Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”

Report submitted by Turkey

Introduction

1. Turkey favours global overall disarmament and supports all efforts in the field of sustaining international security through arms control and disarmament.

2. Turkey does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and has no intention to develop programs for acquiring weapons of this kind. In this spirit, Turkey became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2000. Turkey has also been a party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention since 1997 and the Biological Weapons Convention since 1974. In 1996, Turkey became a founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies. Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zangger Committee in 1999, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group in 2000.

3. Non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes that require continuous and irreversible progress on both fronts. Turkey remains fully committed to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of the 1995 decisions and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the 13 practical Steps. Turkey’s views on the 13 steps are as follows.

Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

4. Turkey attaches utmost importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date. Turkey calls upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so without delay and unconditionally, in particular the 11 States whose ratification is required for entry into force.
Moratorium on nuclear test explosions

5. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Turkey urges all States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any action that would be contrary to the obligations and provisions of the Treaty.

Negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

8. Turkey regrets that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to adopt a programme of work since 1998. Turkey hopes that the current stalemate can be overcome with a balanced programme of work that includes, in accordance with the Sharm el-Sheikh Declaration, negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Turkey believes that such a step would make a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament

7. Turkey recognizes the necessity of establishing an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament, and also supports the proposals for the immediate establishment of such a body.

Irreversibility in nuclear disarmament

8. Turkey is of the view that the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament is an indispensable component of the international arms reduction process.

Nuclear-weapon States — Total elimination of arsenals

9. Turkey considers that an unequivocal undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States, as well as the non-Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty States with nuclear capabilities, to eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a fundamental prerequisite for achieving the common goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament.

START and the ABM Treaty

10. While welcoming the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed in Moscow in 2002, Turkey also believes that reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals should be rendered transparent, irreversible and verifiable, in accordance with the goals and principles agreed upon under START II and START III.

Trilateral Initiative

11. Turkey supports the completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

International stability and security

12. Turkey recognizes the importance, as security assurances and confidence-building measures, of nuclear-weapon-free zones freely entered into, and of unilateral
declarations of nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which do not possess such weapons.

13. In addition, as pointed out in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), Turkey recognizes "the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive security assurances". As also pointed out in the same resolution, Turkey believes that the concerns of non-nuclear-power States are legitimate, and that, "in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty, further appropriate measures [should] be undertaken to safeguard their security". While recognizing the continuing value of confidence-building measures such as unilateral declarations of nuclear-power States, Turkey believes that the further measures mentioned above should be legally binding security assurances and that these measures will complement and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

14. As part of strengthening international stability and security, Turkey also attaches utmost importance to the value of zones free of weapons of mass destruction, established on the basis of arrangements among the States of the concerned region. Turkey calls upon the States of the Middle East to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

15. Turkey also welcomes the announcement by the five Central Asian States on their reaching an agreement on the text of a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty in February 2005.

Transfer of nuclear fissile material from military use to peaceful nuclear activities

16. Turkey urges all nuclear-weapon States to transfer, as appropriate, nuclear fissile material in their arsenals from military use to peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards, in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements.

General and complete disarmament

17. In resolution 984 (1995), the Security Council urged all States, as provided for in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

18. In this context, complete nuclear disarmament must remain as a viable ultimate goal. As a non-nuclear State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Turkey supports efforts towards meeting that goal, and the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies; irreversibility, transparency, and verification of reductions and further non-strategic reductions.

Reporting

19. Turkey has prepared the present report for the fulfilment of its obligation stemming from the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".
Development of verification capabilities

20. Turkey considers the IAEA international safeguards system an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements, and additional protocols to them, is a prerequisite for an effective and credible safeguards system. Turkey regrets that the number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols actually in force continues to be well below expectations. Being a party to a Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto with IAEA, Turkey supports all initiatives to reinforce the conditions of nuclear safety and supply. In other words, the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be misused as a cover for developing nuclear weapons.


22. Turkey supports the proposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the Model Additional Protocol should be adapted as the universal norm for verifying compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.