Further measures to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Twenty-one Measures for the Twenty-first Century

Working paper submitted by Japan

1. The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will provide the States parties with an opportunity to show their commitment to strengthening the NPT regime, thus making a further contribution to international peace and stability.

2. Japan believes that the States parties should redouble their efforts to reach a common understanding on measures for further strengthening the Treaty at the upcoming Review Conference. To this end, Japan proposes the following 21 measures to be included in the document(s) to be issued as final outcome(s) of the 2005 Review Conference;

Nuclear disarmament

3. In accordance with article VI of the Treaty and pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives” and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the Conference agrees that all States parties should take further practical measures towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

1. Further reduction in nuclear arsenals

4. The Conference agrees that the realization of a safe world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper, more transparent and irreversible reductions in all types of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States as they work towards their complete elimination.

5. While recognizing the progress made by nuclear-weapon States on nuclear arms reductions, the Conference encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the two States.
2. **International cooperation in reducing nuclear-weapons-related materials**

6. With a view to accelerating the reduction of nuclear weapons excess to military needs, the Conference encourages States to pursue efforts within the framework of international cooperation initiatives for the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme and the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

3. **Reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems**

7. The Conference calls for the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.

4. **A diminishing role for nuclear weapons**

8. The Conference reaffirms the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that such weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

5. **Securing fissile materials**

9. The Conference stresses that fissile material resulting from reductions in nuclear arsenals must be controlled and protected to the highest standards, and calls for arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification as soon as is practicable, to ensure that such material is irreversibly removed from use for nuclear weapons.

6. **Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

10. The Conference reaffirms the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

11. The Conference urges all States that have not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular those 11 States whose ratification is required for it to enter into force, to do so at the earliest opportunity.

12. The Conference agrees that existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions must be maintained pending entry into force of the Treaty.

7. **Verification regimes of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

13. The Conference reaffirms the importance of continued development of the Treaty verification regime, including the international monitoring system, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty.

8. **Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty**

14. The Conference reaffirms the importance of immediate commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and its early conclusion of the Treaty as soon as possible.
15. The Conference stresses that a conclusion of the Treaty would be an essential step towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. It would contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation through an international ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and increase transparency and accountability in the management of such materials through its verification system.

16. The Conference calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

17. Given the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the Conference regards it as a primary task for the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on a programme of work.

**Nuclear non-proliferation**

9. **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

18. The Conference expresses grave concern over the nuclear programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which undermine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The Conference also expresses deep concern regarding the decision by that country to withdraw from the Treaty; it therefore continues to pose a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime.

19. Furthermore, the Conference expresses its utmost regret and deep concern over the statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 10 February 2005, which announced that it would withdraw from the six-party talks for an indefinite period and that it had manufactured nuclear weapons.

20. The Conference urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to promptly come into compliance with the Treaty and completely dismantle all of its nuclear programmes, including its uranium enrichment programmes, in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to credible international verification. The Conference stresses that the Korean Peninsula must be denuclearized, while the peace, security and stability of the region should be strengthened and the legitimate interests and concerns of the relevant parties be satisfied.

21. The Conference emphasizes the importance of peacefully resolving this issue through diplomatic means within the framework of the six-party talks, and urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return to the six-party talks without preconditions.

10. **Islamic Republic of Iran**

22. Recognizing the efforts made by the international community, especially by France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (EU3/EU) and the Islamic Republic of Iran, to pursue the peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, the Conference recognizes the importance of the decision by the Islamic Republic of Iran to voluntarily continue and extend its suspension of all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. At the same time, the Conference reaffirms its concern that the country’s policy of concealment up to October 2003 has resulted in many breaches of its obligations to comply with its
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
Conference further calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement all the
requirements of the relevant IAEA resolutions, and expects the current negotiations
between EU3/EU and the Islamic Republic of Iran to be successful. In particular, the
Conference considers it extremely important that the Islamic Republic of Iran,
through its negotiations with EU3/EU, agree to provide sufficient objective
guarantees that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

11. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

23. The Conference welcomes the decision by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
announced in December 2003 to abandon all of its weapons of mass destruction
programmes, though it expresses concern over that country’s past failures to meet
the requirements of its safeguards agreement, which constituted non-compliance.
The Conference strongly hopes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
those States suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction will follow the
element of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

12. Strengthening and maximizing the efficiency of International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards

24. The Conference reaffirms the necessity of improving the effectiveness of
IAEA safeguards to ensure the non-diversion of declared nuclear material placed
under safeguards in each State and proscribe any undeclared nuclear material held
or activities conducted by the State as a whole; in particular, it emphasizes the
importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol as the most realistic
and effective means to strengthen the current international non-proliferation regime.
The Conference believes that the strengthened safeguards system should constitute
the Treaty safeguards standard as required by paragraph 1 of article III of the Treaty
from a certain date. The Conference urges those States parties that have not yet
concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and/or an additional protocol with
IAEA to do so without further delay.

