STATMENT

by

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2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Main Committee II

United Nations
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-CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY-
Mr Chairman,

Through the statement by Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union, Sweden’s views on non-proliferation have largely been covered. In the Swedish national statement in the general debate, the interdependence between disarmament and non-proliferation as well as regional issues of particular concern, were discussed in some detail. Here, I will limit myself to a few questions of particular relevance to this committee.

Mr Chairman,

The NPT constitutes the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, some states still remain outside the Treaty. We have had cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations. One country has announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and recently declared that it possesses nuclear weapons. Neither terrorist organizations nor individuals involved in international nuclear networks consider themselves bound by the Treaty. This demonstrates that states’ adherence to the Treaty does not in itself constitute a complete guarantee against proliferation.

Mr Chairman,

Events in recent years have exposed weaknesses in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. A number of lessons can, and must, be learnt and action needs to be taken.

First a general observation: instruments available to prevent nuclear proliferation work well when properly and fully implemented. This goes for IAEA verification when an additional protocol is in place, export controls, physical protection of nuclear material as well as the mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance. The problem is that this is not always the case.

When IAEA has the authority it needs, its verification is effective. The additional protocol gives the Agency the necessary authority. We now have to move towards universalizing adherence to the additional protocol without further delay. This conference should affirm that the additional protocol, together with the comprehensive safeguards agreements, now represent the verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty.

On various occasions we have been confronted with breaches of non-proliferation obligations. As has been pointed out by others, a new strategic consensus at the UN Security Council needs to be forged on how to handle non-compliance with the NPT and Safeguards Agreements, as well as on how to deal with a situation where a State Party announces its withdrawal from the NPT. It is of crucial importance that the Security Council fulfils its mandate to ensure and uphold compliance with the Treaty and with Safeguards Agreements when notified by the IAEA of non-compliance.

IAEA access to the UN Security Council is of utmost importance, particularly, though not exclusively, in cases of non-compliance. Sweden therefore supports the United Nations Secretary-General’s encouragement of the Security Council to regularly invite the IAEA Director General to brief the Council on the status of safeguards and verification processes.

Cases of violations of non-proliferation obligations and one announced withdrawal illustrate the need for a strengthened institutional framework. With such a framework and proper
mechanisms, States Parties would be put in a better position to assist in responding to challenges to the Treaty.

Mr Chairman,

Treaty-bound non-proliferation obligations must be complemented by strict and effective **national export controls**. Such controls indeed constitute an essential means for the States Parties to the NPT to fulfill their non-proliferation obligations. At the same time, the assurances following from such controls serve to facilitate co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The importance and necessity of strong national export controls have been recognised by UNSCR 1540. In fact, this resolution places a binding obligation upon all UN Member States to have in place such controls. From this follows that all states must introduce relevant national legislation and control lists, establish an appropriate institutional framework for the implementation of these rules and regulations and ensure strict enforcement. This requires national efforts both at the institutional level and at the level of practical implementation.

This is why UNSCR 1540 also encourages states, which are in a position to do so, to respond to specific requests for assistance to fulfill the obligations under the resolution. Sweden, for its part, is prepared to consider such requests to help implement the resolution. As current chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Sweden also wishes to point out that the NSG and its individual Participating Governments can provide models for effective national export control systems, as well as expertise and experience with respect to the establishment, implementation and enforcement of such systems.

Mr Chairman,

The right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is central to the NPT. However, in exercising this right we must all ensure that the relevant dual-use products and technologies do not fall into the wrong hands for non-peaceful purposes. That is why it is incumbent on all States Parties to establish and maintain strict and effective national control systems. In doing so, we honour our non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and contribute to promoting an environment conducive to co-operation for peaceful purposes in the nuclear field.

Before concluding this part of my statement, Mr Chairman, I would like to draw your attention to the remark made by the UN Secretary-General in his address to this conference on the Janus-like character of nuclear energy. "The regime" he underlined, "will not be sustainable if scores more States develop the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle and are equipped with the technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice – and, of course, each individual State which does this only will leave others to feel that they must do the same”.

Mr Chairman,

Sweden currently holds the chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). On that basis, I wish to give the Committee an overview of the activities of the NSG since the last Review Conference.
The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do this through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. As members we follow fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls by ensuring that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At the same time the Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in these areas by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with nuclear non-proliferation norms. The Guidelines and their Annexes are published as IAEA Information Circular 254, Part 1 and Part 2.

