Implementation of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China

As Provided in the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Governments of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states are working to implement Action 5 to "further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence" and to make national reports on our Action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee under a common framework. Action 21 states, "As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security." The framework we use for our national reports includes common categories of topics under which relevant information is reported, and it addresses all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20, to make similar reports.

China is a nuclear-weapon state and the largest developing country. China seeks a peaceful, stable and prosperous world and supports the international non-proliferation regime which contributes to this goal. China attaches great importance to the NPT which is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, strictly abides by the Treaty's provisions and has been making unremitting efforts to achieve the three objectives of the NPT, i.e. non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to promote the universality, authority and effectiveness of the NPT.
In response to the request of the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, the Chinese Government hereby submits to this Session the following report on its implementation of the Treaty:

I. Reporting on National Measures Relating to Nuclear Disarmament

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a nuclear-weapon state under NPT, China is firmly committed to an open, transparent and responsible nuclear policy, faithfully implements its nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, and stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China is pleased to see that in recent years, this stand has gained growing acceptance from more countries and the international community. China will continue to make its due contribution to promoting the global nuclear disarmament process and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

i. National Security Policies, Doctrine and Activities Associated with Nuclear Weapons

1.1 China advocates and promotes the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China developed nuclear weapons under compulsion at a certain historical period for the purpose of self-defense. China's development of nuclear weapons is not for threatening other countries, but for defense and self-defense and for safeguarding national security. It is for meeting nuclear threat and breaking nuclear monopoly, preventing nuclear war and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. As In 1964, on the very first day when China possessed nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government issued a statement solemnly proposing a world summit to discuss the issue of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China also calls for the negotiation and conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

1.2 China is always committed to a nuclear strategy of self-defense. China has developed the policies with regard to the role, employment and alerting status of its nuclear weapons, the scale of nuclear forces, and nuclear arms control. China's nuclear weapons are solely for the purpose of defending against possible nuclear attacks that threaten national security and never for threatening or targeting at any other country. China has never provided nuclear umbrella for any other country or deployed any nuclear weapons in any other country. China has never taken part in nuclear arms race in any form. It never competes with other countries in terms of nuclear
input, quantity or scale, and always keeps its nuclear force at the minimum level required for national security.

1.3 China always honors its commitment of not being the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. For the past decades, whether confronted with nuclear threat or nuclear blackmail during the Cold War or faced with the drastic changes in the post-Cold-War international environment, China has never deviated from its commitment and will never do so in the future.

China has also actively worked for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons among nuclear-weapon states, and formally presented a draft "Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the other four nuclear-weapon states in January 1994. China also seeks bilateral and multilateral agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons with other nuclear-weapon states.

The policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons can lower the threat of nuclear weapons, reduce the risks of nuclear war and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is an important step towards the complete and thorough nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. China's commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons, is in itself a genuine action of nuclear disarmament.

1.4 China is the only nuclear-weapon state that has pledged unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In April 1995, the Chinese Government issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states and its commitment to offering them positive security assurances. In 2000, China and the other four nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement, reaffirming their security assurances made in the UN Security Council Resolution984 in 1995. At the request of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the Chinese Government issued statements on security assurances to the two countries in December 1994 and February 1995 respectively.

China maintains that the international community should negotiate and conclude at an early date an international legal instrument to unconditionally provide negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states and support the efforts by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to start substantive work in this regard as soon as possible.

1.5 China's nuclear strategy of self-defense is deeply rooted in China's
defensive strategic culture. The Chinese people advocates harmony and peace, and have a long tradition of not going to war easily. As a Chinese saying goes, "although a country is powerful, bellicosity will definitely bring about its destruction." The thinking of being cautious about going to war is an important part of China's strategic culture. Therefore, ever since the birth of nuclear weapons, Chinese government has made it clear that atomic bombs can not end a war, and committed itself to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The philosophy is to oppose and prevent nuclear wars and more importantly, not to be the one to start a war. Another important idea in China's strategic culture is "just war" which means "the start of war must be based on justified reasons" and "promoting the right and punishing the wrong". All these have directly contributed to the idea of "gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck" in our ancient strategic theory. The no-first-use policy is also a continuation of the "just war" philosophy. Another important idea in China's strategic culture is "subduing the enemy without fighting," an idea from the famous military by strategist Sun Tzu. It means that violence should be avoided as far as possible. A country should not seek military victory, but should win politics, peace and the heart of the people. It is impossible for one to win thoroughly or achieve his purpose by completely dominating and totally eliminating a nation or a country and seeking only its own interests. China does not want to see the humanitarian calamities caused by nuclear war. That is an important reason why China commits itself to no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

ii. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control (including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification

