Mr. Chairman

I would like to begin by associating my delegation with the statement already delivered by the distinguished representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been an important issue since the inception of the NPT.

In the early 1980s, all five nuclear-weapon States, in response to the international demand for a treaty on negative security assurances against nuclear weapons, as a first limited step, accepted some qualified undertakings not to use such weapons against States parties to the NPT and those which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons.

In early April 1995, this pledge was reaffirmed through unilateral statements by nuclear-weapon States and on 11 April 1995, just days before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, UN Security Council Resolution 984 was adopted taking note of these unilateral statements and recognizing "the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive assurances." The Security Council is also very explicit in "considering that the ... resolution constitutes a step in this direction."

The unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and the Security Council resolution were "taking note of, in a package of decisions, by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Principle 5 of the Decision on Principles and Objectives stipulated that "further steps should be considered to ensure non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument."

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Today, as an effect of the Nuclear Posture Review in 2001, the non-nuclear-weapon States are more than ever under the real threat of use of nuclear weapons. The United States through its development of new types of easy-to-use nuclear weapons and naming non-nuclear-weapon States as targets of such humanitarian weaponry, is clearly violating its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty and putting its commitment to its 1995 unilateral statement under serious question. Contrary to some claims, the development of mini-usable nuclear or so-called bunker busters are not mere studies. Hundreds of millions of dollars have already been allocated to the nuclear weapon development project and the international community should not await the deployment or even use of such weapons to react.

The 1995 unilateral statement and the subsequent UN Security Council resolution are inseparable parts of the deal over the indefinite extension of the Treaty and the efforts undermining multilateral achievement in the field of disarmament and other, is now seriously undermining the very credibility of the NPT.

The very fact that the one nuclear-weapon States feels free to further qualify and practically withdraws the essence of its commitment under its 1995 unilateral statement, is a clear indication that time has arrived to further step to be taken in this direction.

This considers the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and finding, the total elimination of these inhuman weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority by the international community.

We regret that the Preparatory Committee was disabled from producing such recommendations. It is abhorrent that during the same period, the dangerous doctrine of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and threats were officially proclaimed by the United States and NATO.

Therefore, we propose that the Conference would establish an Ad-Hoc Committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument on providing security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and to submit the draft of the legal instrument to the next Review Conference for its consideration and adoption.

As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use and NSA, we believe that as suggested by the NGO community this conference should adopt a decision through which the Conference "decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited."

We strongly urge this Conference to move a step forward and to make a concrete decision on the Negative Security Assurances to assure non-nuclear-weapon States.