. The comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol together allow for the application of integrated safeguards. States that have brought into force an additional protocol fully benefit from the increased efficiency under integrated safeguards as IAEA is able to draw a broader safeguards conclusion.

8. IAEA safeguards are fundamental to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty reaffirmed IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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*a* Current as at 31 December 2013.
9. Any State party that does not comply with its obligations under the Treaty isolates itself through its own actions from the benefits of constructive international relationships and from the benefits accruing from adherence to the Treaty, including from cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, until it enters into full compliance. The Group calls on those States that are currently non-compliant — Iran, Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.

10. In order to draw well-founded safeguards conclusions, IAEA needs to receive early design information in accordance with the IAEA Board of Governors’ 1992 decision, in GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev. 2, to determine, whenever appropriate, the status of any nuclear facilities and to verify, on an ongoing basis, that all nuclear material in non-nuclear-weapon States is placed under safeguards. All non-nuclear-weapon States parties must provide this information to the Agency on a timely basis.

11. States should undertake early consultations with the Agency early in the design process to ensure that safeguards-relevant aspects relating to new nuclear facilities are taken into consideration in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation, from their initial planning stage through design, construction, operation and decommissioning.

12. The 1995 and 2010 Review Conferences confirmed that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

13. The State-level concept being implemented by IAEA represents a move towards a more effective and efficient safeguards systems that adheres fully to the principles of non-discriminatory, technical, objectives-based safeguards implementation.
Addendum

Non-compliance challenges to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

a. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear weapons programme remains a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and beyond. Resolution GC(57)/RES/14 of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its fifty-seventh session highlighted serious concerns related to implementation of IAEA safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

b. The nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006, 2009, and 2013 demonstrate the urgent need for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to allow for the return of IAEA inspectors and the reintroduction of IAEA safeguards. The latest nuclear test highlights the important role that the Agency needs to play in resolving the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula.

c. Implementation of the E3/EU+3/Iran Joint Plan of Action is welcome and represents an important first step in verifying the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The recently concluded IAEA-Iran Framework for Cooperation is also a positive step. Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency to address all past outstanding issues regarding its nuclear programme. The establishment of confidence in Iran’s nuclear programme requires not only assurances of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but equally importantly, of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This can only be accomplished through Iran’s full and transparent cooperation with IAEA.

d. In this context, serious concerns remain regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, including the 2005 finding of the Board of Governors of Iran’s non-compliance with its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement, numerous subsequent resolutions of the Board of Governors, and the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear programme found in the annex to the Director General’s November 2011 report.

e. The finding by the IAEA Board of Governors (resolution GOV/2011/36 of June 2011) that, based on the report of the Director General, the destroyed building at Dair Alzour was very likely a nuclear reactor and should have been declared by Syria, remains of concern. Failure to provide design information for the facility in accordance with Code 3.1 of Syria’s subsidiary arrangements remain breaches of articles 41 and 42 of Syria’s Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement, and constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency in the context of article XII.C of the Agency’s statute. Syria must remedy its non-compliance as soon as possible in order to verify the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
Annex III

Export controls

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On export controls, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

   (a) **Reaffirm** that all States parties are responsible for ensuring that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

   (b) **Urge** all States to apply in their export control regimes the understandings of the Zangger Committee, which are designed to implement the obligations under article III of the Treaty, and make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings;

   (c) **Stress** that effective export controls are central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

   (d) **Reaffirm** that the list of items triggering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, should be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices;

   (e) **Welcome** the increasing adherence to export controls, encourage further progress in this regard and call on all States parties to examine opportunities offered by the increasing adherence to export controls with a view to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime;

   (f) **Reaffirm** that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, and urge all States to require an additional protocol based on the model INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) as a condition for new supply arrangements.

2. Export controls aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field, under article IV of the Treaty, is not hindered unduly in the process. Nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty, in order not to contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or acts of nuclear terrorism.

3. The existence of extensive covert networks related to the procurement and the supply of sensitive nuclear equipment and technology underline the need for all States to exercise vigilance in countering proliferation, including through their nuclear export controls.
4. There is a clear relationship between the non-proliferation obligations as set out in articles I, II and III and the objectives with regard to peaceful uses as set out in article IV of the Treaty. Nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Recipient States have an obligation to exercise appropriately stringent controls to prevent proliferation.

5. A number of States parties meet regularly in an informal group known as the Zangger Committee, in order to coordinate their implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, related to the supply of nuclear material and equipment. To this end, these States parties have adopted certain understandings, including a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards, for their exports to States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209, as amended. The Committee’s understandings also relate to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty insofar as the recipient State should recognize the items on the trigger list, as well as the procedures and criteria under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty as a basis for its own export control decisions, including re-exports. The Committee provides important guidance to State parties in meeting their obligation under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

6. A number of States parties have informed IAEA that they cooperate on a voluntary basis through guidelines for their nuclear-related exports (INFCIRC/254, as amended). The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines play an important and useful role in the development of national export control policies and contribute to the international non-proliferation regime.

