Draft Chairman’s factual summary

1. States parties reaffirmed the central role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They emphasized the vital contribution of the Treaty to international peace, security and stability. It was mentioned that the Treaty had created a political rules-based order, like a constitution, and that it requires constant maintenance and strengthening.

2. States parties stressed the fundamental importance of the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and noted that this is a common responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty. They emphasized the importance of a balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty, noting their mutually reinforcing nature.

3. In this context, the necessity was underlined to fully and effectively implement the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-up actions of the 2010 Review Conference, including the action plan. States parties expressed regret at the inability of the 2015 Review Conference to reach agreement on a substantive final document.

4. States parties looked forward to the 2020 Review Conference marking the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty. This was considered to be an opportunity to take stock of past achievements as well as to look forward towards future progress, including towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In this context a number of recommendations were made for possible consideration and adoption at the 2020 Review Conference in pursuit of the full implementation of the Treaty and outstanding commitments.

5. States parties stressed the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty. They again called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without further delay and without any conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols consistent with the model additional protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). States parties also called on South Sudan to accede to the Treaty.

6. States parties recalled action 22 of the 2010 Action Plan and, in connection with its implementation, all States were encouraged to take into account that the overall objective of disarmament and non-proliferation education is to impart knowledge and skills to individuals to empower them to make their contribution to the achievement of concrete disarmament and non-
proliferation measures; in this context it was emphasized that disarmament and non-proliferation education was not intended to prescribe specific ways of thinking, but rather to nurture critical thinking. There was also reference to the need to pass on to younger generations the amassed knowledge and experience of the realities of atomic bombings; the need to involve in a collaborative way various actors, such as governments, local, national and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the media, academics and the private sector; and the need to make use of new information and communications technologies as well as the full range of pedagogical methods.

7. States parties emphasized the importance of promoting the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in the process of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was noted that research showed that women's participation in Treaty meetings is lower than in other multilateral forums. States parties were encouraged, in accordance with their commitments under United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, actively to support participation of female delegates in their own NPT delegations and through support for sponsorship programs. It was noted that the disproportionate gendered impact of ionizing radiation should be factored into the discussions in the current review cycle.

8. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty. It was recalled that States parties were committed to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and contributing to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. In this context, there were calls for States parties to use the current review cycle to identify, elaborate and negotiate effective measures for the full implementation of article VI.

9. Reference was also made to the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith in accordance with Article VI and the unequivocal undertaking given in 2000, and reaffirmed in 2010, by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Deep concern was expressed on the slow progress towards disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in accordance with their relevant multilateral obligations.

10. It was recalled that the nuclear-weapon States had committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of their location, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Those States with the largest nuclear arsenals were encouraged to lead efforts in this regard. States parties emphasized the importance of applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations.

11. The Russian Federation and the United States of America were encouraged to commence negotiations to achieve greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States were called upon to refrain from increasing the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals.

12. It was affirmed that the importance of making progress toward general and complete disarmament remains the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process. The view was also expressed that goal of nuclear disarmament should be pursued in the context of general and complete disarmament, as reflected in the Treaty.

13. States parties discussed disarmament in relation to international peace, security, stability and confidence-building. It was recalled that the implementation of steps by the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should be pursued in a way that promotes international
stability, peace and security, and that they should be based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all. There were concerns that continued possession of nuclear weapons could fuel further proliferation. In this regard, the strong links between disarmament, non-proliferation and international security were also emphasized. Reference was made to the importance of strong non-proliferation guarantees as essential for creating the conditions for further nuclear disarmament. The point was also made that article VI of the NPT does not tie the obligation for nuclear disarmament negotiations “in good faith” to any conditions whatsoever.

14. Deep concern was expressed at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. Reference was made to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996. In this context, the view was expressed that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be inconsistent with fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. This view was not shared by the nuclear-weapon States.

15. There were references made to issues discussed at the international conferences held in Oslo in March 2013, Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014 and Vienna in December 2014. It was stressed that these had added to the knowledge and understanding of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapon detonations and the associated risks posed by nuclear weapons. The view was expressed that these consequences and the need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons were considered to underpin nuclear disarmament efforts. There was a suggestion to discuss those issues in the context of the NPT.

