Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report on the activities of Australia in support of the
implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
I. Nuclear disarmament

A. Principles and objectives: The Conference resolves that:

Action 1  All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

Australia’s commitment to the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons remains undiminished. We hold ourselves to the highest standards of compliance with our non-proliferation obligations. Australia continues to be a prominent and active advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Initiatives we have promoted include a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests (the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Australia ratified in July 1998) and negotiations on a treaty to cap the production of fissile materials. Australia is also, along with Japan, a founding member of the 12-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. The key objective of the Initiative is specifically to take forward the 64-point action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was agreed by consensus and includes most of the steps required to advance the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives encapsulated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Australia actively supported and participated as a Friend of the Chair, contributed a joint building block paper and moderated several sessions in the open-ended working group process in 2013 to advance nuclear disarmament negotiations, as established by General Assembly resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has submitted a number of working papers during the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle calling for concrete steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Our
“Nuclear Disarmament Post-New START” working paper for the 2014 Preparatory Committee welcomed the ongoing implementation of New START but called for a further round of cuts and called upon all nuclear-weapon States and other States possessing nuclear weapons to take further steps to reduce their arsenals. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative also submitted a paper in 2014 calling on the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, pursuant to actions 5 (e) and 5 (f) of the 2010 action plan (“De-alerting” working paper).

At the 2013 Preparatory Committee, the Initiative submitted papers urging the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in any future nuclear disarmament process and calling on nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies (“Reduced role of nuclear weapons” working paper).

Australia’s concerns about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use has underpinned our actions in seeking practical and achievable ways to move towards a world without nuclear weapons. Australia, along with 17 other States, issued a statement at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, underlining that the issue of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons use is an integral part of the global disarmament and non-proliferation process.

Action 2 All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.

Australia reaffirms its commitment to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. Australia’s support for, inter alia, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the fissile material cut-off treaty, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, nuclear-weapon-free zones and transparency through reporting is consistent with that commitment.

Australia, along with the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, also submitted a working paper on increased transparency in nuclear disarmament, stressing that the principle of transparency underpinned the principles of verifiability and irreversibility and that increased transparency went to the core of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process. The working paper called upon nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to use it to meet reporting commitments. Greater transparency is also essential for building the trust and confidence necessary to underpin disarmament.

B. Disarmament of nuclear weapons: The Conference resolves that:

Action 3 In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

Action 4 The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
Action 5  The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:

(a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;

(b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;

(c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

(d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;

(e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

(f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and

(g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

Action 6  All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Australia supports the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work that would provide for the implementation of this action: Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, in a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on
26 March 2014, called on all members to unblock the Conference on Disarmament and agree on a programme of work.

Australia worked actively and constructively as vice-co-chair of the Informal Working Group, through the offices of Ambassador Woolcott, with the mandate to “adopt and implement a programme of work” in the 2013 session of the Conference on Disarmament. This mandate was renewed in 2014 and the Informal Working Group is continuing to proactively obtain a breakthrough at the earliest possible date in the 2014 session on a consensus on a Conference programme of work.

C. Security assurances: Without prejudice to efforts with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference resolves that:

Action 7 All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Australia supports the discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work which would provide for the implementation of this action. Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs attended the high-level meeting in New York on 24 September 2010 and registered Australia’s strong concern about the continuing failure of the Conference to resume substantive work. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, repeated this call in an address to the Conference on 26 March 2014.

Australia is working actively and constructively as vice-co-chair of the Informal Working Group with the mandate to “adopt and implement a
programme of work at the earliest possible date in the 2014 session” to find consensus on a Conference on Disarmament programme of work.

We, as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, produced a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances for the 2013 Preparatory Committee underlining the legitimate interest that non-nuclear-weapon States have in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances.

Action 8  
All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

Action 9  
The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.

Australia is a strong supporter of nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at by Member States.

Australia was an early champion of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and ratified the Treaty on 11 December 1986.

Australia advocates for all countries of the region to join the Treaty and continues to encourage the United States of America to ratify the Treaty’s protocols without reservation.

Australia supports dialogue between Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and the nuclear-weapon States on the signature by the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Australia also encourages all members of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the nuclear-weapon States to continue to work together to resolve their
D. Nuclear testing: The Conference resolves that:

Action 10 All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.

Australia was one of the earliest countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, doing so in July 1998, and actively promotes further ratifications of the Treaty, particularly by Annex 2 States, to allow its entry into force.
Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.

All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.

All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.

Australia has enacted national legislation (the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998 (the CTBT Act) and the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2003) implementing the obligations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in preparation for its entry into force. Through this legislation, a ban on nuclear testing is in force.


