Mr. Chairman

The NPT Review Conference is entitled to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, including Nuclear Disarmament as one of its main pillars. This Conference provides the best forum for a thorough review of the implementation of provisions of the Treaty oriented to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, namely Articles I, II and VI as well as the objectives inherent in the Preamble of the Treaty.

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. The NPT is the sole clear and achievable multilateral instrument with the membership of all nuclear-weapon States which provides the legal basis to reverse the nuclear arms race and avert the danger of nuclear war, through the achievement of the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving nuclear disarmament all States bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear assets, to take practical measures to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context, we have listened carefully to the statements made by the nuclear-weapon States in the Committee, containing reports on their implementation of provisions related to nuclear disarmament.

Today our world remains more than ever alarmed by the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and is convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war. The international community has the right to be assured that the humiliation that visited upon the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never happen again. The nuclear-weapon States in this respect have the basic and fundamental obligations to particularly implement relevant provisions of the Treaty stipulated in its Articles I and VI to effectively aiming at creating a world completely free from the horror of nuclear weapons.

Following the end of the cold war and termination of the East-West confrontation, some serious attempts were exerted to revitalize nuclear disarmament and the agreements such as START were initiated to drastically reduce the nuclear weapons stockpiles.
Unfortunately this process was discontinual, and despite the high expectations of the international community for the practical nuclear disarmament measure by nuclear-weapon States, including the efforts to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons and remove the operational status of their nuclear weapons and de-targeting, this process was reversed.

Some nuclear-weapon States continued, however, to be more progressive in taking practical measures such as those adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which I take note in this respect the initiatives taken by the United Kingdom as also referred to in the previous meeting of this Committee. But the global success of such efforts will require that they would be promoted and followed by all nuclear-weapon States, particularly by those with the largest size and quantities of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

In contrast, some significant developments have been served as serious setback to the Treaty obligations with respect to nuclear disarmament. It is unfortunate that as a matter of principle there is a misunderstanding concept propagated that the nuclear-weapon States do not have any legal and seen political obligation under the NPT for nuclear disarmament. One high ranking official of a nuclear-weapon State has, inter alia, stated recently that “Article VI is just one sentence long”. He argues that since Article VI does not refer to nuclear-weapon States, does not provide any timetable and sets no deadline for the accomplishment of nuclear disarmament, and it “contains no suggestion that nuclear disarmament is to be achieved before general and complete disarmament”. In his assessment, Article VI of the NPT does not provide any commitment for the nuclear-weapon States to conclude any agreement or reducing their arsenals.

In the same context, the adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review which serves as the basis for the US nuclear policy in terms of operationalization and planning, introduces elements which are contrary to the obligations undertaken under Article VI of the Treaty. This Posture Review particularly recognizes the critical role of nuclear weapons by stating that “nuclear weapons capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States option to hold at risk classes of targets important to achieve strategic and political objectives”. It has furthermore specified certain countries, among them non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT to be as real and potential targets to be involved in immediate, potential contingencies, although not on a daily basis.

The Nuclear Posture Review furthermore recognizes “the need for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to require underground nuclear testing if required.” Allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to the construction and developments of new nuclear weapon systems such as mini-nuclear weapons or the so-called tactical nuclear weapons are all practical efforts to implement the policy guidelines. The Development of such program can contrary to the nuclear-weapon States’ obligation to systematic reduction of nuclear weapons.
During the 2000 Review Conference, nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to "the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process." The nuclear-weapon States, moreover, should engage immediately and in good faith in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of their obligations under the Treaty, in particular Article VI and the commitments under the 1995 decision on principles and objectives and the resolution on the Middle East. The new nuclear policy by the United States is not compatible with the principles adopted by the NPT States Parties particularly those related to the application of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility in any agreement for the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

Israel's unsafeguarded facilities and nuclear arsenal is a real threat to all countries of the region and to International Peace and Security. The cooperation extended to Israel has increased the nuclear weapon capability of Israel at the mercy of peace and security in the region. The NPT in its Article III.2 commits all States to refrain from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the treaty, unless they are placed under the IAEA safeguards. Nuclear-weapon States are committed to comply with their commitments to the full implementation of Article I, and should refrain from nuclear sharing, under any kind of security arrangements among themselves with non-nuclear weapon states, and those not party to the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear-weapon States have undertaken under Article I of the treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Today the deployment of nuclear weapons in other countries, are extremely integrated into the military infrastructure of the countries hosting these weapons. Cold war rationales and suggesting vague missions such as war prevention, or attempts directing at deterring proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have not been sufficient in providing justifications the installation of this large number of nuclear weapons in other territories.

At a time where a need to build a foundation for a global partnership against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is high on the agenda, such transatlantic transfer of nuclear weapons and the subsequent efforts to modernize the nuclear posture by clinging to outdated Cold War arrangements and justifications raises serious questions for the public opinion. Dormant hundreds of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapon States and the training of the fighter-bomber pilots of those countries to prepare for handling and delivering the nuclear bombs against nuclear as well as non-nuclear weapon States involves very serious safety and security risks that has warned many in the host States. The danger of nuclear incidents by non-state actors and terrorists require a viable solution to deal with such transferred weapons. This has made many including parliamentarians in those countries to request for the withdrawal of nuclear forces from their territories.