16. States parties recognized the value of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles. They expressed concern over issues related to the implementation of that Treaty. States parties called for efforts to preserve the viability of that Treaty and to resolve implementation issues in accordance with its provisions, including through its Special Verification Commission.

17. There were concerns regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines. There were calls upon the nuclear-weapon States and all other States that continue to maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their military doctrines to take measures to diminish and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. The nuclear-weapons states emphasized the diminished role nuclear weapons have been assigned in their security doctrines over the last decades, but also recalled the continuing role for nuclear deterrence in these doctrines.

18. There were concerns regarding over the risks of unintended nuclear detonations, including as a result of any vulnerability of the technology used in nuclear weapons systems to cyberattacks. The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to continue undertaking all efforts necessary to comprehensively address the risk of unintended nuclear detonations. Nuclear-weapon states underlined their efforts to maintain the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, thereby diminishing the risk of accidental use, including efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring the means to detonate a nuclear or radiological device, to protect nuclear material from theft and nuclear facilities from sabotage.

19. The nuclear-weapon States were urged to take steps to rapidly reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems, in line with previously agreed commitments. It was considered that the current review cycle of the Treaty should recognize a link between high alert levels, associated risks and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences posed by nuclear weapons. It was suggested that reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapon systems would reduce risks, increase human and international security, and would represent an
intermediate disarmament step. The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to regularly report on their implementation of these recommendations. Nuclear-weapon States outlined progress made on decreasing the operational readiness of their arsenals. In this context, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland noted that its weapons are on several days’ notice to fire. France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stressed they had de-targeted their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War. The Russian Federation stressed its de-alerting of tactical nuclear weapons as well as “zero-target” assignments to nuclear weapons.

20. The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties about the outcome of their conference held in Washington, D.C. on 14 and 15 September 2016, which included discussions for the first time on their doctrines and strategic stability.

21. China affirmed its readiness to lead the second phase of the development of the glossary of key nuclear terms. China also affirmed its commitment to a policy of no first use as well as its undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones or non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. States parties welcomed the steps taken to implement the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Russian Federation and the United States of America affirmed their intention to meet the central limits required by the Treaty by 2018. The Russian Federation and the United States of America emphasized they had reduced the size of their overall stockpiles of active and inactive nuclear warheads by over 80% from their Cold War peaks.

23. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland affirmed its commitment to complete the planned reduction of its overall stockpile of nuclear weapons. France recalled that it had completed reductions of its nuclear forces, dismantled its production facilities for fissile materials for nuclear weapons and dismantled its nuclear test site in the Pacific. China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stressed they maintained a minimum level of deterrence required for national security.

24. While acknowledging the unilateral and bilateral nuclear arms reductions by some nuclear-weapon States, concerns were expressed at the fact that the total estimate number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amounted to more than 15,000. It was stressed that efforts are needed to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The view was expressed that reductions in deployed nuclear weapons could not substitute for the complete and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context, it was recognized that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

25. Concern was expressed over the issue of continued qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure as well as plans to further invest in upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of nuclear weapons and related facilities. The view was expressed that such modernization of nuclear weapon systems could contribute to a new arms race and undermine the value of reductions in nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States remarked that such modernizations were aimed at safety and security.

26. States parties emphasized that increasing transparency could be an important objective for the review cycle and recalled the commitments on transparency reflected in the thirteen practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as in Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan. It was pointed out that reporting by all States parties, in particular nuclear weapon states, is an effective
instrument both for increasing transparency on nuclear disarmament activities and for greater accountability as a part of the strengthened review process. Reporting and transparency were linked to the principles of verifiability and accountability as well as confidence-building between States parties.

27. States parties welcomed, in this regard, the increased transparency shown by nuclear-weapon States. It was noted that the information in the national reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States at the third session of the Preparatory Committee held in 2014 and at the 2015 Review Conference does not cover the entire range of nuclear weapons and warheads and differs significantly in amount, nature and type between the nuclear-weapon States.

28. Nuclear-weapon states were encouraged to further develop their reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals. The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to provide updated and completed reporting forms at upcoming NPT meetings, without prejudice to national security. It was noted that options to increase the measurability of progress in this area should be discussed, including the specification of benchmarks and similar criteria such as targets, indicators and deadlines.

29. A number of items were highlighted for reporting by nuclear-weapon States, including but not limited to: (a) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (b) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (c) the measures taken to reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; (e) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; (f) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; and (g) the amount of fissile material for military purposes.