7. The list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, should be reviewed from time to time so as to take into account advances in technology, proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices. In this context, the completion of the fundamental review of the control lists by the Nuclear Suppliers Group is a welcome development.

8. In September 2008, a number of States parties, participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, granted an India-specific exception to the full-scope safeguards requirement in the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s export control guidelines, based on certain non-proliferation commitments and actions of India (IAEA document INFCIRC/734). India must continue to honour these commitments in full, noting that Governments participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group have agreed to consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of all aspects of the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

9. Guidelines from export control regimes are finding increasing acceptance and application by national authorities and the number of States participating in these regimes continues to grow. All States parties should consider the opportunities offered by the increasing adherence to export controls with a view to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

10. Notwithstanding the 2008 decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the principle that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to non-nuclear-weapon
States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains important. Those supplier States that have not yet done so should require the fulfilment of such conditions without delay.

11. Since all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a legal obligation under article III to accept safeguards stipulated under the Treaty, and a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represents the current verification standard for Treaty safeguards, this verification standard should be a condition for new supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Additional Protocol contains important provisions related to reporting to IAEA on the export and import of nuclear-related equipment.

12. Article III of the Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology. This relates to diversion not only at the State level, but also to individuals or subnational groups. Transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology should take place only if the recipient State has in place an effective and adequate national regime of nuclear security. This regime comprises Treaty-related IAEA safeguards, an adequate system of physical protection, a minimum set of measures to combat illicit trafficking, and rules and regulations for appropriate export controls in case of re-transfers.

13. While the responsibility for establishing and implementing such a regime rests with the concerned State, supplying States parties have the responsibility to seek assurance that such a regime is in place in the recipient State as a necessary precondition for their receiving nuclear supplies.
Annex IV

Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is recommended that the Review Group:

   (a) **Recognize** the benefits that can be obtained from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques and acknowledge the right of all States parties to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

   (b) **Stress** that adherence to, and compliance with, the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty is a preconditions for cooperation in this field, and that the use of nuclear energy must also be accompanied by adherence to the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle; and

   (c) **Underline** the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in assisting developing States parties in engaging in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques, including through the further development of instruments, standards and codes of conduct to ensure human safety and environmental protection.

2. For the purposes of article IV of the Treaty, “nuclear energy” embraces both power and non-power applications. All States parties to the Treaty have an inalienable right to undertake research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. States parties may choose individually not to exercise all their rights, or to exercise those rights collectively.

3. All States parties to the Treaty have undertaken to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe and secure environment.

4. Nuclear applications play an essential role in areas such as human health, water management, agriculture, food safety and nutrition, energy and environmental protection. Nuclear applications make a considerable contribution to advancing the Millennium Development Goals and the IAEA technical cooperation programme plays an important role in this regard. The IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative is a flexible and efficient instrument that provides additional, extrabudgetary contributions to this programme.

5. IAEA plays an essential role assisting States party in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the development of programmes aimed at improving their scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities. The Vienna Group welcomes the Agency’s efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes. Close cooperation with other States parties and international organizations, notably of the United Nations system, facilitates synergies and minimizes overlap.

6. The IAEA medium-term strategy is important for technical cooperation through model project standards and expanded use of country programme
commitment as a prerequisite for such cooperation. IAEA should continue taking this objective, and the needs of developing countries, notably least developed countries, and the Millennium Development Goals into account when planning its future activities.

7. When developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, it remains important to ensure that the use of nuclear energy is accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Instruments, standards and codes of conduct developed within the framework of IAEA to prevent and/or mitigate harmful effects on human safety and the environment are of great importance in this regard. When developing nuclear energy, it remains important to ensure that the technical and regulatory infrastructure, a skilled workforce, as well as a legislative framework and regulatory bodies, are in place.
Annex V

Nuclear safety

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On nuclear safety, it is recommended that Review Conference:

   (a) *Emphasize* the importance for States and international organizations to continue to take active steps to enhance safety measures for all fuel cycle activities;

   (b) *Underline* the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in enhancing the global nuclear safety regime, and in sharing and encouraging the application of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and emphasize the importance of States continuing to take active steps to fulfil the actions contained in the Nuclear Security Action Plan as a matter of priority and to identify further scope for enhancing nuclear safety;

   (c) *Emphasize* the need for States embarking on nuclear energy programmes to develop an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure to ensure safety and security for all fuel cycle activities in line with international standards, guidelines and recommendations at a very early stage of the process; and

   (d) *Emphasize* the importance for all States, in particular those with nuclear fuel cycle activities, to become parties to all conventions and agreements relevant to safety and support the further development as necessary of legally binding instruments to ensure a better global safety and security framework.

2. Safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle is a prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Continuous efforts are needed to prevent complacency and ensure that all elements of safety culture are maintained at the optimal level. Although primary responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations rests with individual States, international cooperation is vital for the exchange of knowledge and learning from best practices.

3. IAEA activities directed towards strengthening nuclear safety are crucial, including in operating power and research reactors and recognizing that ongoing challenges for safety include the ageing of facilities.

4. The international community strengthened its focus on nuclear safety following the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, including through the Declaration adopted by the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June 2011, the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security hosted by the Secretary-General in September 2011 and the subsequent Nuclear Safety Action Plan endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in 2011.

5. The strength of the Action Plan will be in its robust implementation, including prioritization, as new lessons are learned and weaknesses are identified. IAEA has a central role to play in implementation of the Plan, including through its ongoing initiatives, including international expert meetings, safety assessments and peer review service missions. All States with nuclear facilities should host IAEA review missions on a regular basis, as provided for in the Plan. Further steps to increase States’ commitment to these missions, for example by agreeing on a mandatory periodicity of peer reviews, would be welcome.
6. Nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies, and acts with malicious intent associated with nuclear and radiological terrorism, may lead to significant radiological consequences over wide geographical areas, generate a pressing need for authoritative information to address public and media concerns, and require an effective international response.

7. The IAEA Safety Standards Commission and Committees continues to prepare internationally recognized safety fundamentals, requirements and guides. The IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles continue to provide a unified conceptual basis for the ongoing development of safety standards.

8. Adequate and independent national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure is of crucial importance, and challenges remain with regard to the availability of well-trained staff. Therefore sustainable programmes for education and training are of fundamental importance, and technical cooperation and assistance play an important role in developing national infrastructure.

9. The Convention on Nuclear Safety remains of central importance and States operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors, or considering a nuclear power programme, should become a party. The voluntary application of the relevant provisions of the Convention to other nuclear installations dedicated to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is important. The Sixth Review Meeting of the Parties to the Convention, to be held in 2014, provides a timely opportunity to consider its operation. The working group on “effectiveness and transparency” has provided useful input.

10. The IAEA secretariat’s implementation of the Plan of Activities on the Radiation Protection of the Environment remains important. There should be further cooperation between IAEA and relevant international organizations and stakeholders in promoting a coherent international policy regarding the radiological protection of the environment.

11. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) continues to provide a valuable contribution by assessing and reporting levels and effects of exposure to ionizing radiation, including its full assessment on the consequences to humans and the environment as a result of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. Many States parties rely on estimates from UNSCEAR as the scientific basis for evaluating radiation risk and for establishing protective measures.

12. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources remains important, as does the comprehensive Action Plan for its implementation subsequently adopted by the Board. The Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources also remains important, as demonstrated by the IAEA General Conference’s encouragement for States to act in accordance with the Guidance on a harmonized basis. All States parties should make political commitments to the Code and the Guidance and subsequently implement them.

13. All States parties should become parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and should actively step up efforts to develop and implement disposal and long-term storage solutions for spent fuel and radioactive waste. IAEA continues to conduct valuable efforts in waste management.
14. Remediating the various nuclear legacy challenges remains important, as recognized by the establishment of an international working forum for the regulatory supervision of legacy contaminated sites. The Agency should continue facilitating ongoing international efforts in this regard.

15. All States that have not yet done so should take the steps necessary to become parties to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The Seventh Meeting of the Representatives of Competent Authorities identified under the joint conventions are due to be held in Vienna in 2014. There remains a need to strengthen the implementation of the conventions and work for amending their review mechanisms, where appropriate.

16. The recommendations and conclusions of the IAEA Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies provide valuable guidance. This should be supported by continued efforts by the IAEA secretariat and member States to implement the strategy outlined in the final report of that Plan, particularly in the light of the nuclear accident at Fukushima. The IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre serves as the Agency’s focal point for responding to nuclear or radiological incidents and emergencies and for promoting improvement in emergency response and preparedness.

17. International cooperation to enhance the safety of international navigation, while respecting maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms, as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments, remains important. It is in the interests of all States that maritime and other transportation of radioactive materials be conducted in compliance with international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and that States have under international law the obligation to protect and preserve the maritime environment.

18. Concerns about a potential accident or incident during the transport of radioactive materials remain. The practice of some shipping States and operators of providing, in a timely manner, information and responses to relevant coastal States in advance of shipments of radioactive materials for the purpose of addressing concerns regarding safety and security, including emergency preparedness, is positive. Recent advances in cooperation in relation to the importance of transparency and timely information exchange between Governments in the event of an accident during the transport of nuclear material and the adoption of best practice guidelines for systematic communications to build on the current practice of voluntary exchange of information provide practical examples.

