STATEMENT

BY H.E. MR. SERGEY KISLYAK,
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THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

New York, May 3, 2005
Dear Mr. Chairman,

At the outset let me read the message of greetings of Vladimir V. Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, to participants and guests of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

"I send my greetings to all participants and guests of the Conference. Your representative forum addresses a vital topic - review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Russia as a State party to the Treaty and one of its Depositaries regards this instrument as an important element of the international security. Over the thirty-five years it has proved its validity, above all in prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

Today, it is on the basis of the Treaty that the new challenges facing the non-proliferation regime, including the "black" nuclear markets, can and must be addressed. This work is already underway. With Russia's active participation, the United Nations Security Council adopted its resolution 1540 which aims to prevent the transfer of dangerous materials to terrorists. In 2004, the G-8 worked out the Action Plan on Non-Proliferation.

Russia strictly complies with all of its disarmament obligations. We have been successfully implementing relevant agreements in this field and we stand ready to take further constructive steps. We expect individual countries as well as the entire international community to become our partners in ensuring stability and security.

At the same time we actively exercise the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, enshrined in the Treaty, and cooperate with the States parties to the Treaty in developing nuclear energy for peaceful nuclear research and application of nuclear technologies."
I am convinced that this forum will provide an objective analysis of the Treaty operation while decisions reached will help produce specific measures aimed at strengthening its efficiency.

I wish every success to all participants of the VII Conference.

Vladimir V. Putin

Mr. Chairman,

Russia, as an initiator of the NPT Treaty, is committed to its strengthening and universalization. The Treaty has always been and remains one of the most important pillars of international security and stability. The NPT laid down conditions for consistent and irreversible progress towards nuclear disarmament. The Treaty helps to fulfill the task of minimizing the risks of nuclear conflicts.

The Russian delegation has come to the Conference with a firm conviction that consistent implementation and strengthening the Treaty would objectively benefit the international community. We are looking forward to a constructive and substantive review of the Treaty in all its aspects, in particular of the five-year period that has elapsed since the last Conference.

We welcome Cuba and Timor-Leste's adherence to the NPT. We are satisfied to note that the high number of participants makes the Treaty the most representative international agreement in the security sphere. We continue to attach importance to the objective of making the Treaty universal. We consistently work towards having the countries that remain outside the NPT legal framework accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. Chairman,

The Russian Federation is committed to its obligations under the Treaty, including to the nuclear disarmament measures.

I would like to emphasize that ever since the last Conference we have been steadily building up our nuclear disarmament efforts. Russia fulfilled its
obligations under the START to reduce strategic nuclear arms, managing to do so well ahead of schedule.

Over the five-year period from January 1, 2000 to January 1, 2005, the Russian Federation reduced its strategic nuclear forces by 357 delivery vehicles and 1740 nuclear warheads.

By now, Russia has cut down its arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons fourfold.

In general, as compared to 1991, the total stockpile of nuclear weapons has been reduced more than fivefold.

The US-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions that provides for mutual reductions of the aggregate number of strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012, for each party has become a new significant step towards nuclear disarmament.

Our contribution to irreversible nuclear disarmament includes the implementation of the programme of reprocessing of 500 tons of highly-enriched uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons into NPP fuel. By fall of 2005, a quantitative milestone will be passed in cooperation with the USA, as we finish reprocessing 250 tons of highly-enriched uranium. This equals to elimination of many thousands of nuclear warheads.

We regard the ban on nuclear tests as a measure aimed at enhancing the non-proliferation regime. The difficulties delaying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's entry into force are well-known. The encouraging part, however, is that the number of States that have ratified it is steadily growing. As of today this number came up to 120. We hope that the CTBT, ratified by Russia in 2000, will be joined by the countries whose ratification instruments are required for the Treaty’s entry into force.

Mr. Chairman,

It is hard to overestimate the unique role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying that the NPT States parties comply with
their non-proliferation obligations. We note the progress made in the past five years in developing the IAEA safeguards system, which constitutes implementation of relevant decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. One of the main tracks here focused on expanding application of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement – an innovative instrument ensuring transparency of national nuclear programmes. To date, this document has entered into force in 65 countries. Russia plans to complete its ratification in the nearest future. At the same time more than 100 countries still do not have the Additional Protocol in place. We consider its universalization to be one of the most important fields of non-proliferation activities in the years to come. We agree with those who consider the Protocol to be a feasible measure to effectively enhance the IAEA verification capabilities.