2.1 China exercises utmost restraint in the development of its nuclear weapons, which is consistent with China's nuclear policies of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as China's nuclear strategy of self-defense. Members of China's first generation of leadership, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai unequivocally stated that "our country may manufacture a small quantity of atomic bombs, but we do not plan to employ them and that we adopt them as defensive weapons". They instructed that research and development departments should not produce "too many" nuclear weapons as the nuclear weapons are to be scrapped after all and too many of them can only become a burden. China has never taken part in any nuclear arms race in any form with any country in the past, nor will it do that in the future. China's nuclear arsenal is very limited and is kept at the minimum level required for national security, which has made important
contributions to the international nuclear disarmament process. China has officially closed its nuclear weapon research and development base in Qinghai. After environmental improvement, the site was handed over as a whole to the local government.

2.2 China's nuclear forces keep an appropriate level of alert in peacetime. If China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear forces will act upon the orders of the Central Military Commission, go into a higher level of alert, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear forces will launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy.

2.3 China’s nuclear weapons are under the direct command of the Central Military Commission. China attaches great importance to and has taken concrete measure to ensure the safety management and effective control of its nuclear weapons and related facilities. China's relevant institutions and combat troops strictly implement the nuclear safety control system, the accreditation system of nuclear-related personnel and the emergency response mechanism for nuclear weapon-related accidents. China has adopted reliable technologies to strengthen the safety management and physical protection of nuclear weapons in the process of storage, transportation and training, and has put in place special safety measures to avoid unauthorized and accidental launches to ensure the absolute safety of its nuclear weapons. China's modernization of nuclear weapons is solely for the purpose of ensuring the safety and security, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons. No accident concerning the security and safety of nuclear weapons has ever happened in China.

2.4 China actively supports multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts and has made its due contributions in this regard.

China maintains that all nuclear-weapon states should fulfill in good faith their obligations under article VI of the NPT and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction toward a downward balance. States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead in reducing their nuclear arsenals drastically. When conditions are ripe, all nuclear-weapon states should join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable and long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the
conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Over the years, China has voted for important nuclear disarmament resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, such as “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments”, “Nuclear Disarmament”, “The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” and “Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons”.

China supports the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to start its substantive work in a comprehensive and balanced manner on important topics like nuclear disarmament, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, FMCT) and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

2.5 China supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and actively prepares for its national implementation work.

China supports the purposes and principle of the CTBT and is one of the first countries to sign the Treaty. China has strictly abided by its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear test. China supports the early entry into force of the CTBT and all international efforts made in this regard. China has participated in all the Conferences on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Treaty and actively supported relevant resolutions at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. China has paid its assessed contributions to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO Preparatory Commission) in due time and in full amount.

China has taken an active part in all the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and is steadily preparing for the national implementation of the Treaty. China has established its national preparatory agency charged with the comprehensive implementation of the CTBT. China has undertaken the construction work of 11 monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory of the International Monitoring System, of which 6 seismic stations, 3 radionuclide stations, the Beijing radionuclide laboratory and the National Data Center in Beijing, have been completed. Construction work of one of the two infrasound stations is close to completion and the other one is under preparation. Under the agreement, the Beijing and Guangzhou radionuclide stations have entered the 3rd phase of the International Noble Gas Experiment. The
Beijing and Lanzhou radionuclide stations regularly send monitoring data on air particles to the PTS. The Haila'er and Lanzhou primary seismic stations as well as the Beijing and Lanzhou radionuclide stations are undergoing testing and evaluation before certification.

China has taken an active part in the negotiations of the on-site inspection operational manual and other operational manuals as well as activities organized or supported by the PTS aimed at enhancing the treaty-implementation capabilities of signatory states and the monitoring capabilities of the International Monitoring System. China has developed the mobile Ar-37 rapid measuring and detection system (MARDS) and the radioxenon sampling, purification and measurement system (XESPM) which can be used to quickly detect gases from underground nuclear tests. Those equipments will be provided for the On-Site Inspection (OSI) Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14).

In recent years, China continued to host seminars and training courses in cooperation with the PTS. In April 2013, the Chinese Government and the PTS co-organized Equipment Training Courses for MARDs and XESPM in Chengdu and Beijing respectively. With the participation of 10 experts from 9 countries, the training courses deepened their knowledge of the Chinese equipment, thus providing guarantee for the full use of the equipment in IFE14. In November 2013, the Chinese Government and the PTS co-organized the OSI Workshop-21 in Yangzhou, and the participants discussed the preparatory work for IFE14, thus facilitating its preparation.