30. It was emphasized that the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a key contribution towards the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, an indispensable step on the way towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and an important additional non-proliferation instrument that would strengthen the integrity of the Treaty. In this context, several benefits of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices were mentioned, including its potential to: offer a unique opportunity to establish a non-discriminatory treaty regime; help to cap the quantitative nuclear arms race; establish greater transparency, help to establish baselines for further nuclear disarmament and form a potential building block for the verification thereof; create the conditions for drawing additional States into the multilateral non-proliferation regime; contribute to regional security and stability, particularly in South Asia, in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula.

31. The decision of the General Assembly to establish a high-level FMCT expert preparatory group was recalled. The open-ended informal consultative meeting convened by the Chair of the group, which allowed all Member States to engage in interactive discussions and share their views, was welcomed and the links between the work of the high-level expert preparatory group and the Conference on Disarmament were highlighted. It was pointed out that these links would facilitate the transfer of work back to the Conference on Disarmament should it agree upon and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that includes the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

32. Pending the negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapons States and all other relevant States were called upon to maintain or declare moratoriums on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The need to create, on an urgent basis, a de facto fissile material cut-off treaty world, which would then facilitate negotiations on, and the conclusion of, a fissile material cut-off treaty was stressed. The need to implement actions 16, 17 and 18 agreed at the 2010 Review Conference was also reaffirmed in this regard.

33. The urgent importance of bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, was underlined. Recent ratifications of the Treaty by Angola, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Myanmar, Niue and Swaziland were welcomed.

34. The intrinsic link between the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the goals and objectives of the Treaty was stressed. It was pointed out that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will provide the global community with a permanent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and legally binding commitment to end any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, as a means to constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which limits both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.

35. To achieve this, all States that have not yet done so were called upon to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, particularly the eight remaining States whose ratifications were necessary for that Treaty to enter into force. It was recalled that positive decisions on that Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty. Those States were called upon not to wait for other States to ratify that Treaty first. The special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to encourage countries listed in Annex 2 of that Treaty to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was reaffirmed, and the nuclear-weapons States were called upon to take initiative in this regard.

36. States parties welcomed the existing de facto moratorium on nuclear test explosions. However, it was considered that this is not a substitute for a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions, which can be achieved only by the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It was emphasized that the importance of refraining from any activities that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

37. States were called upon to close and dismantle any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, to prohibit of nuclear weapons research and development, as well as to refrain from the use of alternate means of nuclear testing and the use of new technologies to upgrade nuclear weapon systems.

38. States parties stressed the need to support the important work of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to establish the verification system for the Treaty, and encouraged States that have not yet done so to complete the International Monitoring System stations in their territory and send data to the International Data Centre as soon as possible. They encouraged non-signatory States to participate in future sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization as observers.

39. There was a recognition of the contribution of the Article XIV Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the process of the Treaty’s universalization.

40. States parties discussed the relevance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon states in the light of the objectives of the Treaty. It was reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
41. The legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them as part of a binding and agreed security arrangement was raised. In this regard, it was emphasized that these assurances should be legally binding, unconditional, universal and non-discriminatory.

42. All nuclear weapon States were called upon to reaffirm existing security assurances noted by UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) and recalled in United Nations Security Council resolutions 1887 (2009) and 2310 (2016).

43. All concerned States were encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively work to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States were encouraged to review any related reservations.

44. It was emphasized there was a need to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. The establishment of a subsidiary body on this issue at the 2020 Review Conference was called for. It was also considered that the Conference on Disarmament should start substantive work on concluding an internationally legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states at an early date. The importance of existing security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States was recalled, especially through the protocols to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as through other arrangements such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

45. The importance of nuclear disarmament verification for the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty was considered, as highlighted in the 2010 Action Plan and the thirteen practical steps agreed the 2000 Review Conference. New and continued cooperative efforts between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities were welcomed. It was pointed out that these will contribute to providing assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements to further enhance their contribution for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Reference was made to the contribution of nuclear disarmament verification to capacity-building, testing verification technologies, and elaborating model verification protocols.

46. All States were encouraged, including in cooperation with international organizations and civil society, to pursue and intensify efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, taking into account the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of verification.