25. The Conference welcomes the completion by IAEA of the conceptual
framework for integrated safeguards as well as its application to the States parties
that have a good track record on IAEA safeguards activities based on both
comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference
recognizes the importance of promoting the adoption of integrated safeguards with a
view to maximizing the effectiveness and the efficiency of IAEA safeguards
activities with available resources, and encourages IAEA to take the necessary steps
to strengthen an integrated approach to safeguards.

13. Establishing and implementing effective national export control systems

26. Recognizing the important role of multinational export control bodies for
nuclear related materials, equipment and technology — i.e., the Zangger Committee
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) — in ensuring the implementation of
paragraph 2 of article III of the Treaty, the Conference urges those States parties that
have not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate effective national rules
and regulations on export controls over both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use
items, based on the Zangger Committee understandings (INFCIRC/209/Rev.2) and
the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 2).
In this regard, the Conference notes that United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), adopted in April 2004, requires all States to establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export controls.

14. Special controls on the transfer of sensitive material, facilities, equipment and technology

27. In particular, the Conference recognizes the necessity of introducing new measures to place special controls on the transfer of sensitive material, facilities, equipment and technology that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons, such as those related to enrichment and reprocessing, and urges all States parties to exercise restraint in and vigilance over such transfers. In this regard, the Conference welcomes the continuing, devoted efforts to update the NSG guidelines by the NSG participating Governments.

15. IAEA Additional Protocol as a precondition of supply

28. With regard to the required safeguards specified in paragraph 2 of article III of the Treaty, the Conference reaffirms paragraph 12 of decision 2 ("Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament"), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, in which States parties agreed that new arrangements for nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a precondition, acceptance of the full-scope safeguards of IAEA. The Conference further agrees that new arrangements for the supply of all nuclear items in the “trigger list” of the Zangger Committee understandings and of the NSG part 1 guidelines to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a precondition, the conclusion of additional protocols. In this regard, the Conference welcomes the continuing, devoted efforts to update the Zangger Committee understandings and the NSG guidelines by participating Governments of the respective multinational export control regimes.

16. Nuclear-weapon-free zone

29. The Conference agrees that the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned contributes to regional and global peace and stability, and thus reaffirms its support for said concept.

30. The Conference appreciates the efforts made to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, in particular in Central Asia and the Middle East, and agrees that progress in this regard will further strengthen the credibility of the Treaty.

17. Measures against nuclear terrorism

31. The Conference urges the States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to participate in the conference of plenipotentiaries in July 2005 and to agree on amendments to strengthen the Convention.


34. The Conference notes that United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) requires all States to develop and maintain appropriate physical protection measures, border control and law enforcement.

**Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes**

18. **Peaceful uses of nuclear energy**

35. The Conference affirms that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by a non-nuclear-weapon State that carries out nuclear activities with the confidence of the international community by faithfully fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and ensuring transparency of its nuclear activities should not be unduly affected.

36. The Conference supports the promotion of the activities of IAEA in the field of nuclear safety, as well as adherence by as many States as possible to international conventions in this area, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

37. The Conference supports the enhancement of the global safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management and recognizes the importance of adherence by as many States as possible to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

38. The Conference recognizes the importance of international technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology — particularly in such fields as human health, agriculture, food, sanitation and water resources, where it plays a key role and brings about significant benefits for the whole world. In this regard, the Conference stresses the need to further strengthen IAEA technical cooperation activities, improve the effectiveness and efficiency of technical cooperation programmes and promote activities supporting self-reliance and sustainability, particularly in developing countries in the fields stated above.

39. The Conference urges IAEA member States to make every effort to contribute to the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Fund, and to honour their obligations to pay their national participation costs as well as any arrears of assessed programme costs. In this context, the Conference stresses that the financing of technical cooperation should be in line with the concept of shared responsibility, given that all members share a common responsibility for financing and enhancing the technical cooperation activities of the Agency.

**General issues**

19. **Universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

40. The Conference urges all States not yet party to the Treaty — namely India, Israel and Pakistan — to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference strongly urges the non-party States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
the Treaty, and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty pending their accession to it as non-nuclear-weapon States.

20. Effective mechanisms to deal with withdrawal from the Treaty

41. The Conference reaffirms that a State party which has withdrawn from the Treaty remains responsible for any violations it committed while being a party. The Conference urges any supplier country of nuclear material, facilities, equipment etc. to make necessary arrangements entitling it to require the return or neutralization of any such nuclear material, facilities, equipment etc. transferred prior to their withdrawal.

21. Disarmament and non-proliferation education

42. The Conference encourages the States parties to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session, and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have undertaken to this end.