Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (resolution 68/27). In addition, Canada voted in favour of a resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (resolution 68/39) which, inter alia, called upon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In resolution 68/39, the Assembly also recognized the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the convening of a conference to be attended by all States of the region on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Canada voted against a resolution entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (resolution 68/65). As expressed in Canada’s explanation of its vote, the resolution unfairly singled out Israel by calling for its accession to the Treaty while failing to address serious nuclear non-compliance issues by States in the region, particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including the holding of a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Canada fully supports the ongoing efforts of the facilitator of the conference, the Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to ensure a successful conference to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Any zone free of weapons of mass destruction should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested. In this regard, we welcome the recent consultations that have taken place in Glion and Geneva, Switzerland.
3. Canada has called for universal and full adherence and compliance with the Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the 2005 and 2006 General Conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2013, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensual approach and because the resolution did not address serious breaches in compliance with Treaty safeguards requirements by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, as determined by IAEA and reported by it to the Security Council. Canada welcomes the fact that all States parties to the Treaty in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We congratulate Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for having fully in force additional protocols with IAEA.

4. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored resolution 68/68 on the Treaty at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and has also encouraged all States in the region, particularly those listed in annex 2 of the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence- and security-building measure.

5. Canada shares the international community’s serious concerns about the scope and nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme and its ongoing failure to meet its safeguards obligations. Although Canada recognizes that, like all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, this right comes with obligations with which all States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, must comply. The Islamic Republic of Iran has lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council through its two-decade-long history of concealing nuclear activities. In the light of this track record and the country’s failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010) and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions GOV/2009/82, GOV/2011/65 and GOV/2012/50. These resolutions express the international community’s desire for a negotiated, diplomatic solution that respects the Islamic Republic of Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear programme.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran is in non-compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement and is in violation of six Security Council resolutions and 12 IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. While Canada notes the confirmation of IAEA that the Islamic Republic of Iran has so far implemented all of its required actions under the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action — including the suspension of uranium-235 enrichment above 5 per cent and downblending its stock of 20-per-cent-enriched uranium — this agreement is only a short-term measure intended to facilitate a comprehensive solution. Canada firmly believes that a comprehensive solution will require all outstanding issues to be resolved. Notably, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be the only State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force that refuses to implement the modified Code 3.1 provisions of its
subsidiary arrangements, in violation of its safeguards agreement. It continues to refuse to provide sufficient information about the original purpose and chronology of the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, as well as about the majority of its other nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran is required by binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council to take steps towards the full implementation of its safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. It has failed to do so. As such, IAEA is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran or to confirm that all nuclear material in the country is being used for exclusively peaceful purposes.

7. Canada has previously made it clear that for the Islamic Republic of Iran to regain its place in the global community, it must resolve all non-compliance issues. Chief among these are the possible military dimensions of its nuclear research, as outlined in the annex to the IAEA Director General’s report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65) — research which can only be understood in the context of a nuclear weapons development programme. The Islamic Republic of Iran has stated publicly that it would like to resolve all concerns relating to its nuclear programme within a year. To achieve this goal, the country will need to accelerate the rate of cooperation with IAEA under the framework for cooperation established in November 2013. Canada notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA have proceeded to a second round of practical measures under the framework, and that the first six measures were implemented satisfactorily within the agreed three-month period. Canada stresses that IAEA must clarify and confirm all information provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran and that these measures should not be seen as static or fixed requirements, but rather as elements in an ongoing process intended to provide IAEA with a complete understanding of the country’s nuclear programme. In this regard, we expect the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully and answer all questions posed by IAEA. From Canada’s perspective, the practical measures agreed to by IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the next phase of the framework will demonstrate clearly the seriousness with which that country views the current process, and whether or not it truly intends to resolve all outstanding concerns about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

8. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and also about possible nuclear cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Canada fully supported the Board of Governors resolution GOV/2011/41 requesting the IAEA Director-General to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of the Syrian Arab Republic’s safeguards obligations. Despite the current security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the necessary cooperation needed to address the country’s outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to “fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues” (GOV/INF/2011/10), so that IAEA can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear programme. Local authorities must be ready to provide access to sites as requested by IAEA. We also continue to urge the Syrian Arab Republic to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. It is only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation
with IAEA that the Syrian Arab Republic can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

9. Canada has called on all remaining States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called upon these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada’s voting record on the resolutions at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as referenced in the first paragraph of the present report.

10. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.