VI: REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
MAIN COMMITTEE III: PEACFUL USES
STATEMENT BY THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATION

I would like to express my compliments to Ambassador Elisabet Bonnier, for presiding over Main Committee III.

In his remarks to the Conference, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, underscored that the basic foundation that made the NPT possible were the twin shared goals of "security" and "development". The right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, enshrined in Article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of the Treaty.

Besides being a clean and reliable source for the generation of electricity, nuclear applications are widespread in medicine, industry, agriculture, and environmental protection. No society, regardless of its level of development, can afford not to make use, to a certain extent, of nuclear technologies, especially in a post-Kyoto world.

These seem to be increasingly diverging views as to what the basic bargain of the NPT is about. Hence, the Conference should reaffirm the validity of Article IV with the view to ensure that the rights of all States Parties are fully protected and that no State Party is limited in the exercise of its rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. PROVIDED THERE IS COMPLIANCE with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

Brazil shares the concern that peaceful nuclear programs may be used as cover for nuclear proliferation. However, some of the proposals that have been made to counter this concern, on the one hand, ignore the successful track record of the system of safeguards now in place and, on the other, wrongly blame the NPT for loopholes that supposedly render it ineffective to combat nuclear non-proliferation.

Exceptional cases of non-compliance should not be invoked so as to justify any reinterpretation, or even review, of the provisions of Article IV. All in all, it is our assessment that the IAEA has been highly effective in the objective of curbing nuclear non-proliferation. In this context, an enhanced safeguards system, on the basis of strict compliance of States Parties to their commitments, can provide the adequate response to the legitimate concerns of the international community. The Conference should, therefore, send a strong message in support of maintaining strengthened capabilities to IAEA.

We welcome the report prepared by the expert group called by the Director General of the IAEA on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. It is an important input that will help us in the further consideration of this critical question. In our view, we should keep the question under review and avoid precipitated decisions that may have severe long-term implications for the NNWS that fully abide by the rules of the NPT.

In particular, we have to make sure that the concept of Multilateral
Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA) will not negatively impact or legitimize powerful nuclear programs developed and carried out under AIEA safeguard agreements.

Offering guarantees of a steady flow of nuclear fuel to States Parties that forswear their NPT-governed rights seems to us, at this moment, unrealistic, in particular in an ever-changing scenario. In this context, it is very unlikely that a state will relinquish its energy security and rely on third country suppliers.

Consider Brazil. Just over fifty years ago, the best experts in the world assured us that there was no oil to be found in our territory. To establish a national oil company at that point would be an exercise in futility. Fifty years later, we realize that an industrialized Brazil would be an impossibility had it not been for Petrobras, one of the world’s largest oil companies. Petrobras not only found the immense oil, domestic oil production today covers about 85 per cent of our oil needs.

The development and uses of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle of our national policy, which is contained in our Constitution. Brazil has developed wide-ranging production capabilities, from mining and processing of uranium to UO2 and reactor fuel element production, all the way to isotopic uranium enrichment.

We remain convinced of the potential benefits of the responsible use of nuclear technologies and of the synergies fostered by international cooperation in the nuclear field, for which the work of the IAEA is of great importance.

Brazil receives significant benefits from international cooperation. We also assist others by supplying them with technical cooperation in the field of nuclear science and peaceful nuclear technology applications. We maintain nearly 20 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, with both developing and developing countries. And have been an active participant in the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Advancement of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL) since the 1980s, mainly as a donor country, both by making scholarships at its nuclear institutions available to training Latin American and Caribbean experts, as well as by making Brazilian experts and instructors available to assist other countries in the region.

Brazil favors due consideration of the following points, which, in our view, would facilitate the achievement of the twin goals of security and development:

1st - recognize the importance of the concept of sustainable development as a guiding principle for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, in this context, emphasize their contribution to progress in general, and their role to narrow technological and economic disparities between developed and developing countries;

2nd - reaffirm that the Treaty, by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation, promotes the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and stresses the central role of the IAEA in assisting developing countries in
this regard:

3rd - review the appeal for the universalization of the Treaty and the strict compliance and balanced implementation of all its provisions;

4th - request that all States Parties bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and demonstrate full compliance with the provisions contained in those agreements;

5th - call upon all States Parties to strengthen domestic and international control of transfers involving fissile material and associated technologies;

6th - request State Parties to bring into force the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials;

7th - strongly recommed the sustained investments in research into proliferation-resistant technologies that are also operationally safe.

I thank for your attention.