Statement  
Republic of Poland  
Cluster II – Nuclear non-proliferation  

Mr. Chairman,  

Poland fully associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union within the framework of Cluster II.  

I would also like to draw attention to the working documents issued by the EU and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative that are relevant to the subject of nuclear non-proliferation. Allow me to add a couple of remarks in my national capacity.  

Distinguished Delegates,  

Today’s world is still facing the WMD proliferation threat to international peace and security. Although President Kennedy’s 1963 Kassandra vision envisaging that more than 25 states will possess nuclear weapons has not materialized, the clear and present danger of nuclear proliferation did not evaporated at all.  

We have never turned a blind eye on that issue, therefore Poland’s record in the WMD non-proliferation has been expanding for many years and we are determined to keep it that way also in the time to come. In the past we chaired the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as the Missile Technology Control Regime. Presently, assuming the post of the Chair of the second Preparatory Committee at that new NPT review cycle gives best testimony to our unwavering commitment and resolve.  

But we are ready to do more. Poland is of the strong view that the IAEA’s role in verification of nuclear non-proliferation process is indispensable and has
been soundly rooted in the provisions of article III of the NPT as well as in its Statute. Its standards of monitoring and inspection, elaborated over the years, rightly enjoy the highest possible international recognition. Therefore Poland has recently provided a voluntary financial contribution in support of the Agency’s activities in connection with the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which we consider an extremely important non-proliferation achievement of the international community, an evidence that regardless of an unfavorable political security atmosphere, the consensus-approach can prevail.

Last year Poland also became a country free of the High Enriched Uranium, adding its input into global efforts on the way to curb the proliferation activities of non-state actors and terrorist groups whose intentions is to allegedly gain fissile and radioactive materials.

Moreover, by assuming the Chairmanship of the Hague Code of Conduct against proliferation of the ballistic missiles (HCoC) for the period of 2017-18 we clearly demonstrated that interlinked proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies did not escape from our security radar.

Poland was also asked to nominate its representative to the High-Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group. We plan to play an active and visible role in the work of this important body.

The counter-proliferation is another dimension of the non-proliferation system. Therefore Poland has been from the very beginning actively involved in works of the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Although remaining beyond the UN system both initiatives already deserved solid credit as effective non-proliferation instruments.

On a final note, allow me Mr. Chairman, to reflect briefly on the issue which can be regarded as clear evidence of the NPT non-proliferation failure and shortage - namely the DPRK’s nuclear program. Poland is a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, therefore we can observe the situation almost on the spot.

The DPRK’s regime decided to leave the NPT regime in 2003, resumed its enriching and reprocessing programs, expelled the IAEA inspectors in 2009 and
carried out tests of nuclear stockpiles. Regardless of the formula of the Six Party Talks – we – the international community – so far - have not found the remedy to that extremely dangerous behavior of an unpredictable regime.

We have to learn a good lesson from that situation during this review NPT cycle. A withdrawing state must be fully accountable for Treaty violations while it was a Party of the NPT. Solid and result-oriented discussion on the strengthening the letter of the Article X is absolutely crucial in order to have the limbo-bar simply too high for those who could feel tempted to violate the non-proliferation NPT norms.

Thank you.