47. In this connection, States parties noted the decision of the General Assembly to establish a group of governmental experts on nuclear disarmament verification in 2018 as well as various international initiatives including the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership. These initiatives were called upon to further their work on nuclear disarmament verification, thus contributing to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty. The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership announced their intention to conduct a realistic arms control verification and monitoring simulation in October and to report their findings to the 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee.

48. Multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations were considered to provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues collectively. States parties elaborated their views on
advanced stages of the nuclear disarmament process, leading up to and achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

49. Support was expressed for the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, in accordance with General Assembly resolution A/RES/71/258. It was stated that the instrument would not undermine the NPT but would rather reaffirm, complement, support and strengthen the Treaty including by facilitating the implementation of Article VI. Other states parties have expressed their lack of support for the pursuit of such an instrument convinced that efforts for nuclear disarmament under Article VI could be based on practical steps that take national and international security concerns into account, and considering that such an instrument will not lead to further nuclear disarmament and would possibly weaken or undermine the NPT.

50. It was also stated that the current security environment adds momentum to the need for nuclear disarmament. Support was expressed for a progressive, step-by-step approach to disarmament leading to a “minimization point” at which a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons or a Nuclear Weapons Convention could be negotiated. In this context reference was made to a discussion on the “building blocks” of a world without nuclear weapons. There were also calls for the negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

51. Deep regret was expressed at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the persistent failure to agree on, and implement, an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, despite further attempts to achieve consensus. States parties recalled they had agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. The view was expressed that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices on the basis of the Shannon report (CD/1299).

52. There were continued calls on the Conference on Disarmament to immediately begin and to conclude at an early date negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein.

53. It was recalled that the United Nations General Assembly decided to convene a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013 and the follow up action by the Assembly.

54. States parties welcomed the interaction with civil society, research institutes and academic organizations during the review cycle and greater engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

55. States parties emphasized that IAEA safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.

56. States parties reaffirmed that the IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. They also stressed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard.

57. States parties underscored the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards. They also underscored the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA’s Statute and the respective legal obligations of States parties and called on all States to extend their cooperation in this regard. The primary responsibility of the Security Council in cases of non-compliance was also underlined.

58. States parties stressed that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty were also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards made a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

59. States parties considered that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the States parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. The adherence to the Treaty and to full-scope safeguards was emphasized as a condition for any cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities with States not party to the Treaty.

60. States parties recalled the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) to all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

61. States parties welcomed the fact that 174 non-nuclear-weapon States parties have in force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. They urged the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible.

62. States parties reaffirmed that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State’s declarations so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

63. States parties recognized that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. They noted that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) provided, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures were an integral part of IAEA safeguards.

64. States parties emphasized that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force or applied provisionally, the additional protocol was a legal obligation. The fact that 128 States parties brought additional protocols into force was welcomed. States parties that have not yet done were encouraged to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.
65. The assistance provided to States, including through the IAEA, to conclude, bring into force and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols was welcomed. The consideration by IAEA and States parties of specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements, and adherence to additional protocols, was also welcomed.

66. The need to distinguish between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and to ensure that such voluntary measures were not turned into legal safeguards obligations was emphasized. It was also noted that additional measures related to safeguards should not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon-States parties to the Treaty.

67. States parties considered that, in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol represented the enhanced verification standard for that State which enabled the IAEA to provide increased assurances on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole. It was also noted that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represented the current verification standard under the Treaty.

68. States parties stressed the importance of the IAEA exercising fully its mandate and its authority in accordance with its Statute to provide assurances about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with respective comprehensive safeguards agreements and, where relevant, additional protocols.

69. States parties welcomed the fact that 64 States parties have accepted to amend their Small Quantities Protocols and 7 other States parties have rescinded their Small Quantities Protocols. They urged all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

70. States parties called for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of the IAEA resources, and stressed that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

71. States parties stressed the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the IAEA's Statute and its confidentiality regime.

72. States parties noted the considerable increase in the IAEA's safeguards responsibilities and the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards are functioning and stressed the need to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

73. States parties emphasized the importance of maintaining the credibility, effectiveness, and integrity of IAEA safeguards, and stressed that safeguards implementation should remain technically based, effective, transparent, non-discriminatory and objective. They supported the further strengthening of IAEA safeguards. In this context, support was expressed for the State-level Concept as an important development aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. States parties welcomed the IAEA Secretariat continued open dialogue on safeguards matters with States to maintain and foster transparency and confidence in the implementation of safeguards and noted the IAEA work on updating, developing and implementing State-level safeguards approaches (SLAs).
74. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA’s Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented by all States parties.

75. States parties welcomed additional technical and financial contributions by States to help the IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities, and to enhance the related technology base, including the modernization of its Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. They noted the assistance provided by Member States and relevant organizations to the IAEA, including through Member State Support Programme, to facilitate capacity building, including related research and development, and implementation of safeguards. They also welcomed the fact that such assistance will continue to be provided towards that end.

76. States parties encouraged, within the framework of the IAEA Statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA. They also encouraged States concerned to promote early consultations with the IAEA at the appropriate stage on safeguards relevant aspects of new nuclear facilities in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation.

77. States parties recognized that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State. They recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

78. States parties stressed the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities. They called upon all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well protecting sensitive information. In this regard they encouraged all States, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, to take into account and apply, as appropriate, the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series publications. They welcomed the contribution made by the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in the development of the Nuclear Security Series publications.

79. States parties reaffirmed the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security.

80. States parties welcomed the 2016 International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions, the Ministerial Declaration adopted and the fact that the IAEA would continue to organize international conferences on Nuclear Security every three years.

81. States parties encouraged the IAEA to continue to assist States upon request in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. They also encouraged States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance was needed and requested, including though the IAEA services in the field of nuclear security, such as the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs), International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC/869) was noted and States parties that have not yet done so were encouraged to subscribe to this Joint Statement.
82. States parties welcomed the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), encouraged all Parties to the Convention and the Amendment to fully implement their obligations thereunder, and further encouraged States that have not yet done so to become party to this Convention and its Amendment as soon as possible.

83. States parties noted the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat such trafficking, including the IAEA’s activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database. They called upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear material throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations, and called upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. They also called upon States to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

84. States parties express concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In this regard, they recalled the obligation of all States to implement fully the United Nation Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

85. States parties encouraged all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

86. States parties reiterated the need to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports were in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

87. The role of national rules and regulations to ensure that States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and for States parties, also fully respecting article IV, was recognized. In this context, States parties that have not yet done so were encouraged to establish and implement effective national rules and regulations and to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

88. States parties underlined that any supplier arrangement should continue to be transparent and to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

89. Concern was expressed regarding limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which were considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this context, a call was made for immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations posed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which were incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. A view was also expressed that effective export controls were essential for facilitating the fullest possible cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty.

90. States parties recalled that the 1995 Extension and Review Conference noted that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

91. States parties welcomed cooperation among States parties and assistance available, including through the IAEA, to promote and implement high standards of safeguards, nuclear security and export controls. They encouraged States parties in a position to contribute to such efforts to do so.

92. States parties reaffirmed the conviction that the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. They reaffirmed their support for internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

93. States parties recognized the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia are making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. They welcomed the parallel declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia on 17 September 2012, concerning Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. They also welcomed the increased cooperation amongst the parties to the zones. States parties recalled the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty. They emphasized the important role of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) as the specialized body in the region for articulating common positions and joint actions on nuclear disarmament. The Tlatelolco Treaty was noted as an important endowment of the international community and a political, legal and institutional reference for the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

94. States parties emphasized the potential of regional approaches to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They noted the role of regional cooperation in terms of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. In this context, States parties referenced was made to the regional dialogues on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Dakar, Jakarta and Santiago, held in the context of the preparation for the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee on the initiative of the Chair and the hosting states.

95. States parties welcomed the progress toward ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and the continuing efforts in this regard of the parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States pertaining to the Protocol to that Treaty. States parties looked forward to the nuclear-weapon States signing and ratifying the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible. They welcomed the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Reference was made to the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, and of bringing into effect the security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols.
96. The importance of the establishment of further nuclear weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East, was underlined.

97. States parties reaffirmed their support for the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. They reaffirmed that the 1995 Resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and that the 1995 Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty, was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was extended indefinitely without a vote in 1995. States parties recalled their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

98. Strong support was reaffirmed for the practical steps agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, including the convening of a conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. Calls were made for the preparations for and the convening of the delayed conference to be accomplished at an early date. The view was also stressed that the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution should propose new and alternative mechanisms and present practical and constructive proposals to achieve its prompt implementation.