19. All States should ensure that national regulatory documents conform with the current edition of the Agency’s transport regulations. Coordination with other bodies associated with the transport of dangerous goods, including the Economic and Social Council Committee of Experts, the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, remain important.

20. In the light of the various conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage, having effective liability mechanisms in place to ensure prompt compensation for damage to people, property and the environment, as well as actual economic loss, owing to an accident or incident during the transport of radioactive materials is important.
21. The IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability continues to undertake valuable work examining the application and scope of the Agency’s nuclear liability regime and considering and identification of further specific actions to address any gaps in scope and coverage of the regime. The International Expert Group should continue to address outstanding issues as provided for in the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and in the recommendations of the 2011 IAEA International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials.
Annex VI

Nuclear security

1. The Vienna Group of Ten proposes that the Preparatory Committee submit the following draft recommendations to the Review Conference. On nuclear security, it is recommended that the Review Conference:

   (a) **Underline** the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection;

   (b) **Call** for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response;

   (c) **Urge** States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible;

   (d) **Underline** the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and urge all States to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible;

   (e) **Note** with serious concern the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, equipment and technology;

   (f) **Recognize** the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts on improving existing control and cooperation mechanisms, including through membership of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database;

   (g) **Encourage** States concerned to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and to further minimize their use, including by converting radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets and other non-highly enriched uranium technologies, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes; and

   (h) **Welcome** other initiatives, such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and encourages participating states to effectively follow-up their outcomes.

2. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central and essential role in the efforts to improve global nuclear security framework, promote its implementation and facilitate effective cooperation and coordination at the international and regional levels. In this regard, it is of great importance that the Agency continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities.

3. IAEA and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee have made progress in developing the Nuclear Security Series, comprising a comprehensive set of Nuclear Security Fundamentals, Recommendations, Implementing Guides and Technical Guidance publications. It is crucial also that cyber- and information security will be handled by the Committee.
4. IAEA is also making an important contribution in assisting States in meeting appropriate security standards. All States should take full advantage of the IAEA advisory services in that regard, including the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service and the establishment of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans.

5. The Ministerial Declaration adopted by consensus by all member States of IAEA at the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts convened by the Agency in Vienna in 2013 is an important milestone in strengthening nuclear security worldwide.

6. Continued and enhanced efforts are needed to provide for the full and effective protection of nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. It is therefore of great importance that all States parties act in accordance with the object and purpose of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material until such time as it enters into force.

7. The minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications, including the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel, carries non-proliferation and security benefits. States concerned should further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and use and convert radiisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets and other non-highly enriched uranium technologies, where technically and economically feasible, and taking into account the need for an assured supply of medical isotopes.

8. The illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, equipment and technology remains a serious concern. All States must fully cooperate in identifying the supply routes and sources of the aforesaid. All States should reinforce their efforts on improving existing control and cooperation mechanisms as appropriate in order to achieve higher degrees of effectiveness in the efforts to curb illicit trafficking.

9. IAEA continues to undertake activities to provide for the enhanced exchange of information, including through the continued maintenance of its Incident and Trafficking Database. All States should consider joining and participating actively in this programme. There remains a need for enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations, such as work by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the World Customs Organization, in preventing, detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

10. Nuclear forensics is important in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials, and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses. States should develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities and engage in enhanced international cooperation in this regard. IAEA, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group deliver important contributions to further enhance knowledge and capabilities in this field.

11. In the conviction that States and industry have a common interest in fostering nuclear security, a substantial contribution of nuclear industry in evaluating nuclear security regulations is essential. While strengthening this cooperation, possible divergences of interest and the ultimate responsibility of national authorities should duly be taken into consideration.
12. Fostering nuclear security culture through nuclear security education, training and proper certification of nuclear security managers should be a priority for States and nuclear industry. The establishment of centres of excellence and other nuclear security training and support centres, as well as an international nuclear security education network, has been positive. In this regard, close cooperation with and through IAEA is essential.

13. A number of valuable initiatives exist to support the goals of nuclear security, including: the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, with its continued multilateral and bilateral contributions to enhance the physical protection of nuclear facilities and weapons-usable material worldwide; the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which is contributing to the reduction and protection of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims at developing partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Proliferation Security Initiative, which further enhances international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

14. The effective implementation of the workplan adopted by the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in 2010, should continue to be supported. Participating States should effectively follow up the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in The Hague in 2014, in order to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and to make the global nuclear security architecture as strong and comprehensive as possible. All States are encouraged to consider participating in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, including the next Plenary to be held in Helsinki in June 2015.