Procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material under article III (2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as the members of the Zangger Committee

The co-sponsors propose that the Preparatory Committee submit to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the following language for inclusion in the final document of the Review Conference:

That the Review Conference:

(a) Note that a number of States parties meet regularly in an informal group known as the Zangger Committee in order to coordinate their implementation of article III (2) of the Treaty related to the supply of nuclear material and equipment. To this end, those States parties have adopted two memorandums, A and B, which include a list of items triggering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, for their exports to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209, as amended. The Zangger Committee’s memorandums also relate to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, insofar as the recipient State should recognize the items on the trigger list, as well as the procedures and criteria under article III (2), as a basis for its own export control decisions, including re-exports;
(b) Endorse the importance of the Zangger Committee in providing guidance for the States parties in meeting their obligation under article III (2), and invite all States to adopt the memorandums of the Zangger Committee as minimal standards in connection with any nuclear cooperation;

(c) Recommend that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III (2), be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, proliferation sensitivity and changes in procurement practices;

(d) Urge the Zangger Committee to share its experience on export controls, so that States may draw on the arrangements of its memorandums.