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Statement

By

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at

The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Main Committee I

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Mr. Chairman,

Let me begin by congratulating you on your election to the chairmanship of Main Committee I. I am confident that under your stewardship this Committee will reap fruitful outcomes. I assure you of any delegation’s full support and cooperation throughout the deliberations of the Committee.

The disarmament obligations by nuclear-weapon States laid out in Article VI of the Treaty are fundamental to the full implementation of the Treaty. We view the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals as one of the key commitments under the NPT. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually complementary and reinforcing to achieve the goals of the NPT. As such, we deem it peremptory that no less attention should be paid to the fulfillment of disarmament obligations by nuclear-weapon States than to the other two pillars of the NPT.

In parallel with the strengthened call for non-nuclear-weapon States to solidify their non-proliferation commitments, nuclear-weapon States must also do their part by taking substantive steps toward disarmament as required by the Treaty. Through substantial and unequivocal progress made on disarmament, we believe that nuclear-weapon States would enhance their moral authority with which to discourage the potential proliferators from seeking nuclear ambitions, by assuring them that the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is indeed seriously pursued and universally shared.

In reality, the security environment at the national, regional and global level is an important factor in determining the nature and characteristics of nuclear disarmament. Different security environments often call for different approaches to disarmament. Taking note of these realities, we support practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it is imperative that the international community make every effort to foster a favorable environment for nuclear disarmament, preferably through a combination of unilateral, bilateral, regional and global endeavors and initiatives.
While we welcome the significant progress made thus far in shrinking nuclear stockpiles in nuclear-weapon States and the commitments to further reductions under the Moscow Treaty, we expect deeper cuts and further engagements by nuclear-weapon States. We take note of the growing perception gap between nuclear haves and have-nots surrounding the implementation of disarmament obligations both in quantitative and qualitative perspectives. We believe this narrowing of perception gap would boost the moral authority and political legitimacy of nuclear-weapon States in strengthening non-proliferation norms while sustaining the delicate balance among the three main pillars of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

In this connection, we underscore the importance of the faithful implementation of the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. First and foremost, the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is important. We call upon those States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, particularly those eleven States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, to do so without delay. In addition, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, it is imperative to maintain the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.

At the same time, we call for prompt commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and its early conclusion. In the meantime, pending the entry into force of the FMCT, we call upon all nuclear-weapon States and the non-NPT States to declare and abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. We also call for the early normalization of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as an eligible body to start negotiations on the FMCT.

We attach importance to transparency and accountability of nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their disarmament obligations. Enhanced transparency and accountability will be conducive to reducing controversy surrounding the process of dismantling nuclear arsenals. In this regard, we encourage nuclear-weapon States to report disarmament progress to the international community on a regular basis. Nuclear-weapon States are also encouraged to report on their nuclear stockpiles and inventories of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Despite our clear-cut support for regular reporting, however, given currently divergent views among States Parties on the
modality of reporting, my delegation is sympathetic with the view that reporting can be flexible in its scope, format and framework.

Mr. Chairman,

While the Republic of Korea stands firmly behind international non-proliferation endeavors and agrees that they must be enhanced and strengthened, we believe that these efforts will work best when they address the root causes of proliferation. We believe that the most effective way to prevent proliferation is to eliminate the incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons. While ensuring that nuclear options are ultimately negative to the security interests of the proliferator. Insecurity, real or perceived, is in many instances a key motive for the pursuit of nuclear weapons. In dealing with these complexities, the international community must redouble its efforts to alleviate security concerns that have prevented certain states from joining the NPT and caused others to clandestinely pursue nuclear weapons capabilities.

As a practical means of reducing the sense of insecurity, we support the concept of negative security assurances. In this regard, we believe that nuclear-weapon States should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that faithfully meet their NPT and other safeguards obligations. At the same time, we also recognize the value of providing enhanced security assurances and other incentives to those States Parties that voluntarily accept additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the parameters of the NPT.

Given the time constraints, I'll not reiterate my Government’s position on the other elements, which is included in my Government’s working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.42) titled “Views on substantive issues of the 2005 Review Conference.”

Thank you.