At present the number of NSG Participating Governments stands at 44. The European Commission participates in the Group's meetings as a permanent observer. A list of the NSG Participants is attached to this statement.

Mr Chairman,

Since the Review Conference in 2000 a number of developments have taken place impacting on the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. On the positive side, the international community has welcomed Libya's voluntary decision to eliminate materials, equipment and programmes leading to the production of nuclear weapons. On the negative side, obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA have been flouted. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 have brought the terrorist threat to the fore. And the discovery of elements of a covert international proliferation trafficking network has demonstrated that certain actors have delivered nuclear equipment and technology to proliferators. In the process they have also misused the territories of States with insufficiently strong export controls.

In order to counter these proliferation threats the NSG, for its part, has taken a number of steps:

- The NSG has called on all States to exercise extreme vigilance to make the best efforts that none of their exports of goods and technologies contribute to nuclear weapons programmes or unsafeguarded activities;

- At its Extraordinary Plenary Meeting in Vienna in December 2002, the Group agreed to several comprehensive amendments to strengthen its Guidelines to prevent and counter the threat of diversion of nuclear exports to nuclear terrorism;

- In order to further strengthen Participating Government's national export controls, the Göteborg Plenary in May 2004 decided to adopt a "catch-all" mechanism in the NSG Guidelines. This mechanism provides for the introduction of a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the NSG control lists;

- The Group has also taken steps to enhance its information exchange concerning proliferation threats.

NSG Participants continue to discuss ways to further strengthen the Guidelines in order to address the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the unrestricted spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. At present, this work takes place in preparation of the next Plenary Meeting to be held in Oslo, Norway, on 23-24 June 2005.
The NSG also attaches great importance to transparency in its activities. Our outreach programme, which is directed towards States both inside and outside the NPT, plays an important role to achieve this goal. This programme is also consistent with UNSCR 1540, which calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation. In addition to contacts with our outreach partners in the margins of the IAEA General Conference, the programme also includes visits to capitals for a strengthened dialogue. These contacts provide an excellent opportunity to discuss more in detail proliferation threats, the work of the NSG, the status of national export control systems and possible needs for technical assistance to strengthen these systems. At the 2004 Göteborg Plenary NSG Participants also agreed to strengthen contacts with non-partners through seminars and other joint activities.

Further information on the NSG with respect to its origins, role and activities is published as IAEA Information Circular 539.

Mr Chairman,

NSG Participants welcome the recognition by UNSCR 1540 of the importance of export controls to non-proliferation, as well as its decision that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including establishing end-use controls. The resolution also invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests for support to establish such controls. The NSG, for its part, has informed the Chairman of the 1540 Committee that the Group fully supports the resolution and stands ready to contribute to its implementation. The NSG can provide models for strict and effective national export control systems as well as expertise and a vast experience of practical implementation of such systems.

Mr Chairman,

In conclusion, I wish to underline that the NSG will continue to be guided by the objectives of supporting nuclear non-proliferation and facilitating the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Universal transparency of the NSG Guidelines and the Control Lists will continue through their publication as IAEA InformationCirculars. The NSG also remains open to admitting further supplier countries as Participating Governments. And the Group is committed to the further promotion of openness and transparency in its practises and policies.

Thank you, Mr Chairman
NSG PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS
AND PERMANENT OBSERVERS

Participating Governments

1. ARGENTINA
2. AUSTRALIA
3. AUSTRIA
4. BELARUS
5. BELGIUM
6. BRAZIL
7. BULGARIA
8. CANADA
9. CHINA
10. CYPRUS
11. CZECH REPUBLIC
12. DENMARK
13. ESTONIA
14. FINLAND
15. FRANCE
16. GERMANY
17. GREECE
18. HUNGARY
19. IRELAND
20. ITALY
21. JAPAN
22. KAZAKHSTAN
23. REPUBLIC OF KOREA
24. LATVIA
25. LITHUANIA
26. LUXEMBOURG
27. MALTA
28. NETHERLANDS
29. NEW ZEALAND
30. NORWAY
31. POLAND
32. PORTUGAL
33. ROMANIA
34. RUSSIAN FEDERATION
35. SLOVAK REPUBLIC
36. SLOVENIA
37. SOUTH AFRICA
38. SPAIN
39. SWEDEN
40. SWITZERLAND
41. TURKEY
42. UKRAINE
43. UNITED KINGDOM
44. UNITED STATES

Permanent Observer:

1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION