Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Lithuania

Article I

1. Lithuania views the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. An effective implementation of article I by nuclear-weapon States plays an essential role to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article II

2. Lithuania abides by its commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. Non-proliferation efforts are guided by the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of December 2003.

3. Furthering its commitment to sound export controls and prevention of proliferation in all its aspects of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Lithuania joined all major export control regimes, namely, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is pending a decision by MTCR members. Before membership in EU, Lithuania passed a new Law on the Control of Strategic Goods on 1 May 2004, which now includes provisions on brokering, transfer of intangible items, and the like.

4. With the assistance of IAEA and other organizations, Lithuania has taken the necessary measures to improve the national physical protection system of radioactive materials. Improvements in the physical protection system of high-activity sealed radioactive sources in five Lithuanian personal health-care institutions of an oncological profile have been made.
5. The physical protection system in the Maišiagala nuclear waste repository was modernized. The Maišiagala repository, since 1963 operated by the Soviet military, was closed in 1988, but high-risk radioactive sources, including caesium, still remain buried at the site. An account of the buried materials has been maintained since 1973, yet information for 10 preceding years is missing. A modern monitoring and diversion detection system has been installed at the site.

6. In 2004, with the assistance of the United States of America, an investigation of orphan sources was conducted in those former industrial and military enterprises of the Soviet Union that used radioactive sources in their operations.

7. With a view to implementing the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, appropriate changes were made in the legislative framework which regulates the requirements for the physical protection and safety of such sources.

8. Additional measures were taken to secure contaminated beryllium at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and radiation detection capabilities were enhanced.

9. Since the accession of Lithuania to EU, the accounting and control of nuclear materials has been regulated by the European Commission’s Regulation on the Application of European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) Safeguards. Lithuania is subject to IAEA and EURATOM safeguards. The role of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials is carried out by the Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI). The system of accounting of nuclear materials is maintained and nuclear inventory change reports are submitted to IAEA and the European Commission.

10. All sources of ionizing radiation and radioactive substances imported and stored in Lithuania as well as exported from Lithuania are recorded on the accounting system that is maintained by the Radiation Protection Centre. Information is collected, accumulated, systemized and analysed in the State Register of Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Exposure of Workers.

Article III

11. Lithuania seeks to implement the EU Common Position on the universalization of the main multilateral non-proliferation agreements, adopted in November 2003 and supports universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol and recognizes that, together with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Additional Protocol is now the verification standard under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

12. Lithuania has been implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol for four years now and IAEA noted in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2003 that the Agency found no indication of diversion of nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

13. After Lithuania became a member of the European Union in May 2004, a transition from a bilateral safeguards agreement with IAEA and its Additional Protocol to the trilateral ones between the EU non-nuclear-weapon States, EURATOM and IAEA was required. Implementation of an integrated safeguards approach should soon follow in Lithuania.
14. Since Lithuania’s accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004, the inspections under the EURATOM safeguards have been carried out by European Commission inspectors.

Article IV

15. Under the commitment undertaken by Lithuania in the process of accession to the European Union, on 31 December 2004 Unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP was shut down. The decommissioning programme has been set.

16. The spent fuel has been stored on the Ignalina NPP site since the start of operation of the Nuclear Power Plant. No reprocessing or export of spent fuel has ever taken place. The dry storage casks for spent fuel outside Ignalina NPP were commissioned in 1999, but have been almost filled in. A new state-of-the-art dry storage facility is being designed for 50 years of operation. It will provide adequate containment and radiation shielding of fuel assemblies removed from both units of Ignalina NPP.

Article V

17. Lithuania ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in February 2000 and undertook all necessary measures to implement its provisions at the national level. Lithuania considers the Treaty an essential instrument in the global architecture of the nuclear disarmament process.

Article VI

18. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons as affirmed in the Final Documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences has been Lithuania’s objective. Lithuania is convinced that accountability, transparency, irreversibility and confidence-building are fundamental principles that constitute an indispensable framework within which to further the implementation of article VI.

19. Commitments, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, need to be followed through. Lithuania believes that the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons, among others, should be addressed as a matter of priority. Verifiable reductions in these weapons are an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. It is important to fulfil the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and report regularly on their implementation.

20. A fissile material cut-off Treaty constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Lithuania calls upon the immediate commencement of negotiations without preconditions on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

21. Lithuania supported the Proliferation Security Initiative, which proved to be an effective means to tackle illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in accordance with national legislation and the respective provisions of international law.

22. Lithuania supports Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), calling for effective measures by all States to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear
weapons. Lithuania submitted its report under that resolution in 2004 (S/AC.44/2004/(02)/26).

Article VII
23. While not a member itself of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Lithuania welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements consistent with international law and the Disarmament Commission guidelines.

Article VIII
24. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 included a commitment to a strengthened Treaty review process. Regular reporting on implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proved to be enhancing the performance of and the accountability under the Treaty.

Article IX
25. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a core objective. Lithuania deplored the announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty and continued to urge it to return to full compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, including its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA.

Article X
26. Lithuania believes it is important that States should not be able to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and then continue to enjoy the benefits of nuclear technologies or facilities acquired while they remained Parties to the Treaty.