2.6 China supports the early negotiation and conclusion of an FMCT

The Chinese Government is of the view that, the complete banning on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through concluding the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) will contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and is an important step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

China always stands for concluding a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable FMCT as early as possible in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. As the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the CD is the only appropriate venue for the negotiation of an FMCT. China supports the CD in agreeing on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work so as to carry out
substantive work, including the FMCT negotiation.

China supports the CD's decisions on the mandate, working mechanism and other relevant issues of the FMCT negotiation. It was earnestly involved in all FMCT-related activities within the CD framework and has been working with others through active communication. During its Presidency in the CD, China organized a non-formal discussion on the FMCT. China has also participated in the P5 coordination and the dialogue process of P5 with relevant countries.

On 15 May 2013, China submitted its views on the FMCT to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/53. China is of the view that the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the FMCT should operate within the mandate of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/53. It should discuss relevant issues and make recommendations under the principle of consensus. Should the CD agree upon a programme of work, the GGE should conclude its work and hand it over to the CD. China has nominated a government expert to the GGE and the Chinese delegation has attended relevant meetings.

2.7 China actively carries out research on nuclear arms control verification technologies and has made important progress in the research on verification measures and technological means. China's research covers verification technologies of nuclear warheads dismantling and authentication, and the storage and disposition of nuclear components and nuclear material, with emphasis on authentication technology of nuclear warheads and components, information barrier technology, monitoring technology of the dismantling process, chain of custody technology on storage and transportation. China has exchanged views with other nuclear-weapon states on its research progress in the P5 Confidence Building Measures Conferences.

China has established national verification means for comprehensive nuclear test-ban, including the remote underground nuclear test monitoring system, the atmospheric radionuclide monitoring system and the on-site noble gas sampling and measuring system, which played an important role in monitoring the leakage of radioactive substance from Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and the DPRK's announced nuclear test.

On 11 March 2011, the earthquake and tsunami seriously hit the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which caused huge leakage of
radioactive substance. The CTBTO launched a monitoring process on the spread of the radioactive substance across the globe from the very beginning. China's Beijing, Lanzhou and Guangzhou radionuclide monitoring stations and the Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory have, upon the request of the PTS, provided a large amount of data during the monitoring period. These data greatly helped the PTS to monitor the spread of radioactive substance in East Asia and Northeast Asia and also contributed to the research on the spread of particles and gases in the atmosphere as well as the improvement of the atmospheric transfer model for the purpose of comprehensive test-ban verification.

On 12 February 2013, the DPRK conducted a third nuclear test. The CTBTO monitored the DPRK's nuclear explosive test. The Beijing and Lanzhou radionuclide monitoring stations have provided atmospheric particles monitoring data to the CTBTO continuously for a long time.

China supports and actively advances the negotiation on an internationally effectively verifiable FMCT, and has engaged in researches on a reasonable, effective, cost-effective verification system which can address concerns of all signatory states, and the system's relationship with the safeguards of the the International Atomic Energy Agency.

China will continue to dedicate itself to research on nuclear arms control verification technology so as to promote the international nuclear arms control process.

iii. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

3.1 China's nuclear strategy and nuclear policy has been consistent, open and transparent. China holds the view that, nuclear transparency should be guided by the important principle of "undiminished security for all", and relevant measures should be adopted by countries on voluntary basis in line with their national situation, taking into consideration their specific security conditions. Under this precondition, China has made many efforts and taken active measures in nuclear transparency.

3.2 China published 3 arms control white papers in 1995, 2003 and 2005 respectively. They are China: Arms Control and Disarmament, China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures and China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. From 1998 to 2010, China issued 7 white papers on national defense. In 2013, China issued the white paper The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces. In above-mentioned documents, China clearly explains its nuclear strategy, role
of nuclear weapons, employment policy, development of nuclear forces, command and control of nuclear forces and its alert status.

3.3 China is also engaged in other confidence-building measures. China actively seeks non-targeting of nuclear weapons at each other with other nuclear-weapon states. In September 1994, China and Russia issued a joint statement on not targeting their strategic nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998, the presidents of China and the United States declared not to target at each other strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control. In May 2000, the five nuclear-weapon states, namely, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States declared in a joint statement that their nuclear weapons would not be targeting at any state. In 2009, heads of states of China and the United States reaffirmed their commitment of not targeting at each other the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control. In the same year, China and Russia signed the Agreement on the Notification of Launch of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles. The agreement is implemented well since its signing.

To enhance mutural trust, China has arranged visits by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen to the headquarters of the Second Artillery Force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in October 2005, August 2007, January 2011 and July 2011 respectively. Besides, China has established direct phone call mechanisms between the Ministry of National Defense and its Russian and US counterparts respectively in 2008.

