The Delegation of the United States of America to the
2005 Review Conference of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
2-27 May, 2005

U.S. STATEMENT

to the

2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

PEACEFUL COOPERATION,
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

New York
May 2005
Thank you Madam Chairwoman:

The United States delegation recognizes the importance of Article IV, especially at this particular time. Our first statement to this Committee focused on the linkage established in Article IV between compliance with the NPT's non-proliferation obligations and the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. We appreciate the opportunity to present our views on the substantial record of U.S. support for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and also to address the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programs.

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

We believe that the substantial record of U.S. support for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shows clearly the depth of our commitment to Article IV.

In 1979 when the NPT entered into force, there were 12 operating power reactors in states that would eventually join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS). Today there are 214 power reactors, and many of them were either supplied by the United States or were built using commercially-licensed U.S. technology. Historically, the United States has been the major exporter of enrichment services and fuel to the world's power reactors. Of the approximately 90 research reactors currently in operation in NPT NNWS today, about 60 were originally supplied by the United States and/or use fuel provided by the United States. The U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute estimates the value of annual nuclear commerce from the United States to other countries in the range of $1.2 billion.

In addition to our 21 agreements for nuclear cooperation that permit exports of fuel and reactors to 45 NPT parties, we have many other bilateral mechanisms in place that promote peaceful nuclear cooperation. The U.S. Department of Energy sister laboratory agreements with nine NPT parties pair up nuclear research establishments to promote scientific exchanges and training, as well as collaborative projects. We are particularly proud of our joint committees on nuclear energy cooperation, which began with a U.S.-South Korea committee established in the mid 1970s. More recently, following their adherence to the NPT, we were pleased to begin similar collaboration with Argentina and Brazil, and hope to do so in the near future with South Africa. These joint committees meet once or twice a year and focus in great detail on both policy and technical questions relevant to civil nuclear applications.
Through the Technical Cooperation Program of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we have supported nuclear cooperation in fields ranging from nuclear power to nuclear applications in human health, agriculture, hydrology, and other areas. In the period since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, we have provided nearly $100 million to support the Agency’s technical cooperation activities and these funds have been expended in nearly 100 developing countries.

Looking at where we are today, we see impressive results. Let’s look at one example. In the area of human health, the IAEA in cooperation with the World Health Organization, has launched a new Program of Action for Cancer Therapy to raise public awareness and to assist Member States to analyze, develop, and implement appropriate cancer treatment programs, mainly by expanding fundraising efforts with non-traditional donors. By 2015, two-thirds of the cancer cases will be in the developing world. Yet, many developing countries lack the radiotherapy equipment and professional expertise necessary to fight the growing battle. Currently, there are approximately 150 active technical cooperation projects involving radiotherapy. My government is pleased to provide seed money to support the Agency’s program in this area, which we believe can provide benefits to millions of people worldwide. A broad range of peaceful nuclear cooperation activities pursued in conformity with NPT non-proliferation obligations can make a substantial constructive difference in the lives of people everywhere.

Safety and Security

Parties have long recognized that peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be safe and secure. The terrible Chernobyl accident in 1986 and the horrors of September 11, 2001 made that realization more acute. Collectively, the world knows that a significant accident or successful terrorist attack in one country could threaten the viability of peaceful nuclear uses worldwide and carry devastating economic, environmental, and health effects.

Ensuring the security and safety of peaceful nuclear programs requires a comprehensive approach involving all states. While nuclear safety and security remain a sovereign responsibility, the IAEA plays an important role in assisting states to strengthen their ability to ensure the safety and security of their programs. As of March 31, 2005, 26 Member States, the EU, and one non-governmental organization have pledged $38 million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund in support of key program activities to combat nuclear terrorism. The United States has contributed two-thirds of that total and remains centrally involved in the program’s development.
We have taken a leading role at the IAEA to enhance safety and security standards. The United States is an active party to the Nuclear Safety Convention, the Joint Conventions on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and actively supports the diplomatic process to strengthen key CPPNM provisions. We played a strong role in revising the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, adopted by the IAEA Board and General Conference in 2003. The United States has, along with the G-8, lent strong political and economic support to ensure these standards are met.

We will continue to provide assistance in implementing the IAEA's revised Code of Conduct, because it strengthens vital norms and practices for radioactive source security, national tracking of sources, access and export controls, and export notifications. We welcome the new IAEA policy, adopted by the Board and General Conference in 2004, to accelerate its program to help countries establish regulatory controls for radioactive sources. We endorse this policy, with commit financial and technical resources to it, and urge others to do the same.

The United States has recently launched, with the IAEA, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. This multilateral program identifies, recovers, secures and facilitates the disposition of high-risk nuclear and radioactive materials around the world that pose a threat to the international community. This initiative seeks to accelerate and expand existing threat reduction efforts, including repatriation of Russian and U.S.-origin research reactor fuel and conversion of civil research reactors worldwide to low enriched uranium fuel.

**Nuclear Fuel Cycle**

One of the most important issues that this Committee will discuss concerns the nuclear fuel cycle. Over the past two years, there have been a number of proposals by President Bush, the IAEA Director General and the UN High Level Panel to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies that can provide access to weapons-usable nuclear material, specifically enrichment and reprocessing. These capabilities can be and have been misused by certain non-nuclear-weapon States. Parties to support clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons in violation of their NPT commitments. In our earlier statement, the U.S. delegation outlined President Bush's proposals in this area, which would ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel at reasonable cost to NPT parties that comply with their obligations.
and forego such technologies. While there are many competitive sources of fuel supply at the current time, we would welcome more attention on ways to provide assurance of supply in nuclear fuel services at a reasonable cost so as to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities to additional countries.

The international community clearly recognizes the problem posed by proliferation of these sensitive technologies. Efforts to solve this problem are only beginning and will require much serious discussion. As these discussions continue within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the G-8, the IAEA, and at this Review Conference -- it is important to "keep our eye on the ball" -- to use a colloquial U.S. expression. Any solution should make it more difficult for these NPT parties seeking nuclear weapons to acquire enrichment or reprocessing facilities, whether openly or secretly, while not impairing the ongoing genuinely peaceful nuclear programs of the vast majority of NPT parties. Clearly, however, any state not currently having enrichment or reprocessing facilities that elects to build such a facility must expect great scrutiny of that decision on economic and nonproliferation grounds. As we have established in other statements, Iran's decision clearly does not stand up to scrutiny on either basis.

Looking ahead, we want to build on the strong record of cooperation and efforts to enhance nuclear safety and security and prevent proliferation. We see considerable potential to enhance the contribution of nuclear technology and materials to the well being of our peoples and our planet, without placing us all at increased risk to nuclear terrorism or proliferation. Nuclear applications can improve many aspects of life, including medical care, sources of potable water, electricity generation, shelf life of food supplies, and health of livestock. We look forward to working with others to review the past as well as to define our shared goals for cooperation in the future. Working together, we can help to realize the full promise of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes envisaged under the NPT, in full conformity with our nonproliferation obligations. We can thereby contribute to a better, more secure life for our citizens now and for generations to come.