99. It was deeply regretted that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as endorsed at the 2010 Review Conference, did not take place. The delay in implementing the 1995 Resolution was also regretted.

100. It was recalled that relevant steps and confidence-building measures would contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. It was also recalled that all States should refrain from undertaking any measures that precluded the achievement of this objective, and in this connection they noted with concern recent negative developments affecting security in the region. The view was expressed that these developments have affected negatively efforts to implement the 1995 Resolution.

101. The special responsibility of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, together with that of the States of the region as well as that of all States parties, to implement the Resolution and support efforts leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, was emphasized.

102. The successful ongoing implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was welcomed. States parties underscored the vital role of the IAEA in verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The strict adherence by Iran to all of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and its full cooperation with the IAEA to achieve international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme was stressed. The need for all parties concerned to continue maintaining their constructive role to ensure the progress in the full implementation of the JCPOA was also stressed.

103. Concern was expressed towards the continuous lack of cooperation and progress on the long outstanding safeguards issues concerning the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian Arab Republic was called to remedy its non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues. The Syrian Arab
Republic stated that it was committed to the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

104. States parties condemned in the strongest terms the five nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, including on 6 January 2016 and 9 September 2016, and the repeated launches of ballistic missiles in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council resolutions. States parties strongly urged the DPRK to refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests and launches that use ballistic missile technology, as required by relevant Security Council resolutions, and to renounce its policy of building its nuclear forces, which undermines the global non-proliferation regime.

105. States parties strongly urged the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities, and abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as required by relevant Security Council resolutions.

106. States parties reaffirmed that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty, as stated in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, reiterated the international community’s opposition to the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons and urged the DPRK to return, at an early date, to the Treaty, to come into full compliance with the Treaty and cooperate promptly with the IAEA in the full and effective implementation of IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

107. States parties strongly urged the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and to take concrete steps to fulfil its commitments under the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

108. States parties stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, and the desire for a diplomatic resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue through dialogue. There were calls to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. States parties also supported and encouraged the international community’s diplomatic efforts to address the challenge posed by the DPRK.

109. States parties recalled that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. They stressed that this right constituted a fundamental pillar of the Treaty and recalled that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including its fuel cycle policies.

110. States parties recalled their undertaking to facilitate, and their right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They called on States in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States parties or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with due consideration for their development needs in accordance with Article IV.

111. States parties emphasized that transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty should be encouraged, and that they would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.
112. States parties noted that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied at all stages by commitments to, and ongoing implementation of, safeguards consistent with States parties’ national legislation and respective international obligations. It was noted that this should also accompanied by appropriate effective levels of safety and security.

113. States parties recognized an indispensable role which science and technology, including nuclear science and technology, plays in achieving social and economic development for all States parties.

114. States parties commended the IAEA’s contribution to peace and development under the motto “Atoms for Peace and Development”. They underlined the role of the IAEA in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the development and delivery of effective and efficient programmes in areas such as health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and environment, industrial applications. In addition, they noted with appreciation the IAEA’s response to emergencies such as the Ebola and Zika virus disease outbreaks.

115. States parties underlined the need for an enhanced international cooperation, including through the efforts of the IAEA, to expand the extent that nuclear sciences and applications are utilized to improve the quality of life and the well-being of the peoples of the world including the achievement of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), as well as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

116. States parties acknowledged the development of competent human resources as a key component for sustainable use of nuclear energy and underlined the importance of collaboration with the IAEA as well as amongst States parties in this regard. They welcomed initiatives directed at expanding nuclear knowledge and expertise, as well as training in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

117. States parties acknowledged the central role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), in enhancing the application of nuclear science and technology in many States parties, in particular, in those that are developing countries, and recognized the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) as the most important mechanism for the implementation of the IAEA TCP. They stressed the need to make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable and to meet the objectives mandated in article II of the IAEA Statute.

118. States parties recalled the need to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They noted the ongoing collaborative efforts by the IAEA and its Member States, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. The IAEA was encouraged to work in a systematic manner to raise awareness of its activities with key players in the field of development and to strengthen partnerships with relevant organizations to enhance the synergies between relevant activities. In this context, States parties welcomed the convening of the International Conference on the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme: Sixty Years and Beyond – Contributing to Development, in May and June 2017.