Australia, as co-chair of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty group, which convenes a high-level meeting biannually during General Assembly Leaders’ Week, consistently urges States that have yet to do so to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs chaired the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty meeting in New York on 27 September 2012.

Australia welcomed the most recent ratifications of the Treaty: Guinea-Bissau and Iraq in September 2013 and Niue in March 2014.

With Mexico and New Zealand, Australia is lead sponsor of the annual General Assembly resolution (most recently 68/68), which stresses the fundamental importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and urges its earliest entry into force.
Australia’s Ambassador for Disarmament reiterated, at the eighth Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Article XIV Conference in September 2013, the importance of maintaining international momentum towards entry into force of the Treaty.

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd is a member of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Group of Eminent Persons, which is focused on entry into force and pressing remaining States to ratify the Treaty, particularly Annex 2 States.

Australia, with other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and Vienna Group of Ten, presented working papers on this issue to the 2013 Preparatory Committee.

Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on addressing “Vienna issues” to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty issues.

Action 14  The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.

Australia hosts the third largest number of monitoring stations (21) in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty International Monitoring System. Australia also actively supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in developing other aspects of its verification regime, including a leading role in developing on-site inspection procedures.
Australia works with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, through technical workshops and other outreach measures, to promote development of and cooperation between national data centres.

Australia consistently calls on all States to provide strong financial, technical and political support to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for its work on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime.

E. Fissile materials: The Conference resolves that:

Action 15   All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Australia is a strong proponent for the commencement of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, commonly known as the fissile material cut-off treaty.

Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs attended the high-level meeting in New York on 24 September 2010 and registered Australia’s strong concern about the continuing failure of the Conference on Disarmament to resume substantive work.

In 2011, Australia and Japan co-hosted, and in 2012 Australia participated in, a series of experts side events in Geneva to discuss technical aspects of such a treaty and to help build confidence and momentum for a start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work which would provide for the implementation of this action, most recently during an address to the Conference on Disarmament on 26 March 2014 by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop.
Australia supported General Assembly resolution 67/53 and General Assembly decision 68/518, which called on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and, in the interim, for a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on aspects of such a ban. Australia actively participated in the first group of governmental experts in Geneva in April and May 2014.

**Action 16** The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

**Action 17** In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

**Action 18** All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**F. Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament:** The Conference resolves that:

**Action 19** All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

Australia affirms its readiness to contribute to the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

Australia has never had facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Australia is committed to supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear
Action 20  States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

(This field can be used for reporting on implementation of relevant decisions agreed prior to 2010.)

disarmament. This report is consistent with that commitment and outlines Australia’s efforts in this regard.

We, as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, presented a working paper on increased transparency in nuclear disarmament to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, underlining the importance of nuclear-weapon States agreeing on a standard reporting form to meet their disarmament reporting obligations.

In addition to the 2010 action plan, this report takes in Australia’s reporting on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Australia’s previous report on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” is contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/36 of 7 May 2010.

The present report updates our 2012 written report and the 2013 verbal update on Australian’s activities in support of the 2010 action plan.

The Australian National University’s Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which has received financial support from the Australian Government, produced the report Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play on the implementation of, inter alia, the 2010 Review Conference action plan.
Action 21  As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.

With other countries in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Australia has jointly developed a draft nuclear disarmament reporting form. The Initiative has shared the draft form with the nuclear-weapon States, as a contribution to their discussions on disarmament transparency and implementation of this action. The Initiative presented a working paper on this issue to the 2012 Preparatory Committee. The Initiative further submitted a working paper to the 2014 Preparatory Committee on increased transparency, calling on nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to use it to implement action 20 and action 5.

Action 22  All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

Australia welcomes the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, in September 2011, announced that it would actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The Initiative produced separate working papers on this issue for the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees. Australia joined Japan, along with 30 other countries, as a co-sponsor for a statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education delivered to the 2013 Preparatory Committee. We are again supporting Japan’s initiative in 2014.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

Action 23  The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

Australia actively promotes universal adherence to the Treaty and its principles.

In bilateral exchanges and statements in multilateral forums, Australia has consistently called for all Non-Proliferation Treaty States to
join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and without preconditions. Australia has also conducted regional outreach activities promoting adherence to and fulfilment of Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, including through hosting capacity-building courses and workshops in Australia.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper on addressing withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the 2014 Preparatory Committee.

Action 24  The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.

Australia actively supports the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards, together with the IAEA additional protocol, to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities.

