Mr. Chairman,

The continued integrity of the NPT depends entirely on the ongoing fulfilment of obligations contained in the Treaty. Pursuant to NPT Article II I, non-Nuclear-Weapon States undertake to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applied on all source or special fissionable materials in all peaceful nuclear activities, and to implement export controls aimed at preventing diversions to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The IAEA plays a unique role in verifying State compliance with their safeguards obligations under Article III. A Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), together with an Additional Protocol (AP), is the current verification standard pursuant to Article III.1. The CSA and AP together provide the basis for the IAEA to draw an annual conclusion regarding the peaceful nature of a State’s nuclear program. We urge those States that have yet to sign and ratify an AP, to do so as soon as possible. We will continue to advocate for the universal adoption of the AP until that goal is achieved.

Mr. Chairman,

Canada welcomes the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed between the E3/EU+3 and Iran. Full implementation by Iran of all of its JCPOA commitments combined with rigorous monitoring and verification by the IAEA, and fulsome reporting by the Agency’s Director General, will continue to help build the confidence of the international community that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful in nature. Canada strongly supports this essential role of the IAEA and has contributed $10 million to the IAEA’s verification efforts in Iran since the beginning of 2014.

Mr. Chairman,

Canada is outraged by the pattern of non-compliance by North Korea and Syria with their non-proliferation obligations.

Canada condemns in the strongest terms the five nuclear tests conducted by North Korea, as well as the unprecedented number of ballistic missile tests launched by North Korea since the beginning of 2016, in contravention of successive UNSC resolutions. We are deeply troubled by North Korea’s continuing efforts to enhance the capabilities of its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile delivery systems – efforts which are destabilizing, provocative and illegal.

Canada also deplores North Korea’s relentless proliferation activities abroad, and calls on the international community to strengthen our collective counter-proliferation efforts. Canada welcomed, and co-sponsored, United Nations Security Council resolutions 2270 and 2321, and stands ready to support appropriate measures in response to any further provocations by North Korea, as well as efforts to forge peaceful multilateral solutions to enhance security in the region. It is imperative that North Korea resume adherence to the NPT and re-engage in its
review cycle. Canada also urges North Korea to abide by its safeguards and relevant international obligations.

With regard to Syria, Canada demands that Syria respond to the IAEA’s repeated requests to resolve that country’s non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations, in connection with issues related to the Dair Alzour site and three other related sites. Canada underscores that the security circumstances in the country do not negate the need for Syria to uphold its safeguards obligations under the Treaty.

As I mentioned earlier, the efficacy of the NPT is predicated on its integrity. Cases of non-compliance that are not addressed will undermine the Treaty and the global non-proliferation regime, and make disarmament harder to achieve. Thus, the Preparatory Committee must reaffirm the fundamental necessity of full compliance with Article III of the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

Concerning export controls, Article III.2 of the NPT stipulates that each State Party undertake not to provide nuclear-related exports to any Non-Nuclear-Weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the transfers of source or special fissionable materials are subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the Treaty. We underline the need for all States Parties to exercise vigilance in their nuclear export controls.

To this end, Canada continues to value the role that multilateral export-control regimes such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group play in facilitating legitimate nuclear trade among States while respecting non-proliferation commitments.

Finally, as a contributor to the efforts of the “Vienna Group of Ten”, Canada draws attention to the VG10’s Working Paper on ‘Vienna Issues’ that has been submitted to the Secretariat. We believe this will make a valuable contribution to this Committee’s deliberations.

Thank you.