Innlegg – PrepCom I - Cluster I

Mr. Chair,

The signing of the Treaty almost 50 years ago, took place against the backdrop of a worldwide fear for a devastating nuclear war. Through article VI, the NPT contains clear disarmament obligations, which have been further elaborated in subsequent review conferences. Over the last 30 years, there have been important achievements, but also setbacks.

Today, however, there is a growing concern that nuclear arms may gain more prominence in security doctrines. Prospects for new arms control initiatives are discouraging. Furthermore, the irresponsible nuclear actions and rhetoric of the DPRK further undermines a global environment conducive for disarmament.

The risk of a nuclear detonation is real and is an inherent characteristic of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian consequences of such a detonation would be catastrophic, and the only way to eliminate the risk is the complete elimination of these weapons.

Disarmament towards this end must be balanced, mutual, irreversible and verifiable. That requires the engagement by all, including the nuclear-weapons States.

The upcoming Review Cycle of the NPT provides an opportunity to reaffirm the Article VI obligation, as well as the outcome documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences - including the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals. We must consolidate and build on previously agreed steps and actions. In addition, the Review Cycle should identify additional steps on how to speed up the process towards zero.

Mr. Chair,

The road to complete disarmament goes through multiple and parallel steps.

Last year the United Nations General Assembly near universally adopted the resolution calling for the development of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures. Effective verification will foster confidence and facilitate the advancement of nuclear disarmament efforts. The GA affirmed the importance of effective disarmament verification measures facilitating the objective of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

The Review Conference should call for the immediate negotiation of an international non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty.

Pending the conclusion of a fissile materials cut-off treaty, all nuclear weapon States should formally declare and/or reconfirm moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes and take appropriate transparency measures such as allowing IAEA monitoring.

All nuclear-weapon states should place fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime. The Trilateral Initiative on fissile
material between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and IAEA could be revisited. Other nuclear weapon states should be encouraged to enter into similar arrangements.

The Review Conference should call for the implementation of existing disarmament treaties, based on the principles of irreversibility and transparency, and for increased transparency in the implementation of these disarmament commitments through regular reporting.

It is vital to preserve achievements such as New START and the INF. We urge the US and the Russian Federation to re-engage in dialogue on resolving outstanding compliance matters to the INF, extend New START, and pave the way for a new round of negotiations on reductions in arsenals. Such talks should comprise all categories of weapons. Other nuclear weapons States should eventually join in such a process.

The Review Conference should call for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In the meantime, the nuclear-weapon states should declare or reconfirm moratoriums on nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones created on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States in the region concerned, are important for sustaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime and for promoting disarmament.

The Review Conference should reiterate the importance of negative security assurances and the relevance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States. The Conference should recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapons States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances.

The Review Conference should also call for the reaffirmation of the undertaking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security and defense policies through practical steps.

Mr. Chair,

Norway is deeply committed to this work. Last year, the Norwegian parliament agreed on a consensus motion that requested the Norwegian Government to actively work for a world free of nuclear arms and to promote the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to be a driving force for non-proliferation and disarmament with a view to the balanced, mutual, irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, and on these grounds to take a long-term perspective in working for a legally binding framework to achieve this goal.

It is on this basis that the Norwegian government will continue to pursue the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Thank you.