Mr. Chairman,

First of all I would like to express my congratulations to you on your assumption of chairmanship of this session.

It is an honour and pleasure for me to address the Third session of the Preparatory Commission for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

We were encouraged by the results of the 2010 NPT Review Conference that sent a clear political signal on the credibility of the NPT, which should be further enhanced. The outcome of the last NPT Review Conference was an adoption by consensus of a balanced Final Document, which contained a practical agenda with the Action Plan covering all three pillars of the Treaty.

Bearing in mind that international community has developed a number of concrete recommendations for the follow-on actions, inter alia, on nuclear non-proliferation, providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear disarmament, including fissile materials and nuclear testing as well as peaceful use of nuclear energy, we believe that the main objective of today’s discussion is to critically assess what have been achieved by the Parties to the NPT and to identify practical steps which have to be realized.

At this stage it is extremely important to transform political declarations and statements into concrete practical deeds.

Mr. Chairman,

It is our strong conviction that the Treaty is vital in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and providing strong security benefits. Ukraine is of the opinion that this session should reaffirm the fundamental importance of full compliance with all provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that non-compliance undermines the integrity of the Treaty and abuses the trust Parties place in it.

We recognize the threat posed to international peace and security by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need for strict compliance by all states with their
non-proliferation obligations, including compliance with their IAEA safeguards agreements and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Ukraine has demonstrated its commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and made the historic contribution to this process. Ukraine has consistently supported effective multilateral efforts aimed at preventing and combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

During Ukrainian Chairmanship in the OSCE in 2013 Ukraine invested efforts in sharpening the OSCE profile in ensuring comprehensive WMD non-proliferation agenda in a regional dimension.

The first update of the common position of the OSCE participating States in the area of non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery since the year 1994 was an important milestone during the OSCE Ukrainian Chairmanship in the politico-military dimension.

The updated OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation, which were adopted at the Ministerial level in Kyiv in December 2013, demonstrated our intention not only to comply with, but also to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime.

In the context of today’s discussion it is worth mentioning that 20 years ago – on 14 January 1994 in Moscow the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and the Russian Federation signed a Trilateral Statement, where the arrangements on practical realization of the decision of Ukraine to renounce nuclear weapons and become a non-nuclear-weapon state were envisaged. At the same time the 20th anniversary of Ukraine’s decision to renounce nuclear weapons took place against the background of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, occupation and annexation of its territory in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and destabilization of the situation in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine. Such actions of the Russian Federation is a grave violation of the imperative norms of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, which ensured the territorial integrity of Ukraine, inviolability of its borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs.

Such actions were especially cynical as they were committed by the state-guarantor of the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Budapest, on December 5, 1994.

In particular, the State-signatories to the Memorandum «reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations».

We deem necessary to emphasize that the aforementioned Memorandum was signed in connection with Ukraine’s adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state and in pursuance of its commitments to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within the specified period of time and duly implemented by the Ukrainian side.

Since the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum have been totally neglected and brutally violated by the Russian Federation as one of its States-signatories, we call on the Conference on Disarmament to urgently develop and conclude a multilateral legally binding instrument in order to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons». If the Security Council fails to reconfirm its obligations assumed 19 years ago, the broad discussion on this issue at the General Assembly could be another option.

Let me also express Ukraine’s concern about unilateral actions of the Russian Federation to denounce the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on status and conditions of deployment of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine of May 28, 1997.

Under provisions of the Article 5 of the Agreement «the Russian Federation is obliged not to have nuclear weapons in formation of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, which is stationed on the territory of Ukraine». As a result of these unprecedented events and taking into consideration strategic location of Crimea in the region, we cannot exclude the deployment of nuclear forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which constitutes a serious challenge to the existing non-proliferation regime and must be tackled by the international community.

I hope that these top priority issues will be properly addressed during this NPT meeting.

**Mr. Chairman,**

Ukraine highly values the important role which the IAEA plays in coordinating international efforts in securing nuclear non-proliferation regime and facilitating the peaceful use of the nuclear energy worldwide.

It is our strong conviction that comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocol represent the verification standard that best fulfils the objectives of the article III of the Treaty.

Ukraine fully supports the IAEA activity in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. In 1995 Ukraine signed an Agreement with the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; in 2000 Ukraine signed Additional Protocol thereto. As a responsible and reliable partner Ukraine takes all necessary steps at the national level to implement the IAEA integrated safeguards and continues close cooperation with the Agency’s experts.

Ukraine has a powerful nuclear energy industry, possesses uranium reserves and successfully applies advanced technologies in the area of peaceful use of the nuclear energy. Nowadays Ukraine considers new tasks on developing nuclear fuel cycles, including the production of nuclear fuel in the country. In this regard particular emphasis will be placed on design basis threats and control over nuclear materials in the new nuclear industrial facilities.

Ukrainian nuclear energy sector operates in the framework of national and international standards and requirements on providing nuclear safety, nuclear security as well as radiological safety. Ukraine demonstrates the reliability and transparency of the existing control over nuclear materials. We established the system of nuclear security, which meets the international standards. The relevant national regulations on safety culture of nuclear plants and facilities, radiological waste management, other sources of ionising radiation have been developed; the site inspections of the system of nuclear security of NPPs, specialized enterprises and medical facilities have been fully completed. At present, we can confirm the high level of nuclear safety and nuclear security at the Ukrainian NPPs, where nuclear materials are stored and used.
Seizing this opportunity we would like to stress that all nuclear facilities and materials located on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is a property of Ukraine. The IAEA safeguards are applied in accordance with the Agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time attempts of the Russian Federation to take control over nuclear material and facilities on the Ukraine’s territory in Crimea contradict the norms of international law and the IAEA Statute.

We would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Russian Federation should exercises control only over its own nuclear facilities under the Agreement between the USSR and the IAEA of 1985 and the additional protocol thereto of 2000.

Ukraine would like to express gratitude to the IAEA for its principled position on the implementation of safeguards in Ukraine, including on the Ukraine’s territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution «Territorial integrity of Ukraine» adopted on 24 March 2014, we call on IAEA to further adhere to the provisions of the Agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is fully effective.

Mr. Chairman,

The issue of Chornobyl remains to be the challenge for the future. Participation of the IAEA in addressing problems of Chornobyl NPP, in particular «Shelter» facility is an important instrument in overcoming the consequences of this catastrophe. Nowadays Ukraine has been implementing four national projects of technical cooperation, among which the project of supporting radioactive waste management and Chornobyl NPP decommissioning is of particular importance. We would like to thank all our partners for providing funding for the «Shelter» project and look forward to continuing our cooperation on Chornobyl-related issues.

Mr. Chairman,

Today, Ukraine is not only the recipient of the international technical and advisory support, but also its active provider. In this context let me mention the initiative of Ukraine to establish on the basis of the George Kuzmycz Training Center of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the IAEA Regional Centre of excellence to provide international training, workshop and seminar capacities for specialists from Eastern European and CIS countries. Ukraine is also finalizing the construction of Neutron Source Facility at Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, which meets the demands of the 21st century.

We are ready to share our national experience with international partners and the IAEA Secretariat.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.