Statement by
The Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Before NPT 2005 Review Conference, Main Committee I
On Nuclear Disarmament

Mr. Chairman,

At once let me congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee and assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation in carrying out your task. I would like to begin by associating my delegation with the statements already delivered by the distinguished representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement in this Committee on the wide range of issues on nuclear disarmament. Iran fully supports the positions reflected therein.

Mr. Chairman,

In the course of the negotiations leading to the NPT, a delicate and balanced package of rights and obligations was introduced according to which non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to place their facilities under the safeguard agreements. In return nuclear weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover all States Parties to the Treaty undertake to cooperate and ensure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the States Parties for peaceful use of nuclear energy in a non-selective and non-discriminatory manner.

Since 1978, when the final document of the SSODI confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority on disarmament agenda, the international community had to wait for more than two decades to witness a comparable endorsement of its long sought goal in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We should not permit the new hopes for revitalization of the issue of nuclear disarmament fade out again.

With the adoption of the 13 practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, including the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty", hopes for the implementation of this fundamental part of the NPT was renewed. The 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT, was considered to be the most important achievement of the 2000
Review Conference in the field of nuclear disarmament. This Conference would need to
seriously consider the expansion of the national reports by the nuclear weapon States with
respect to their implementation of Article VI of the Treaty to the Conference, to include
their measures adopted in implementation of the these 13 practical steps.

Since the 2000 NPT Conference, developments in the area of nuclear
disarmament have not been promising. Despite the obligations under Article VI and
undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States in 1995 and 2000, in particular the 13
practical steps, the continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear
warheads in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapons States are still threatening international
peace and security.

The non-entry into force of START II agreement, the reluctance to pursue the
START III negotiations and abrogation of the ABM Treaty are among the serious set
backs to the implementation of 13 practical steps. The international community has noted
the signature of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction in 2002. However,
reductions as stipulated in this treaty are far below the international expectations for real
steps towards total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moscow Treaty does not go beyond
de-commissioning of nuclear weapons and Parties do not have any obligation to destroy
their nuclear weapons. No verification mechanism is also envisaged. It, therefore, does not
take into account the principles of "increased transparency", "diminishing role for
nuclear weapons" and "irreversibility" which were agreed by the nuclear-weapon States
in the 2000 NPT Conference.

During the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed
themselves to "the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral
initiatives and as integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process". In spite of
that, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by the nuclear
weapon States.

The adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States, provides for the
development of new types of nuclear weapons, possible use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and targeting nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapons States Parties to the Treaty, in contradiction with the assurances given
by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the NPT and its indefinite
extension. My delegation intends to address this issue as well as the general question of
"security assurances" in its proper stage allocated to the issue in the Conference.

At the earlier stage, the questions raised over the new posture review were simply
refused as being based on an unofficial paper reports. Yet today is spite of allocation of
hundreds of millions of dollars in projects aimed at developing mini-nuclear weapons or
the so-called bunker busters, they are claimed to be simple research programs. This
Conference has an urgent task to alleviate the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States
over the development of new nuclear weapons and should consider a decision on
prohibition of development and production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly
mini-nukes as well as a ban on construction of any new facility for the development and production of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, real concerns of the international community over vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons transfer and deployment of nuclear weapons in territories of non-nuclear-weapons States, lowering the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons and the danger of using such plurarmi weapons in conventional conflicts and against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, remains unabated.

Mr. Chairman,

In accordance with Article I of the NPT “Each nuclear-weapon State to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly”. Contrary to this obligation hundreds of nuclear weapons have been and are still deployed in other countries and air forces of non-nuclear weapon states train delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. In the same context, the nuclear sharing between nuclear weapon States and between nuclear weapon States and capable nuclear weapon States not parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for NPT parties. The nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under Article I by refraining from nuclear sharing, no matter what the pretext or under any kind of security arrangements or military alliance.

Furthermore, the Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources of devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the NPT, without exception and in particular to Israel, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and its continued program for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries in the Middle East and to the international peace and security.

Although as a positive note nuclear testing moratorium has been maintained after the CTBT signature, some efforts are underway in United States to allocate millions of dollars to reduce the time necessary to resume a nuclear test up to 18 months that put into question their commitment on moratorium. The prospect for the CTBT entry into force has faced a serious set back by the rejection of the ratification process by the United States. Similarly at the time the prospect for commencing the negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was high the unwarranted insistence from the same country for excluding the element of verification from the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to be established at the CD has created an obstacle for the realization of this long standing commitment of the international community. It is time to seriously consider that by changing the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, no basis is remained to allow for the commencement of the Cut-Off Treaty negotiations.
While the new issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation threats and the role of non-state actors should be dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused to justify the pursuit of programs on new nuclear weapons systems and the ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations. Specific threats may not be resolved through resorting to more dangerous weapons with catastrophic consequences going well beyond any other threats in scope and effects.

The NPT Review Process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted by consensus in the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Parties to the Treaty particularly the nuclear-weapon States should engage in good faith in substantive work of the Conference for the speedy and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty including Article VI and the commitments made within 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.

We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as the highest priority and as soon as possible of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been an important issue since the inception of the NPT.

The 2006 NPT Review Conference in paragraph 2 under ‘Article VII Chapter’ of its Final Document reaffirmed the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthens the nuclear proliferation regime and called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference. In view of this agreement, despite the inability of the Preparatory Committee, the NPT Review Conference has a clear mandate to make a decision on Negative Security Assurances.

We regret that the Preparatory Committee was disabled from producing recommendations on the Security Assurances to the 2005 Review Conference. Therefore, we propose that the Conference would establish an AD-Hoc Committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument on providing security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and to submit the draft of the legal instrument to the next Review Conference for its consideration and adoption.
As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use and NSA, we believe that as suggested by the NGO community this Conference should adopt a decision through which the Conference "decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited."

Mr. Chairman

In concluding let me express our disappointment and dismay that the delegation of the United States instead of opting to focus on the efforts that it has taken to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty, attempts, as cover-up of backward accusations and passing arbitrary unjustified judgments against my country, through presenting completely distorted facts and conclusions which are in contradiction with the reports and decisions of the IAEA and its Board of Governors. Despite the futile tremendous efforts by the United States, no member state or IAEA document, inter alia has referred to the non-compliance of Iran with the NPT, although a very unhappy and frustrated case for the United States. The IAEA, on the contrary has concluded in one of its latest documents that following extensive inspections of all relevant facilities in Iran no trace has been found to show any diversion of the Iranian activities to other than peaceful purposes.

It is unfortunate, Mr. Chairman, that the legacy of Mr. Bolton remains to be pursued and pronounced in this Conference by stressing that the United States does not have particular obligations under Article IV of the Treaty and the US delegation should utilize every forum available to direct politically motivated accusations against Iran.

I thank you.