Mr. Chairman,

1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro, Iceland*, Serbia*, Albania*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Andorra.

2. For the European Union, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the further development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes.

3. At the start of a new review cycle, our priority is to uphold and preserve the NPT as a key multilateral instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability; to promote its universalisation and to strengthen its implementation. Speaking at the 2017 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in March this year, the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini said “The Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it turns fifty, has become even more important – not less”. The three pillars of the Treaty remain equally important and mutually reinforcing and can contribute to a safer world. The EU therefore calls on all States Parties to continue to implement the commitments assumed under it or undertaken during previous Review Conferences. The EU continues to promote comprehensive, balanced and full implementation of the 2010 Action Plan designed to strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty.

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*Candidate Countries Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

*Iceland is a member of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.
Mr Chairman,

4. The world continues to face major proliferation threats to international peace and security. They must be addressed in a resolute way in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime. In this context, we underline the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. The threatening and destabilising actions of the DPRK confirm the urgent need to further strengthen the NPT and for the CTBT to enter into force as soon as possible. The DPRK is the only State to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century, in violation of several UNSC Resolutions as well as its international commitments, such as the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. The EU reiterates that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT. The EU recalls its support to the ultimate goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. It becomes more evident that through its repeated nuclear tests and missile launches, the DPRK leadership is making progress towards operational capability with negative consequences for the stability in Asia, and beyond. The EU once again urges the DPRK leadership to re-engage in a credible and meaningful dialogue with the international community.

6. The EU deeply regrets that, despite the resolution of the Board of Governors of the IAEA of 9 June 2011, the Syrian pledge to the Director General to respond positively and without delay to the Agency’s request to resolve all outstanding questions, and in addition the renewed calls by the Director General, Syria has yet to provide the necessary cooperation. Syria remains responsible for urgently remedying its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and for concluding and bringing into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

7. The EU considers that becoming party to the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by all States of the Middle East region would be an important confidence-and security-building measure, and could constitute tangible steps in the direction of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East.

8. The EU continues to strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East and reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We regret that it has not been possible so far to convene a Conference on the establishment of such a zone. We maintain the view that dialogue and building confidence among all stakeholders is the only sustainable way to agree arrangements for a meaningful conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by them. We positively note that the Co-Convenors and the EU Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament both met, separately, with the Arab League Committee of Wise Men on Arms Control and Non-proliferation Issues in January 2017 to explore how a fresh start can be made to the process, and that they will continue to engage with all States in the region.
Mr. Chairman,

9. The European Union recognizes the importance of appropriate effective export controls, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 2325. In this context, we fully support the activities of the international export control regimes, namely the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the full participation of all 28 EU Member States therein. The EU has assisted third countries with around €8 million with a view to improve their legal framework and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls.

10. The EU is seriously concerned by the proliferation of missile technology. The development, test or use of ballistic missiles is clearly a destabilising factor in various regions of the world. In this regard, the EU strongly supports the MTCR. We are deeply concerned by the tests conducted by DPRK in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, we reaffirm our concern with Iran's ballistic missile launches which are inconsistent with UNSC resolution 2231. Moreover, as the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation, the EU continues to pursue the objectives of, and support financially, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) in three aspects: universality, implementation, and enhanced and improved functioning.

11. The IAEA's system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol form an integral part of the IAEA Safeguards system. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements together with Additional Protocols constitute the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT. The EU calls for their universalisation without delay. Further, the EU urges remaining States which have not yet amended their Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to accelerate their efforts in this respect. The EU supports the development and application of the State-level concept as a means to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA Safeguards System and to contribute to strengthening the global non-proliferation efforts.

12. Through the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme and through the Support Programmes of some of its, Euratom and its Member States continue to provide expert and technical support to the IAEA safeguards. The close cooperation between the Euratom Safeguards System and the IAEA contributes to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and allows the EU's Member States to demonstrate continuing respect for their international non-proliferation obligations. The EU, including through individual contributions of some of its Member States, has substantially contributed to the modernisation of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL). The EU has also provided the Agency with technology and expertise from the European Commission's Joint Research Centre and its Institutes, designed to meet IAEA specific requirements in a wide range of fields.

13. 16 January 2017 marked the first anniversary of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed by the E3/EU+3 and Iran. The EU has
continued its key role in the deal, notably through the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, who is the Coordinator of the Joint Commission under the JCPOA. The JCPOA is an important non-proliferation instrument and a successful, multilateral endeavour, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, all provisions of which must be fully implemented. The EU re-affirms the need for Iran to strictly abide by all its nuclear related commitments through the lifetime of the agreement. The early ratification by Iran of the Additional Protocol is essential.

Mr. Chairman,

14. The EU remains greatly concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, develop, traffic or use nuclear or other radioactive materials. While recognising that nuclear security remains the responsibility of States, international cooperation contributes to strengthening nuclear security. In the framework of its strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU is actively supporting UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1887 as well as other international activities, such as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The EU and many of its Member States have actively contributed to international initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. The four Summits have raised the priority accorded to nuclear security on the international agenda. The EU was among four international organisations invited to attend the NSS and participates in the newly established Nuclear Security Contact Group together with many EU Member States. In this context we also reaffirm the importance of international instruments such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, to prevent access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related material.

15. The IAEA has the central role in coordinating the global efforts and strengthening the international nuclear security architecture. The entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (aCPPNM) on 8 May 2016 is an essential step in strengthening nuclear security. It requires parties not only to protect nuclear material in international transport, but also to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material which is in domestic storage, use, or transport – including by imposing legally binding measures. Moreover, it will, for example through exchange of information, help to increase international cooperation in locating and recovering stolen or smuggled nuclear material, and in improving the capacity of each State party to take appropriate actions with the aim of preventing acts of sabotage or mitigating or minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage.

Mr. Chairman,

16. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the European Union would like stress the importance of the mentioned non-proliferation aspects for a successful outcome of the 2020 Review Conference and will fully support the Chairs of the NPT Preparatory Committee in order to ensure a successful review cycle.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.