3.4 China actively participated in the P5 conferences held in London, Paris, Washington and Geneva in 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively and has maintained dialogue and consultations with other P5 states on establishing confidence-building measures and implementing the NPT. The P5 Beijing Conference was successfully held on 14-15 April 2014. P5 states discussed issues of enhancing strategic mutual trust and coordination in implementing NPT review outcomes and issued a joint statement afterwards. China also hosted a public event attended by P5 delegates and representatives from academic institutions and media organizations to promote mutual understanding and trust.

China is leading the work of P5 Working Group on Glossary of Definition for Key Nuclear Terms. It hosted 2 experts' meetings in Beijing in September 2012 and September 2013 and made great efforts to promote
smooth compilation. As agreed, P5 will submit a nuclear glossary in Chinese, English, French and Russian to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

These measures are conducive to increasing understanding and mutual trust, broadening common ground and reducing miscalculation, and as such contribute to maintaining regional and global security.

iv. Other Related Issues

4.1 China is of the view that maintaining global strategic balance and stability will lay a solid foundation for international nuclear disarmament process. Therefore the Chinese government believes that the practice of seeking absolute strategic advantage should be abandoned and it does not approve of the deployment of missile defense systems and relevant international cooperation that disrupt global strategic balance and stability.

4.2 China actively promotes the multilateral process of preventing the weaponization of and arms race in outer space. In February 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (CD/1839), and actively called for discussions on the issue at the Conference on Disarmament. China and Russia will submit to the Conference on Disarmament a revised draft Treaty soon. China supports outer space transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). As the co-sponsor of relevant United Nations General Assembly resolution, China attended 2012-2013 United Nations Group of Government Experts (GGE) on Outer Space TCBMs meeting and participated actively in the reporting work. China also participates in a constructive manner in the discussions of a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

II. Reporting on National Measures Relating to Nonproliferation

China firmly opposes proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form and has strictly fulfilled its nonproliferation obligations under NPT. China has joined all international treaties and mechanisms in the nuclear non-proliferation field and strictly implemented the non-proliferation resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. China has established a comprehensive system of laws and regulations on nuclear export control and has been taking robust measures to ensure its effective implementation. China has been treating the nonproliferation issue in a highly responsible manner and participating actively in the process of political solution of regional hotspot nuclear issues.
i. Safeguards

1.1 Upon joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, China undertook to fulfill the IAEA safeguards obligations under the Statute, and declared in 1985 to voluntarily subject parts of its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. In 1988, the Chinese Government signed the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China. In December 1998, China signed the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and completed its domestic legal procedures in March 2002, becoming the first nuclear-weapon state that brings the Additional Protocol into effect.

1.2 China actively supports and cooperates with the IAEA in implementing safeguards measures. China has offered 20 nuclear facilities for the IAEA safeguards, including pressurized water reactor, heavy water reactor, research reactor, high temperature gas-cooled reactor, uranium enrichment plant and nuclear fuel element production line, among which 6 are new facilities subjected to the IAEA after 2010. China's efforts have not only broadened the safeguards activities of IAEA on China, but also contributed to the IAEA's safeguards capabilities.

1.3 In 2007, China joined IAEA Member State Support Programmes, and undertook the responsibility of researching on and developing IAEA safeguards methods and measures. China recommended experts to the IAEA to serve voluntarily, joined the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories and carried out validation activities.

1.4 China attaches great importance to human resources development of safeguards professionals. In late 2006, China and the IAEA jointly established a CAEA-IAEA Training Center on Nuclear Safeguards and Security. The center organizes training activities on safeguards inspection, nuclear material inventory and control and nuclear export control, enhancing the technology capabilities and human resources reserve in relevant fields.

ii. Export Controls

2.1 China has exercised stringent control and administration over nuclear export, and adopted three clear principles governing nuclear export, i.e. peaceful use only, acceptance of IAEA's safeguards and no transfers to any third party without prior consent of the Chinese side.

2.2 In 1991, the Chinese Government announced that it would, on a continuing basis, notify the IAEA of China's export to or import from
non-nuclear-weapon states of any nuclear material of over one effective kilogram. In July 1993, China formally undertook that it would voluntarily notify IAEA of all its import and export of nuclear materials as well as its export of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear material.

In May 1996, China pledged not to provide assistance, including nuclear export and personnel and technical exchanges and cooperation, to nuclear facilities of non-nuclear-weapon states not under the IAEA safeguards.