119. The need to continue strengthening regional and interregional cooperation through identifying, utilizing and strengthening established regional capacities was underlined. The IAEA was called on to enhance regional collaboration, including under regional cooperation agreements, among States parties through projects that focus on specific shared needs and priorities.
120. States parties welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project, which is central to the IAEA's efforts to provide opportunities for training in and research and development of nuclear applications in broader areas, thus enhancing the access of States parties, in particular developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. They welcomed the contributions made by countries to this project and called on all States in a position to do so to make appropriate contributions to support the completion of the modernization of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories in Seibersdorf.

121. States parties acknowledged that the IAEA PeacefulUses Initiative (PUI) had become instrumental in mobilizing extrabudgetary contributions to support IAEA activities aimed at promoting broad development goals in Member States and to allow the IAEA to be more flexible and quicker in responding to evolving priorities of Member States, as well as to unexpected needs or unforeseen emergency events. They encouraged States parties in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the PUI, while welcoming the contributions made by countries in support of IAEA activities.

122. While noting each State party has the right to define its national energy policy, States parties acknowledged that nuclear power is expected to continue playing an important role in the energy mix of many countries around the world. They called on the IAEA to continue its support to interested Member States in building their national capacities in the operation of nuclear power plants and in embarking on new nuclear power programmes.

123. States parties concerned were encouraged, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize high enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use low enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible.

124. States parties noted developments in relation to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the progress made in establishing the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. It was noted that the creation of mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply should not affect rights under the Treaty and should be without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies.

125. States parties recognized that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States and reaffirmed the central role of the IAEA in promoting international cooperation on nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards.

126. States parties called upon States that had not yet done so to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

127. States parties welcomed the activities of the IAEA directed towards the strengthening of nuclear safety in operating power and research reactors and the work of the IAEA, including in the provision of international peer review services, the support to the regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of the infrastructure of Member States.

128. States parties noted with appreciation the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (APNS) and called upon the IAEA to continue to build upon the APNS and the experience of its implementation by Member States, the IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plan accident, and the principles enshrined in the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.
129. States parties recalled that it was in the interests of all States parties that the transport of radioactive material continues to be conducted consistent with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines. International cooperation efforts to enhance the safety of the transportation of such material, including through the use of best practice guidelines for systematic communications in relation to the safe maritime and other transport of radioactive material, were welcomed.

130. States parties encouraged States that had not yet done so to put in place a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.

131. States parties recalled that each State party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country, in accordance with article X.1 of the Treaty.

132. It was, however, noted that withdrawal from the Treaty could constitute a risk to non-proliferation efforts and could constitute a threat to international peace and security. It was emphasized that any reinterpretation or restriction of the sovereign right of withdrawal could be detrimental to the implementation of the Treaty. It was also noted that the faithful and balanced implementation of the Treaty would ensure that no State has any incentive to withdraw.

133. It was underscored that under international law, a withdrawing party remains responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to its withdrawal. It was further underscored that withdrawal should not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created through implementation of the Treaty prior to withdrawal, including those related to IAEA safeguards. It was further considered that nuclear supplier States should be encouraged to incorporate dismantling, and/or return clauses or fallback safeguards in the event of withdrawal into contracts or arrangements concluded with the withdrawing States, and to adopt standard clauses for this purpose.

134. States parties reaffirmed the purpose of the review process as set out in the relevant decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.

135. States parties exchanged views on a number of specific proposals. Specific proposals included, inter alia: enhancing the interactivity of discussions; increasing accountability through transparency and reporting; increasing the participation of women on delegations; enabling the Preparatory Committee to take substantive decisions; conducting work on the basis of a rolling text so as to enable progress to be carried forward by each session of the Preparatory Committee; ensuring effective time management; and revisiting the topics considered by subsidiary bodies.

136. There was also recognition of a need to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle. In this context, there were calls for, inter alia: the early nomination of Presidents of the Review Conference and Chairs of the Preparatory Committee; encouraging past and incumbent Presidents and Chairs to be available for consultations with the incoming President and Chairs regarding practical matters related to their responsibilities; and continuing the practice of reaching out and holding regional dialogues prior to the session.