New York, 2-27 May 2005

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”

Report submitted by Norway

1. The present report presents the steps taken by Norway to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. The report focuses on the 13 practical steps of the 2001 Final Document, which is the most recent elaboration of the obligations embodied in article VI and the “Principles and Objectives”. Reference is also made to a Norwegian position paper tabled at the 2005 Review Conference as well as a paper on Norway’s contribution to the implementation of the Treaty.

Step 1: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

2. Norway signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at an early stage. Universal adherence to and early entry into force of the Treaty continues to be a high priority. Norway has worked towards this goal by actively promoting signature and ratification of the Treaty and by supporting the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna in implementing the Treaty’s verification mechanism.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Jan Petersen, has signed a joint ministerial statement in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway has co-sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly calling for the early entry into force of the Treaty.

4. Norway has on several occasions expressed the view, notably at the two conferences on article XIV, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference and at the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, that it is of crucial importance that the nuclear-weapon States ratify the Treaty without delay and that the remaining States parties listed in annex II to the Treaty do so as well. In order to accelerate the ratification process, Norway has
granted financial assistance to selected countries from the list of 44 States through the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in Vienna.

Step 2: Test moratorium

5. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, it is important that the moratorium on tests remains. Norway advocates that such self-imposed moratoria cannot, however, replace legally binding commitments through the signing and verification of the Treaty.

6. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty establishes a far-reaching global monitoring and verification system, capable of detecting all relevant nuclear explosions. The verification system is thus at the core of the Treaty. The full implementation of the International Monitoring System as soon as possible, without waiting for the entry into force of the Treaty, would represent a significant confidence and security-building measure. Six monitoring stations comprising altogether 179 field instruments are located on Norwegian territory as part of the International Monitoring System. With the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1999, the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) was established as the Norwegian National Data Centre for verification of compliance with the Treaty.

Step 3: Fissile material cut-off treaty

7. Norway considers it a top priority for the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. Such a treaty is the next logical step in the multilateral arms control agenda and is essential if we are to advance nuclear non-proliferation. Over the last five years Norway has co-sponsored a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for an early commencement of negotiations on such a treaty.

8. As long as the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament remains, Norway welcomes the ongoing parallel process to identify and assess particular and technical aspects of a fissile material cut-off treaty. It is necessary to deal with the entire field of weapons-useable material in a comprehensive manner. All nuclear-weapon States should conclude and implement arrangements to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime. Norway advocates the principle of irreversible disposition in order to ensure that excess stockpiles of fissile material remain outside the military cycle. To that end, IAEA monitoring is required.

Step 4: Nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament

9. Norway has expressed concerns about the continued deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament and has supported efforts to agree on a programme of work, including the cross-regional initiative as well as its revised version. This proposal calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider nuclear disarmament.
Step 5: Irreversibility

10. Norway has repeatedly expressed support for the principle of irreversibility in arms control and nuclear disarmament. Irreversible reductions of existing stockpiles constitute an effective non-proliferation measure that prevents terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear material.

Step 6: Unequivocal undertaking

11. Norway considers this commitment as highly relevant in attaining the overall objective of article IV.

Step 7: Strategic arms agreements

12. Norway welcomes the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. Reductions in the numbers of operationally deployed strategic warheads will be an important contribution to the implementation of the decisions of the 2000 Review Conference and to continued strategic stability and enhanced security in the new international context. While welcoming reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, Norway underlines the need for verifiable, transparent and irreversible reductions.

Step 8: Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency

13. Norway holds the view that emphasis should be given to the completion and full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and International Atomic Energy Agency. Efforts could be made to expand this arrangement to all nuclear-weapon capable States, as an important step in the direction of international control of excessive stocks of fissile material and deeper cuts in nuclear arms.

Step 9: Steps by the nuclear-weapon States

14. Norway strongly supports increased transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. At the 2000 Review Conference we introduced proposals in this respect, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. We also would like to refer to the working papers tabled by Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway at the second and third meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference as well as the working paper tabled at the 2005 Review Conference.

15. We also encourage transparency through the conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA. We urge all those States that have not yet signed or notified an Additional Protocol to do so without delay.

16. Norway has welcomed the unilateral declarations by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation in 1991 and 1992, which aim for the
elimination of a great number of tactical nuclear weapons. In the view of Norway, these declarations are still relevant and should be preserved and strengthened. We encourage the adoption of transparency measures such as reporting on the implementation of these two important declarations and reciprocal information exchange by the two countries involved. In this regard we would like to point to the transparency measures that NATO has proposed to the Russian Federation. Norway hopes to see an early start of further negotiations on substantial cuts in the arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons.

17. Norway emphasizes the need for continued reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons as well as for a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies.

Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States on fissile material

18. Norway has advocated that a fissile material cut-off treaty should also deal with existing stocks in order to have a full and genuine disarmament impact. Norway has consistently encouraged nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant, international verification and arrangements for disposition.

19. The Norwegian Government sponsored an international conference on nuclear material management, which was held in Oslo on 3 and 4 March 2005.

20. As regards bilateral cooperation programmes, for over 10 years Norway has had bilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation on nuclear safety issues. Since 1995, Norway has allocated $159 million United States dollars, mainly to the Russian Federation, through a plan of action for nuclear safety. The plan of action concentrates on four main areas: nuclear safety; safety of nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; monitoring of radioactive contamination; and weapons-related environmental problems. This assistance facilitates and speeds up the ongoing programmes on dismantling decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear fuel on board.

Step 11: General and complete disarmament

21. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues remain central elements in Norwegian foreign policy.

Step 12: Reporting

22. Norway believes that national reports by States parties should contain regular, systematic and detailed information to the other States parties with the goal of improving the functioning of the Treaty’s strengthened review process. In submitting its national report, Norway shares the view that reporting should be done by all States parties and that it should be obligatory rather than optional.
Step 13: Development of verification

23. Norway supports the further development and strengthening of verification capabilities, which is clearly linked to the issue of compliance. We have taken a number of steps to support verification regimes under various arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, including the above-mentioned International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway co-sponsored the resolution entitled “Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification”, which was adopted at the fifty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

24. Norway also supports the verification regimes of IAEA. Its agreement with IAEA on comprehensive safeguards was signed in 1972, while its agreement on the Additional Protocol entered into force in 2000. IAEA has conducted several inspections within the framework of the Additional Protocol. The measures contained in the IAEA model Additional Protocol are important for the Agency’s efforts with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and as a new verification standard. It strengthens the effectiveness of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards system. Norway advocates making the Additional Protocol mandatory.