The Russian Federation has provided and will continue to provide assistance to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including through financing a national programme of scientific and technical support of the Agency’s safeguards activities.

We respect the interest of the states in developing peaceful nuclear technologies. Our country has a long history of cooperation with many countries in this sphere. We assist the NPT State parties in building accelerators, and neutron generators, as well as supply equipment for radiography, gamma-ray treatment to name just a few. We take part in the relevant IAEA programmes.

In general, we support the broadest possible cooperation in using nuclear energy for development purposes. At the same time, it is essential to reliably exclude the use of the peaceful atom for production of nuclear explosives.

In this connection, I would like to once again draw your attention to the initiative proposed by President Vladimir V. Putin at the Millennium Summit to develop proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies. The first stage of an international project to implement it is being successfully completed under the IAEA auspices. We call on all interested countries to join the project.
We also advocate such nuclear energy development patterns that would make programmes of reliable supply of nuclear fuel on the basis of international cooperation an alternative to spread of sensitive technologies. We share the opinion of the IAEA Director General M. ElBaradei, that today there is no reason to create additional facilities for uranium enrichment or reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel. The world already has more than enough capacity. We thus support the idea of developing multilateral approaches and practical cooperation patterns in the sphere. In particular we support relevant efforts undertaken by the Agency.

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to reiterate our position in favor of the earliest possible beginning, at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), negotiations on a treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We also support the idea of establishing an Ad Hoc Committees within the CD framework to deal with nuclear disarmament issues and negative security assurances. In fact, we need to reach a comprehensive compromise on the CD programme of work that would finally unblock its practical disarmament activities. We are open to such compromises.

Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones is an effective measure of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are pleased to note that the elaboration of a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is almost completed.

We remain committed to the provisions of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Russia, as a member of the "quartet" of international mediators involved in the Middle East settlement, is consistently supporting the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in this region.

Mr. Chairman,

The past five years were shadowed with some alarming developments. The DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT; the NPT non-compliance
cases and “black” nuclear markets were exposed. The “breaches” and “non-compliances”, and “technical failures” in such a sensitive field as nuclear are always a major international problem. Such problems should be raised as decisively as possible and solved with maximum determination.

In this vein we highly appreciate meticulous and professional work by the IAEA to fix the situation. It is important that within the Agency these processes are developing not only without undermining the credibility of the Treaty, but totally relying on its inviolable norms. However, there is still a lot of work to be done to ensure the implementation of the Treaty non-proliferation requirements everywhere. This work will require extensive political consultations and complex negotiation processes. As a rule, we deal with proliferation issues in conflict-prone regions. However complicated these tasks are, we are certain that the best way to complete them is through political negotiations. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, being an integral element of international security and stability, will continue to provide foundation for that.

We positively assess Tripoli’s renunciation of its WMD programmes and the measures taken by Libya jointly with a number of states and the IAEA to eliminate elements of nuclear weapons programme.

We call for current negotiations and consultations to provide such decisions with regards to Iran’s nuclear programme that would meet the country’s legitimate energy needs on the one hand and dispel doubts as to the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, on the other. We have worked and we will continue working with all concerned countries to achieve this goal.

Despite continued tensions around the North Korea’s nuclear problem, we are convinced that this situation can be resolved through political and diplomatic means. In order to achieve this, the six-party talks should be renewed. We believe that the DPRK’s return to the NPT is not only possible but virtually essential.
The cases of non-compliance with the Treaty, the “black” markets phenomenon, and the possibility of the nuclear materials falling into the hands of the terrorists confirm the necessity to be vigilant and to strengthen in every way the non-proliferation regime. This is the major factor of ensuring each state’s national security and the security of the international community as a whole.

New challenges call for new solutions. We appreciate the wide support offered to Russian proposals on elaboration of both the UN Security Council resolution 1540 on non-proliferation and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Now the time has come for joint efforts of all states to ensure fall and universal implementation of these instruments.

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to assure you that the Russian delegation looks forward to constructive work at the Review Conference and stands ready to cooperate with all delegations in order to strengthen the NPT and the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime. We hope that the outcome of our Conference would in fact help address these issues.