Statement by the head of the delegation of Ukraine at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (cluster 2)

Mr Chairman,

Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add some remarks in its national capacity.

Ukraine highly values the important role which the IAEA plays in coordinating international efforts in securing nuclear non-proliferation regime and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide.

It is our strong conviction that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements together with Additional Protocols represent the verification standard that best fulfills the objectives of the Article III of the NPT.

Ukraine fully supports the IAEA activities in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. In 1995 Ukraine signed an Agreement with the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the NPT; in 2000 Ukraine signed Additional Protocol thereto. As a responsible and reliable partner Ukraine takes all necessary measures at the national level to implement the IAEA safeguards in close cooperation with the Agency.

We support the IAEA efforts aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of its safeguards system. We welcome the progress made in the area of development of safeguards implementation at the State level which will enable the Agency to address new demands and challenges related to the nuclear technologies. In this vein we commend the high level of confidence between Ukraine and the Agency reflected in downsizing, since the application of the integrated safeguards in Ukraine in 2012, the verification activity in Ukraine.

Bearing in mind that current approaches are an essential part of international confidence-building efforts, Ukraine finds it vital to continue further improvement and optimization of safeguards regime in order to effectively respond to growing verification requirements of Member States in this regard.

16th of January of 2017 marked the first anniversary of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, agreed between China, Germany, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union as coordinator and Iran. We reiterate our strong support of this milestone nuclear deal and believe that its further implementation will significantly contribute to strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

While Iran has been proving its intention to the international community to use nuclear technologies exclusively for peaceful purposes, we, however, share the concerns over its recent ballistic missiles test launches. Should such ballistic missile be capable of delivering nuclear weapons this test will be a clear violation of UN SC resolution 2231. This situation requires thorough and detailed analysis.
While supporting the right of any state to take measures for protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, we call upon Iran to comply fully with its obligations under the Comprehensive Plan and resolution 2231.

Mr Chairman,

The international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process is still confronted with serious challenges.

The nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the DPRK and conduct of nuclear tests by this state in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014 and 2016 present a serious threat to the international non-proliferation regimes and international peace, security and stability.

Pyongyang’s actions are a grave violation of the UN Security Council’s resolutions and may lead to further significant aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, it is a serious threat to the international peace and security. Such acts prove the urgent necessity of entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its universalization.

Ukraine repeatedly called upon the DPRK to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, renew its dialogue with the IAEA and re-engage constructively with the international community by taking meaningful steps towards denuclearization in order to work together towards lasting peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Ukraine as a country will use all possible leverages in its capacity of a non-permanent member of the Security Council this year in order to return North Korea to the international legal framework.

Mr Chairman,

Ukraine underscores the crucial role of export controls in implementing the nuclear non-proliferation obligations under paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT. We encourage all states to establish, develop and maintain appropriate effective national export controls for nuclear and related dual-use goods and technology. We stand ready to share our national practice in the area of export control with other states.

In this regard Ukraine highly appreciates the results achieved by the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as Zangger Committee.

Recognizing the serious threat of nuclear terrorism, we reaffirm our commitment to work together with the international community to strengthen nuclear security.

Ukraine attaches great importance to the worldwide implementation and continuous improvement of the highest standards of nuclear security, especially taking into account that the nuclear-energy programme of my country stays one of the largest in Europe and includes 15 operational power units at 4 sites of Ukrainian NPPs.
Ukraine is taking all necessary measures to ensure the highest level of physical protection of nuclear facilities and material, fully performs its international obligations in the area of nuclear safety and security, and comprehensively participates in the implementation of the activities envisaged by the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan.

The necessity to immediately strengthen and adapt the regime of physical protection of nuclear facilities and material in Ukraine is primarily related to the threats emanating from ongoing aggression of Russia.

Over the past three years Ukraine significantly improved and strengthened the national regime of physical protection of its facilities and material by developing and introducing at all Ukrainian NPPs comprehensive plans of action in case of sabotage and crisis situation. We implemented projects for modernization of physical protection systems of nuclear and waste management facilities which, inter alia, were incorporated in the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan of Ukraine for 2016-2018.

We observe the recognised premise that the main responsibility for nuclear security rests with each individual state. All states have the responsibility to establish appropriate systems and take necessary measures to prevent, detect and respond to the unauthorized access to nuclear and other radioactive material.

However, the fulfilment of these commitments in good faith could be heavily undermined by the irresponsible behaviour of another state as we in fact learned from our own experience.

Mr Chairman,

Despite dramatic circumstances Ukraine remains firmly attached to its disarmament and non-proliferation choice. However, it must not be acceptable that historic decision of Ukraine to abandon nuclear weapon capabilities resulted in significant enhancement of security for all but Ukraine.

Russia’s illegal occupation and attempted annexation of part of Ukraine’s territory – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol – entailed militarization of the peninsula, including with nuclear capabilities. Such Russia’s actions breach Ukraine’s non-nuclear status.

Mr Chairman,

We highly appreciate the IAEA principled position on safeguards application to all nuclear facilities and material on the whole territory of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, in accordance with the norms of international law, the IAEA Statute and Safeguards Agreement and Additional protocol thereto between Ukraine and the Agency.

Any possible attempts of Russia to extend its jurisdiction over nuclear facilities and material of Ukraine located on the temporarily occupied territory of
Ukraine - the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol - are null and void and shall be deemed unlawful.

The goals of nuclear non-proliferation demand that Russia ceases its unlawful actions as well as abstains from any steps leading to the violation of nuclear-free status of Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr Chairman