Nuclear cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper submitted by Egypt

1. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remains one of the key pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In particular, article III (2) of the Treaty is an essential component of the non-proliferation regime. We note with concern the growing trends of ongoing cooperation in the nuclear field between certain nuclear-weapon States and States that are not parties to the Treaty. The continued activities by some States parties to the Treaty to increase cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty negatively affect agreed non-proliferation norms. Such cooperation contradicts not only the text of the Treaty but also the commitments agreed upon in previous Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty and deviates from efforts to promote and achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.

2. Such cooperation negates the bargain struck between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States based on the shared interest in preventing nuclear proliferation. It not only weakens one of the essential pillars of the Treaty but also erodes the credibility of the Treaty as a whole, constituting a challenge to the non-proliferation regime.

3. Previous Review Conferences reiterated the importance of the acceptance of the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and that any transfer of nuclear material and equipment should be conditional upon the acceptance of such safeguards. It is essential to stress that the IAEA safeguards remain a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and are essential in creating an environment conducive to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear cooperation between States parties to the Treaty. Any provision of sensitive material to or cooperation on dual-use nuclear technologies with States that are not parties to the Treaty negatively affects non-proliferation norms.

4. Egypt believes that it is of the utmost importance for States to continue to adhere to the Treaty and avoid any changes that would accord a different status to States that are not parties to the Treaty. Any continued cooperation will only blur the line between States parties and States that are not parties to the Treaty, leading to the undermining of the Treaty itself.
Actions required by the 2020 Review Conference

1. Affirm that any nuclear cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty contravenes both the text and the spirit of the Treaty and weakens the norms, rules and principles of non-proliferation.

2. Call upon all States parties to the Treaty to respect the Treaty regime’s norms, rules and principles to reinforce and strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

3. Call upon all States that are not parties to the Treaty to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States immediately and without conditions and to subject their nuclear facilities to comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA.

4. Call upon all States parties to make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty.

5. Reaffirm that any transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technology should be carried out under the IAEA full-scope safeguards and that any deviation therefrom goes against the letter and spirit of the Treaty.