Australia was the first country to sign and ratify the additional protocol (entry into force on 12 December 1997), the first to make it a condition of supply for uranium exports and the first for which IAEA was able to declare that all nuclear materials and activities of safeguards relevance had been appropriately declared and accounted for. Australia continues to work to promote universalization of and adherence to comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols for all Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon States.

Action 25  The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.

Australia encourages all States that have not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA, together with an additional protocol. Australia has facilitated discussions, provided expert advice and hosted study tours that assist States to bring into force these agreements.
Action 26  The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system. Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully with IAEA. Australia consistently and strongly promotes universal compliance by States with their non-proliferation obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and under their agreements with IAEA. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on compliance and verification to the 2013 Preparatory Committee. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on “Vienna issues” to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, compliance and verification issues. See also responses to action 29.

Action 27  The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency. Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations and cooperates fully with IAEA. Australia consistently calls on all States to cooperate fully with IAEA and to comply with their international safeguards obligations. Australia does this in bilateral, regional and multilateral forums, including the IAEA Board of Governors. Australia provided an extrabudgetary contribution for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the P5+1/Islamic Republic of Iran Joint Plan of Action.

Action 28  The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force. Australia signed the additional protocol on 23 September 1997, with entry into force on 12 December 1997.
Australia actively encourages all States that have not yet done so to bring into force an additional protocol to their safeguards agreements with IAEA.

See also response to action 23.

Australia currently chairs the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, an informal network of safeguards authorities, ministries and other organizations responsible for implementing safeguards in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of the Network is to promote safeguards best practice in the region. This is being achieved through enhanced cooperation in areas such as training, professional development and the sharing of experiences.

The Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office chairs the IAEA Director-General’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. Australia has also provided instructors for safeguards courses run by IAEA and other partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

Australia continues to engage with and support South-East Asian and Pacific Islands States on safeguards issues, particularly those States that have yet to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols with IAEA.

Australia has offered assistance to some States in the development of their safeguards agreements and arrangements with IAEA.
Action 30 The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper on the wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States to the 2013 Preparatory Committee.

Action 31 The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

Australia has never had a small quantities protocol.

Australia consistently encourages all Non-Proliferation Treaty States parties with older small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

Australia, including as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, conducts outreach to States, where appropriate, to amend or rescind small quantities protocols.

Action 32 The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

Australia affirms its support for these recommendations. As a Board of Governors member, Australia supports the Director-General’s and Board’s efforts to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, including through the use of the State-level concept.

See also response to action 29.

Action 33 The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

Australia always pays its assessed contribution and provides additional extrabudgetary contributions and in-kind support.

Australia is a strong proponent of IAEA carrying out its functions with the full cooperation of all States. One of the key elements of Australia’s support to IAEA is its active participation on the IAEA Board of Governors and participation in the IAEA Member State support programme since 1980.
Action 34 The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.

Australia provided an extrabudgetary contribution for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the P5+1/Islamic Republic of Iran Joint Plan of Action.

Australia maintains a strong technology base and technical capabilities, which it makes available to contribute to international safeguards efforts. It also maintains an IAEA Member State support programme to support the Agency’s technical safeguards capabilities.

Australia hosts two diagnostic labs as part of the IAEA network of analytical laboratories.

Action 35 The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

Australia’s uranium is exported for exclusively peaceful purposes and only to countries and parties with which Australia has a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Australia’s bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements include treaty-level assurances that Australian nuclear material will be used for peaceful purposes only and that this material will be subject to IAEA safeguards. These agreements ensure that Australia’s nuclear exports remain in exclusively peaceful use and may only be retransferred to a party with a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia. Australia currently has 23 such bilateral agreements in force covering 41 countries plus Taiwan. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, IAEA safeguards must apply to all existing and future nuclear activities.
Australia has ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which is implemented via the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 and the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2007, and is implementing Revision 5 of IAEA INFCIRC/225 (Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities).

Action 36
The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

Australia ensures that nuclear-related exports do not assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Australia’s export controls are based on multilateral best practice. In addition, Australian nuclear agencies cooperate closely with law enforcement and customs agencies to enhance Australia’s capability to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

Australia is a member of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

The Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations of the Customs Act 1901 states that any item on Australia’s control list, the Defence and Strategic Goods List, requires authorization prior to export. The Defence and Strategic Goods List incorporates the Nuclear Suppliers Group control list (parts I and II), the Zangger Committee trigger list and annexes 1 and 2 to the IAEA additional protocol.

The Australian Government has also enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995. The Act and the associated Regulations enable the Government to control the export or transfer of any goods and services that may assist a weapons of mass destruction programme and which are not controlled under other legislation.

