STATEMENT

DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
TO THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (NPT)

ON ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY
The Russian Federation is committed to the objective of nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this connection, we believe that complete elimination of nuclear arms can only be achieved through a gradual, phased movement towards the ultimate objective on the basis of a comprehensive approach and with the participation of all nuclear powers and, certainly, in conditions of sustained strategic stability.

The Treaty of unlimited duration between the USSR and the US on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (the INF Treaty) that entered into force on June 1, 1988, was a major step forward in this direction. This actually unprecedented Treaty completely eliminated two classes of land-based missiles — the medium range missiles with a range of 1000 to 5500 km and shorter range missiles with a range of 500 to 1000 km — and banned future production and testing of such missiles. The Russian Federation fully meets its obligations under the INF Treaty.

The next step was the conclusion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) which entered into force on December 5, 1994, following the withdrawal of all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union to the Russian territory, and after Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine had joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.

Under that Treaty the Parties assumed the obligation to reduce, after seven years following its entry into force, the number of their strategic delivery vehicles to 1600 and the number of nuclear warheads attributed to them to 6000 for each side. Russia fulfilled its obligations completely and ahead of the Treaty schedule with respect to those reductions and, as of the target date of December 5, 2001, reduced the actual number of its deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) to 1136 and the number of warheads attributed to them to 5518.
While the Russian Federation has implemented its reduction obligations under the START Treaty, it is continuing to eliminate its strategic offensive arms. To date, the Russian side has eliminated more than 1,320 ICBM and SLBM launchers, more than 2,650 ICBMs and SLBMs, 45 nuclear submarines and 66 heavy bombers. As of January 1, 2005, Russia possessed 981 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4,732 warheads accountable to them under the START Treaty. Since the last Review Conference, Russia has eliminated more than 350 ICBM and SLBM launchers and reduced the aggregate number of warheads by 1,740 pieces. These figures clearly demonstrate the Russian Federation’s real contribution to the fulfillment of its obligations under the NPT.

The last nuclear warhead withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine to Russia was eliminated in October 2001.

As it was acknowledged in the UNGA resolutions 57/68 and 59/34, the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions that entered into force on June 1, 2003 (the Moscow Treaty) is an important step toward nuclear disarmament.

The Moscow Treaty calls for considerable strategic offensive reductions. In accordance with its provisions, Russia and the United States of America have to reduce, by December 31, 2012, the levels of their respective strategic nuclear warheads to the aggregate number of 1,700–2,290, that is approximately threefold as compared to the maximum limit set forth in the START.

Russia consistently fulfills its obligations under the Moscow Treaty.

Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation has repeatedly stated that our country is prepared to further reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to a lower level than the level provided for by the Moscow Treaty, that is to 1,500 warheads.

With regard to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, I would like to touch upon the matters of reduction of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons (TNW). In this respect, I would like to state that the TNW arsenal of the Russian Federation has been reduced by three quarters as compared to the Soviet inheritance. We will further reduce TNW. All TNWs have been withdrawn from
the former USSR republics and accumulated at central storage facilities strictly within the national territory, with its safety and security ensured in a proper way.

Improving the effectiveness of the control over the security of nuclear weapons is achieved through both organizational and technical measures. In particular, since 1991 the total amount of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been reduced more than fivefold, and the number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has been cut by four times. As it has already been mentioned, all the non-strategic nuclear weapons have been transferred to the Ministry of Defense central storage facilities. This has made it possible to concentrate financial resources on ensuring the security and reliable protection of the nuclear munitions storage facilities using state-of-the-art technical means of security and physical protection.

Russia has developed and introduced a set of measures to counter terrorist actions. We carry out periodic comprehensive checks of all facilities which pose nuclear and radiation risks in terms of security and readiness to prevent terrorist actions.

In August 2004, full-scale exercise of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency was conducted in the Murmansk Region, titled “Avaria 2004”. This exercise were attended by 48 observers from 17 NATO member States. Undoubtedly, this exercise clearly demonstrated to the international community the real situation in the field of nuclear weapons storage and transportation safety and security in the Russian Federation, as well as confirmed the high degree of preparedness of emergency units to immediately respond to nuclear weapons-related unexpected incidents. A total of more than 2000 people and more than 590 units of equipment of the Ministry of Defense and Federal Atomic Energy Agency were involved in the exercise.

Such an unprecedented transparency measure in such a sensitive field confirmed the efficiency of the nuclear weapons safety and security policy pursued by the Russian Federation.
Those and other steps prove that the Russian Federation is on the way
towards phased nuclear disarmament and its strategic offensive arms reductions. At
the same time, the Russian Federation bears in mind and successively and strictly
fulfills its obligations under the existing treaties to eliminate and reduce the
stockpile of chemical weapons, which requires significant financial resources.

One of the key elements of narrowing down the geographic sphere of
nuclear weapons’ presence is establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in
various parts of the world. We support the efforts by states seeking to establish
such zones. We consider NWFZs as a real contribution toward strengthening the
nuclear non-proliferation regime in light of the need to intensify efforts to counter
with new challenges and threats.

In our view, the NWFZs are also an important element of confidence-
building among states, strengthening international stability and security and
promoting arms control processes at the global and regional levels.

I would also like to make the following points.

The decisions on detargeting nuclear weapons are an important confidence
building measure. As a result of their implementation, all Russian ballistic missiles
have a so-called “zero” flight mission plan.

Along with treaties on nuclear weapons limitations and reductions we attach
particular importance to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Russia ratified the CTBT in 2000 and is pursuing a principled course toward
ensuring the earliest possible entry into force of that Treaty, one of the most
important instruments in the area of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear
weapons limitation.

We are concerned by the situation around the CTBT’s entry into force. To
date not all of the countries whose accession to the Treaty is key to its entry into
force have ratified it. We can only express regret in this respect.
I also wish to note that our steps toward nuclear disarmament are accompanied by relevant structural changes in the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons sector. We have reduced by one half our industrial capacity that is excessive for defensive purposes. Together with the United States we are working toward shutting down the Russian industrial uranium-graphite reactors for the weapon-grade plutonium production. The material produced by those facilities is not used for military purposes. Moreover, Russia ceased to produce uranium for nuclear weapons long ago.

We attach great importance to the earliest possible start of disposition by Russia and the United States of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium for each side that is no longer required for defensive purposes. This would ensure the start of the process of irreversible transformation of excessive amounts of weapon-grade plutonium into forms unusable for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

As we have repeatedly stated, Russia supports the beginning of negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on elaboration of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation has consistently opposed deployment of any types of weapons in outer space. The placement of weapons in space is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire arms control process, strategic stability and international security as a whole. Eventually a new spiral of arms race will become possible in the space, as well as on the Earth, in both the nuclear and missile sphere and other spheres.

In order to prevent such situation, we – in cooperation with China and a number of other states – brought before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a document on possible elements for a future international legal agreement on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space. At the 59th session of the UN General Assembly, we made another prominent step ahead, when we announced that we will not be the first to deploy weapons of any kind in outer space. We call on all the states with space capabilities to join this measure aimed at preserving peaceful status of space.
Mr. Chairman,

This demonstrates that the Russian Federation is determined to move ahead towards the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and, most importantly, proves this determination in practice.