2.3 The Chinese Government has, in line with the principle of the rule of law, constantly strengthened and improved the legal system of nuclear export control and stepped up efforts to ensure the effective enforcement of its non-proliferation policies. Since the mid-1990s, China has gradually set up a comprehensive legal system for export control of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other sensitive items and technologies as well as all military products.

In 1987, Chinese Government promulgated Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Materials, and introduced a licensing system for nuclear materials. The regulations clearly stipulated the authorities for nuclear material supervising and management and their responsibilities, nuclear material control measures, the application, examination and issuing of nuclear material license, nuclear material accounting, inventory, physical protection and related reward or punishment measures.

In September 1997, the Chinese Government promulgated the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Export, stipulating that no assistance should be provided to nuclear facilities that are not under the IAEA safeguards; that nuclear exports should only be handled by bodies designated by the State Council; and that the Central Government implements a nuclear export licensing system. The Regulations also provide for a more rigorous examination system for nuclear export, severe punishments for violations and a comprehensive and detailed control list.

In June 1998, the Chinese Government promulgated the Regulations on Export Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies, instituting strict controls on the export of nuclear dual-use items and related technologies and a licensing system for related exports. It established an exporters’ registration system, procedures for the processing and approval of exports, and punishments for violations of the Regulations.

The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China adopted in December 2001 define the illegal manufacturing, trafficking and
transporting of radioactive substances as criminal offences and shall be punished as such. In February 2002, the Chinese Government promulgated the Provisions on Safeguard and Supervision of Nuclear Import and Export and Nuclear Cooperation with Foreign Countries.


In the missile field, the Chinese Government promulgated the Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies in 2002. Its control list is almost the same with the Annex of Missile Technology Control Regime.

2.4 With regard to nuclear export control system, China has adopted internationally accepted practices including exporters’ registration, end-user and end-use certification, licensing system, examination and approval principles taking nuclear non-proliferation as a starting point, list control method and the “catch-all” principle. These principles are consistent with international practices.

China joined the Zangger Committee in October 1997 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in June 2004. The control lists under the Regulations on the Nuclear Export Control and Regulations on the Export Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies covers all items and technologies listed by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

### Nuclear Security

3.1 China strictly fulfills its international nuclear security obligations. In 1989, China joined the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In 2008, China ratified the Amendment to the Convention and has improved security and safety system for nuclear material according to the


3.3. China has been increasing input in and improving management of nuclear security, enhancing management level. China has carried out comprehensive analysis and examination on the security situation of its domestic nuclear facilities recently and has issued upgrading plan. China has completed the English-Chinese translation of *IAEA Nuclear Series*, which promotes its readership and application in China. China also increases its input in nuclear security human resources development.

3.4 China takes active steps to minimize the use of sensitive nuclear materials. China has decommissioned two HEU miniature research reactors in a step-by-step manner, and is advancing the conversion of another miniature research reactor to using low enriched uranium. The experimental stage of the project is completed and the actual conversion will begin soon.

3.5 China attaches high importance to the research and development of new nuclear security technologies. China has developed independently a range of new security equipment including explosive detection system and radionuclide identification system. These equipments were successfully applied to ensure the security of major international events, such as 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Shanghai 2010 World Expo and the Guangzhou
3.6 China actively participates in the Nuclear Security Summit process and makes contributions to consensus-building of the international community on nuclear security. China's then President Hu Jintao lead a delegation to the 2010 Washington Summit and 2012 Seoul Summit. President Hu expounded China's efforts on nuclear security in his two speeches. President Xi Jinping led a delegation to attend the Hague Nuclear Security Summit this year and systematically explained on China's approach to nuclear security.

China has taken active measures to implement the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summits. China steadily advances its domestic nuclear security legislation, values international cooperation on HEU security and is helping Ghana to convert its HEU research reactor under the framework of the IAEA. China takes stern measures to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and keeps strengthening inspection and detection capabilities at gateway ports. China has set up a China Customs Training Center for Radiation Detection in collaboration with the US and has carried out a series of cooperation projects with other countries including Russia and Kazakhstan.

3.7 China actively supports and engages in nuclear security cooperation in a broad range and at multiple levels. As an initial partner of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, China has all along actively participated in various activities under the initiative. In 2006, China joined the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database and shared information and resources with other countries. In 2007, China and the IAEA signed *Practical Arrangement on Nuclear Security Cooperation* and the two sides cooperated in nuclear security field on events such as Beijing Olympic Games. In 2010, China and the IAEA signed the second *Practical Arrangement on Nuclear Security Cooperation* with a view to extending cooperation between the two sides into such areas as nuclear security regulations and standards, physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, capacity building and training, and nuclear security culture. In 2013, China and the IAEA signed the *Practical Arrangements of Cooperation on China's Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security*, making a detailed plan on how to cooperate and make full use of the Center of Excellence in nuclear security training. China has also worked with the United States to upgrade the security facility of regional radioactive sources storage centers and centralized the storage of several dozens of radioactive sources with high danger. In January 2011,
China and the United States signed the Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Jointly Establishing the Radiation Detection Training Center of China Customs. The Center provides training to countries in the region on top of meeting China’s domestic training demand.