See also response to action 35.
Australia contributed to two working papers on export controls submitted to the 2013 Preparatory Committee by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and the Vienna Group of Ten respectively.

Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on addressing “Vienna issues” to the 2014 Preparatory Committee which covers, inter alia, export control issues.

Action 37  The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

Action 38  The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

Action 39  States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

Australia has consistently affirmed its support for the development of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, within a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security and safety.

Australia facilitates the transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties through arrangements such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific; the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia; the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme; the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and other IAEA programmes.

See responses to actions 35, 36 and 38.
Action 40 The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

Australia maintains the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, as was recognized by Australia’s number 1 ranking for security of its nuclear materials by the 2012 and 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative nuclear materials security indexes.

Australia is an active participant in the series of Nuclear Security Summits focused on implementing measures to improve the global nuclear security regimes, particularly against international terrorism. Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, attended the most recent Nuclear Security Summit, held in the Netherlands in March 2014.

In November 2013, Australia hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission. Australia has also provided experts to a number of other Advisory Service missions.

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation participates in the IAEA Advisory Group on Nuclear Security advising the IAEA Director-General on activities related to preventing, detecting and responding to nuclear and radiological terrorism.

At the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in March 2014, Australia announced a contribution of A$1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund to support IAEA activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including assisting regional partners to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, strengthening nuclear security cooperation through regional and bilateral programmes and assisting States to adhere to relevant international nuclear security agreements.
Australia has hosted a number of table-top exercises in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, most recently in February 2014. Australia also chairs the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on nuclear security to the 2013 Preparatory Committee, and a working paper on addressing “Vienna issues” to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, nuclear security.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has presented a working paper on nuclear security to the 2014 Preparatory Committee.

See also response to action 35.

Action 41 The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

At The Hague Nuclear Security Summit, Australia committed to realize or exceed the objectives of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 as part of the joint statements on strengthening nuclear security implementation.

See also response to action 35.

Action 42 The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

Australia ratified the amendment on 17 July 2008.

See also response to action 35.
Action 43  The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

Australia has implemented the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

Action 44  The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

See response to action 36.

Australia supports and contributes as necessary to the Incident and Trafficking Database.

Action 45  The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.


Australia has implemented its requirements under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and plays an active role in the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Also, Australia has taken every opportunity in its outreach on non-proliferation to inform Asia-Pacific countries of the goals and obligations of resolution 1540 (2004) and to offer to work with them to further improve and strengthen their capacity to implement the resolution where possible.
The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.

Australia, as an IAEA Board of Governors member, affirms its support for this recommendation. Australia further broadens its support for IAEA programmes through participation in the IAEA Member State support programme.

Australia, through mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources Project and the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, has assisted regional countries in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear and radiological materials.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: The Conference calls upon States parties to act in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty and to:

Action 47 Respect each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.

Australia respects each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engages in extensive cooperation with other States parties and international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses.

See also response to actions 35 and 38.

Action 48 Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Australia has shared its experience with neighbouring countries in the safe application of nuclear science and technology through arrangements such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia, the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources Project, the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and other IAEA programmes.

See response to action 38.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.</td>
<td>The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation participates in the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications, providing high-level input on priorities for the IAEA research programmes in nuclear technology. See response to action 48.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.</td>
<td>See response to action 48.</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.</td>
<td>See responses to actions 35, 36 and 38.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.</td>
<td>Australia is a long-standing contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. In 2011, Australia provided A$100,000 in an extrabudgetary Peaceful Uses Initiative contribution to IAEA for a study on marine impacts of radiation from the Fukushima Power Plant and, in 2012, contributed A$15,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative to study ocean acidification. In 2014, Australia also contributed €20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. Australia’s policy has been to pay its annual Technical Cooperation Fund contribution in full and on time and to encourage other States to do the same.</td>
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In addition to the Technical Cooperation Fund, Australia plays a key role in cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s nuclear-related agencies, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office continue to provide experts to IAEA and to hold a range of meetings with regional counterparts, as part of bilateral cooperation agreements and IAEA projects.

Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented working papers on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the 2013 Preparatory Committee; and on addressing “Vienna issues” to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, cooperation on peaceful uses.

Action 53 Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

See response to action 52.

Action 54 Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.

See response to action 52.

Action 55 Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.

In 2011, Australia contributed A$100,000 to IAEA for a study on marine impacts of radiation from the Fukushima Power Plant. The study is administered by IAEA and conducted under the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific, a treaty-level agreement to which Australia is a party.

In 2012, Australia contributed A$15,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative to study ocean acidification.
In 2014, Australia also contributed €20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy.

See response to action 48.

Australia, in cooperation with IAEA, provided training for international participants on a range of topics related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including specialized areas such as radiological crime scene evaluation, reactor decommissioning and the regulation of uranium mining.

See responses to actions 38 and 40.

Australia recognizes the potential for proposals relating to multilateral fuel assurance mechanisms and multilateralization of the fuel cycle to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

Through its position on the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia has supported IAEA-managed multilateral fuel cycle projects and proposals.

Australia supports further discussion of this issue in appropriate international forums.

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Action 56  Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Action 57  Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

Action 58  Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.
Action 59  Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.

Australia is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and has ratified its amendment).

See also response to action 45.

Action 60  Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.

Australia supports and promotes the actions in the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which takes forward lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident.

In the margins of the IAEA General Conference, Australia hosts a Friends of Responsible Uranium Mining activity with industry involvement that provides a forum to share best practices in uranium mining.

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation played a leading role in the 2014 Nuclear Industry Summit, which brought together leaders of the nuclear industry to strengthen efforts in areas including cybersecurity and reducing the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector.

Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented working papers on nuclear safety to the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees, and a working paper on addressing “Vienna issues” to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, which covers, inter alia, nuclear safety issues.
Action 61  Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.

Australia has minimized its possession and use of highly enriched uranium through the exclusive use of low-enriched uranium for its nuclear research reactor fuel and targets in the manufacture of medical radioisotopes. Australia’s success in that regard has demonstrated that there is no technical reason for the use of highly enriched uranium in radioisotope production.

Australia has also reduced its remaining stocks of highly enriched uranium.

Australia is sharing its experiences in the use of low-enriched uranium in research reactors and radioisotope production, both bilaterally and by participating in IAEA and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency initiatives.

Action 62  Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

Australia works to meet the highest standards of safety, security and environmental protection in the transport of radioactive materials. Australia supports the principles enshrined in the nuclear liability conventions adopted in 1997 and 2004: the 1997 Vienna Convention; the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; and the 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention. Australia has signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

Action 63  Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.

Australia works to meet the highest standards of safety, security and environmental protection in the transport of radioactive materials.
At the invitation of the Director-General of IAEA, Australia chairs the IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability.

Australia abides by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

IV. The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference stresses that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process, and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Conference takes note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

4. The Conference regrets that little progress has been achieved towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

5. The Conference recalls the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA

Australia continues to support the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, freely arrived at by regional States. The Australian Government welcomed the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference on the 1995 Middle East resolution and will support constructive efforts to progress the implementation of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Australia affirms its readiness to support efforts towards convening a Conference on the establishment of such a zone and calls on all relevant States to achieve a constructive outcome to these processes.

Universal membership of and adherence to existing treaties and instruments would greatly facilitate the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Australia is contributing to this objective through its efforts to achieve universal membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention and its active support for the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
safeguards. The Conference reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Conference calls on all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

6. The Conference stresses the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference urges all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and calls upon all States to refrain from undertaking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.

7. The Conference emphasizes the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. To that end, the Conference endorses the following practical steps:

(a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;

(b) Appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

(c) Designation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 Conference;

(d) Additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including that IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant international

The additional protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards offers Middle East States an important confidence-building opportunity. Australia encourages the adoption by all States of an additional protocol with IAEA, without delay or preconditions. Stronger safeguards are in the interests of all countries when they can prevent the emergence of more nuclear-weapons-capable States.

Australia acknowledges the difficulty of achieving disarmament and non-proliferation goals without concurrent efforts to address the underlying political tensions that drive international conflicts. It urges all States parties to work to secure a regional political environment that is conducive to disarmament, non-proliferation and the creation of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has presented a working paper on this issue to the 2014 Preparatory Committee.
organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained;

(e) Consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organized in June 2008.

8. The Conference emphasizes the requirement of maintaining parallel progress, in substance and timing, in the process leading to achieving total and complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the region, nuclear, chemical and biological.

9. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference.

10. The Conference further recognizes the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and encourages all efforts in this regard.

**Other regional issue**

The Conference strongly urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement, and urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to its adherence with its IAEA safeguards agreement. The Conference also calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and all States parties to fully implement all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The Conference reaffirms its firm support for the Six-Party Talks and remains determined to achieve the satisfactory and comprehensive resolution to the issues involved through diplomatic means.

Australia strongly urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return, at the earliest date, to the Treaty and to its adherence to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

Australia fully implements all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, including relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.