3.8 China actively provides assistance to other developing countries on nuclear security. In recent years, China and the IAEA has jointly hosted multi-themed nuclear security training courses and seminars in China every year. China has also provided assistance to regional countries within its ability through technical illustration and personnel training. China has been contributing to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund for many consecutive years, with a view to promoting nuclear security capacity building of countries in the Asia Pacific region. China has also donated to the IAEA nuclear security equipment independently developed by China. China has participated in the HEU miniature reactor conversion project under the framework of the IAEA. China's Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security, which is set-up jointly by China and the United States, had its foundation stone laid in 2013 and the construction work is expected to complete by 2015. The center will be equipped with world-class equipments and technology on nuclear analysis, nuclear security equipment testing and emergency preparedness drill, and will become the biggest center for nuclear security exchanges and training with the widest range of equipment and the most advanced technologies in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world.

4. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

4.1 China has always respected and supported the efforts made by countries in relevant regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or WMD-free zones in light of the actual situation of their respective regions and on the basis of voluntary consultations and agreements.

4.2 China has signed and ratified all Protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties that are open for signature, including Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Additional Protocols II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and Additional Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China has also joined the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.
4.3 China supports the efforts made by the ASEAN countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, and has played a constructive role in promoting the agreement on the Protocol to the *Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty* between ASEAN and P5 states. China also supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and has no substantive difficulty with the current text of the treaty and its protocol. China has reiterated on many occasions its readiness to consider signing the above-mentioned Protocols at an early date once they are open for signature.

4.4 China supports the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and hopes to see the early achievement of this goal. China joined the consensus reached at previous sessions of the UN General Assembly on resolutions on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and supports the early convening of an international conference on this issue.

4.5 China respects Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and supports the relevant resolutions adopted at the previous sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. In 2000, China, together with the other four nuclear-weapon states issued a statement undertaking to provide to Mongolia security assurance. In 2012, China and the other four nuclear-weapon states issued another statement, reaffirming their support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and their security assurance to Mongolia.

5. Compliance and Other Related Issues

5.1 China has been strictly fulfilling relevant international non-proliferation obligations and responsibilities in related fields. China abides by the rules and resolutions on nonproliferation obligations endorsed by international agencies such as the IAEA and UN Security Council.

5.2 China attaches importance to the role of the NPT as the cornerstone to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, calls on all states that are yet to join the NPT to do so at an early date as non-nuclear-weapon states, and supports the international community's efforts to work out detailed measures against and raise the bar for withdrawal.

6. Other Contributions to Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation

6.1 China addresses the nonproliferation issue in a highly responsible manner, actively participates in international nonproliferation cooperation
and works actively to promote the settlement of regional nuclear issues. China is of the view that the international community should pursue a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, reject the practice of functionalism and double standards, enhance the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory nature of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and address the nuclear proliferation concerns through political and diplomatic means within the existing framework of international laws.

6.2 On the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, China is committed to achieving a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and pursuing a peaceful solution to the issue through dialogue and consultations. China has worked, through various channels, with all parties of the Six-Party Talks in an extensive and in-depth manner with a view to an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

6.3 On the Iranian nuclear issue, China has stayed committed to encouraging peace negotiations aimed at maintaining the international nonproliferation regime and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East and has actively participated in the diplomatic efforts to address this issue through dialogue and negotiations. With the joint efforts of the P5+1 and Iran, the negotiations on the Iranian Nuclear issue has achieved substantive progress in the form of a first phase agreement. China has made a voluntary contribution of RMB 1,500,000 to the IAEA for carrying out safeguard and verification activities in Iran under the agreement. The P5+1 and Iran are conducting a new round of talks. China has proposed five principles for a comprehensive solution of the Iranian nuclear Issue which was appreciated by all the other parties. China will continue to take an active part in the pursuit of a solution.

III. Reporting on National Measures Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

China has actively engaged in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the relevant international cooperation, and supported the right of all countries, developing countries in particular, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China holds the view that nonproliferation can not be used as an excuse to undermine this right. China attaches importance to enhancing technical research and industrial development for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and has gained rich experience in this regard. On this basis, China has vigorously participated in and supported multilateral cooperation on promoting nuclear technology development and peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and assumed due international obligation.

i. Promoting Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

1.1. Over the last 50 years and more, China's nuclear industry has started from scratch and travelled a development path suited to China’s national conditions. A complete nuclear industry system including nuclear power, nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear technology application has been put in place.

The Chinese government takes the development of a nuclear energy as an important tool to meet energy demand, ensure energy security, tackle climate change and develops nuclear power with great efficiency under the principle of safety first. In 2012, the Chinese government adopted the modified *Medium-to-Long-Term Development Plan for Nuclear Power (2011-2020)*, which set out the target of 58 million kilowatts of installed capacity in operation and 30 million kilowatts of installed capacity under construction by 2020.

In the field of nuclear power, in 2013, the first unit of Ningde nuclear power station and the first unit of Hongyanhe nuclear power station started commercial operation. Construction began for the fifth and sixth units of Yangjiang station and the fourth unit of Tianwan station in the same year. Currently, in the mainland of China, there are 17 nuclear power units in commercial operation with a total installed capacity of 14.7 million kilowatts, and 31 units under construction with an installed capacity of 33.5 million kilowatts. China leads the world in terms of the scale of nuclear power units under construction, which is 44% of the total scale under construction across the world. China is the fastest-growing country in nuclear power.

In the field of nuclear fuel cycle, China sticks to the path of closed cycle in nuclear fuel development and has basically formed a complete nuclear fuel cycling system. The supply of nuclear fuel in China can serve the demand of all the operational nuclear power stations. The fuel elements needed by domestic nuclear power stations are largely produced on our own. The pilot plant for reprocessing spent fuel built independently by China has passed hot test and China has signed a letter of interest with France to work together on a commercial reprocessing plant. After building two near-surface disposal sites for low-and mid-activity radiological waste, China is choosing the place for a deep geological disposal site for high activity radiological waste.

While developing safe and efficient nuclear power, China is working
vigorously on basic research on nuclear science, research and development of advanced nuclear energy technologies, greater percentage of home-made equipment, secure supply of nuclear fuel, treatment and disposal of radiological waste and training.

1.2 China has accumulated rich experience in nuclear energy development. It has followed cutting-edge example and focused on independent development. China has independently developed miniature neutron source reactors, small and medium sized reactors, million-kilowatt pressurized water reactors and other types of nuclear reactors, and also developed the technology of third-generation pressurized water reactors featuring outstanding performance in security and economic viability as well as the technology of high temperature air-cooled reactors that has the characteristics of the fourth generation nuclear power, both of which can help developing countries in nuclear energy development. China has developed, built and run the pebble bed helium-cooled high temperature reactor (HTR-10) and started the construction of a pilot project in Shidaowan. The experimental fast reactor has reached critical state and started feeding electricity to the grid in July 2011.

China is willing to share experience with countries committed to nuclear energy development and provide all round support and assistance to them.

1.3 China pays great attention to its cooperation with the international community on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has signed inter-government cooperation agreements with over 20 countries. On this basis, China has carried out extensive exchanges and cooperation with these countries including personnel exchanges, import of equipment and technology, and trade exchanges, which have brought about win-win results.

China attaches great importance to its cooperation with developing countries, and has done what it can to provide assistance to emerging countries in nuclear power and other countries interested in peaceful use of nuclear energy. Such cooperation is conducted under strict safeguards by the IAEA or as part of the IAEA technical cooperation projects.

1.4 The Chinese government actively supports multilateral cooperation and exchanges for promoting nuclear technology development and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In March 1990, China joined the Forum of Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA). In June 1992, it signed the Asia Nuclear Technology Cooperation Agreement. In November 2006, it signed the

In 2013, China successfully hosted the International Nuclear Engineering Conference, which is known as the Olympics in this field as its agenda covers almost all aspects of nuclear engineering. The 2013 conference attracted over 1,300 engineers and technical personnel from more than 30 countries. The participants made advice and suggestions for the future of this field.

ii. Technical Assistance to Other Member States through IAEA

2.1 Under the framework of the IAEA Statute, China has supported and actively participated in technical cooperation activities organized by the IAEA. China contributes in time and in full to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Foundation every year. While obtaining assistance from the IAEA, China provides manpower, material and financial supports to IAEA technical cooperation activities.

By the end of 2013, China has voluntarily contributed 33.4 million US dollars to the IAEA (China's technical cooperation contribution will reach 3.43 million euros in 2014), provided 1,300 person-time expert services to other member states, and received more than 1400 technical personnel from other countries for training and scientific visits.

2.2 In April 2009, the Chinese Government and the IAEA jointly held the "International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century" in China, giving a boost to the communication and cooperation in the international nuclear energy industry and contributing to the global development of nuclear energy.

2.3 In October 2011, China signed with the IAEA a Practical Arrangement on Cooperation in the Field of Safe Nuclear Plant Construction, under which China's International Construction Training Center on Nuclear Power (ICTC) established by China Nuclear Engineering Group will undertake some IAEA training activities in the field of nuclear power plant
iii. Nuclear Safety and Liability of Civil Nuclear Energy

3.1 China follows the principle of "putting safety and quality first" in the development of nuclear energy and takes strict and effective safety measures. It has established full-fledged and effective legal, supervision and emergency response systems for nuclear safety, and has been enhancing related infrastructure. To date, all of China’s nuclear power units have maintained a good safety record, with main performance indicators reaching world-class level.

3.2 China has established and constantly improved its legal system for nuclear safety. China has enacted and promulgated a series of laws and regulations in this regard, including the Law of the People's Republic of China on Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Environmental Protection, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Monitoring and Management of Civil Nuclear Facility Safety, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Material Control, and the Provisions on Design Safety of Nuclear Power Plant. Legislation on atomic energy and nuclear safety has been included in the national legislative agenda.

3.3 The Chinese government attaches great importance to nuclear safety. After the Fukushima nuclear accident, China took decisive measures to suspend construction of new nuclear power plants, and conduct a comprehensive safety examination. On this basis, China issued the Plan on Promoting Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control during the 12th Five-Year Period and Long-term Goals 2020 and the Nuclear Power Safety Plan, and set out technical requirements to be universally observed in the generic improvement of nuclear power plants that are in operation and under construction. In June 2012, China issued the General Technical Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants Improvement after the Fukushima Accident (trial version), which sets out clear technical requirements with regard to flood control capability, emergency water supply and related equipment, mobile power supply and configuration, spent fuel pool monitoring, hydrogen surveillance and control system, habitability and function of emergency control center, external disaster response and so on. Improvements have been made accordingly to all the nuclear power plants in China. All new nuclear power projects in China will be constructed in line with the highest safety standards in the world, and all new units will meet the Generation III safety standards.
China attaches importance to maintaining daily preparedness for nuclear emergencies. Since 2003, China has promulgated the *Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Accident Emergency Response and Management*, and the *Provisions on Conducting Nuclear Accident Emergency Response Exercises in Nuclear Power Plants*.

After the Fukushima nuclear accident, China issued a revised *Nuclear Emergency Plan* in June 2013, and strengthened the emergency response institution and structure by developing a three-tier management mode and setting up 10 nuclear accident response teams.

The nuclear power plant operators in China pay high attention to releasing information on safe operation. In order to publicize the information in a more open and transparent way and make the public feel safer, the operators have improved the ways and means of communication, such as press conferences, information release platforms, social responsibility reports, white papers on safe development, and open days. The operators attach greater importance than before to raising public awareness of nuclear power, and establishing a full-scale public education platform by utilizing fashionable communication vehicles such as micro-blog and WeChat (an on-line chat tool). They also take into better consideration local economic and social development where the nuclear power projects are located, to align nuclear power development with the development of the local society, thus creating a favorable social atmosphere for nuclear power development.

China conducted its first state-level nuclear accident emergency response exercise in 2009.

3.4 China has been making consistent efforts to establish a compensation regime for nuclear damage. In 1986, the State Council of China issued the *Reply by the State Council on the Nuclear Liability of the Third Party*, explicitly holding the operator responsible for nuclear damage. In 2007, the State Council issued the *Reply by the State Council on the Issue of Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (known in short as State Correspondence No.64)*, raising the compensation limit of the operator to 300 million RMB, and that of the state government to 800 million RMB. The *Tort Liability Law* which has been in place since 2010 stipulates the tort liability during a nuclear accident in civil nuclear facilities. These measures fully demonstrate people-oriented governance principle of the Chinese government, and its commitment to addressing liability for nuclear damage.

iv. Other Related Issues
4.1 China attaches great importance to the peaceful use of nuclear technology in other related areas. China has carried out wide-ranging research on and application of technology in such areas as industrial detecting, industry engineering control, nuclear medicine and radioactive treatment, food and crops, animal production and health, food irradiation, resources evaluation, archaeological dating and pollution monitoring.

4.2 China pays great attention to spreading scientific knowledge about nuclear energy. The Chinese government and businesses have worked actively to raise public awareness of nuclear safety, nuclear emergency policies, laws and regulations, and basic knowledge of nuclear science and technology, which has increased the confidence of the public in the safety of nuclear energy.