NPT — a dynamic instrument and core pillar of international security

1. The present security environment is radically different from the one existing 35 years ago, when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970. We are facing new threats in connection with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the danger that terrorist groups may acquire such deadly weapons.

2. The Treaty is the first line of defence against the spread of nuclear weapons. It is essential to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty.

3. The States parties have a collective responsibility to preserve and strengthen the authority of the Treaty. The 2005 Review Conference provides an opportunity to demonstrate to the international community that the Treaty remains a dynamic instrument for providing added security value. The conference should reconfirm the interlinkage between nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use. We need to ensure that the outcome of the Review Conference is positive, balanced and forward-looking.

Strengthening the non-proliferation regime

4. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has established a fundamental norm by emphasizing verification and confidence-building. Given the new security threats, it is imperative to strengthen the non-proliferation dimension of the Treaty.

5. Norway advocates the following:

(a) The Review Conference should recognize the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the verification norm under the Treaty. Ratification and implementation of these two instruments should be mandatory for all States parties and should be considered a condition for participation in peaceful nuclear cooperation;
(b) The Review Conference should call for the negotiation of an international non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty without delay;

(c) Pending the conclusion of a fissile materials cut-off treaty, all nuclear-weapon States should formally declare and/or reconfirm moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes and take appropriate transparency measures such as allowing IAEA monitoring;

(d) All nuclear-weapon States should place fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime;

(e) The Trilateral Initiative (on fissile material) between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and IAEA should be completed. Other nuclear-weapon States should be encouraged to enter into similar arrangements;

(f) The Review Conference should endorse the IAEA instruments on nuclear security and non-proliferation. Likewise, it should call for the universalization and further strengthening of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and for the universalization of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The Review Conference should also encourage all States parties to contribute to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund;

(g) The Review Conference should call for increased international coordination of national export policies and underline the importance of all States parties adhering to the understandings of the Zangger Committee and the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group;

(h) The international community should identify pragmatic ways of engaging the remaining three countries outside the Treaty in constructive non-proliferation cooperation, pending their accession as non-nuclear-weapon States;

(i) The Review Conference should encourage a moratorium on the development of new nuclear fuel cycle systems until agreement can be reached on a multilateral arrangement based on the report of the IAEA Expert Group on Multinational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle;

(j) The Review Conference should encourage a moratorium on the production and use of highly enriched uranium, like the moratorium on the production of weapons-grade material declared by certain nuclear-weapon States. The long-term objective should be the establishment of a total ban;

(k) NPT States parties should express their full support for Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and their readiness to participate unconditionally in its implementation;

(l) The Review Conference should recognize the useful complementary role played by cooperative threat reduction initiatives in upholding the NPT norm, such as the Group of Eight Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Moving the disarmament agenda forward


7. Much has been achieved in the field of disarmament. The cessation of the nuclear arms race is a reality. There have been considerable reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty represents an important contribution to the implementation of article VI. There are, however, still around 30,000 nuclear warheads in the world. Important disarmament milestones such as the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of the fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations have not been reached.

8. Norway advocates:
   (a) Reaffirmation of the NPT disarmament commitments and agreed undertakings from previous review conferences, including the 13 practical steps;
   (b) Increased transparency in the implementation of the disarmament commitments through regular reporting;
   (c) Further nuclear arms reductions based on the principles of irreversibility and transparency;
   (d) Such arms reductions should also include sub-strategic nuclear weapons through full implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 and their gradual codification;
   (e) An early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In the meantime, the nuclear-weapon States should declare or reconfirm moratoriums on nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions;
   (f) The negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty with clear disarmament objectives, which also addresses the issue of existing stocks;
   (g) Reaffirmation of the undertaking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security and defence policies by refraining from vertical proliferation;
   (h) Efforts to encourage countries outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to subscribe to the disarmament commitments of the Treaty.

Peaceful use

9. Although Norway does not produce nuclear energy, it fully recognizes the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear technology. The rights set out in article IV must not, however, be to the detriment of non-proliferation efforts and environmental concerns. For this reason Norway has taken the lead in IAEA in the development of the IAEA International Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies.
10. Norway advocates:

(a) Support for the IAEA technical cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and security;

(b) Universalization and further strengthening of the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management;

(c) Endorsement of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors;

(d) Support for the IAEA International Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies;

(e) Full support for the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

Sustaining the NPT

11. Nuclear-weapon-free zones created on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States in the region concerned, are important for sustaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime and for promoting disarmament. Previous review conferences have underlined the importance of negative security assurances and the relevance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States.

12. The announced withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons poses a fundamental challenge to the Treaty. It is essential to further develop disincentives to withdrawal from the Treaty. States parties should formally address fundamental challenges. This can be done by strengthening the institutional machinery of the Treaty.

13. Norway advocates:

(a) Support for existing and entry into force of agreed nuclear-weapon-free zones. States parties to nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements are encouraged to further enhance non-proliferation efforts by making the IAEA Additional Protocol mandatory;

(b) Nuclear-weapon States should support the nuclear-weapon-free zones by signing relevant protocols for negative security assurances;

(c) The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas of tension, such as the Middle East. Such zones would contribute to nuclear disarmament;

(d) Nuclear-weapon States should adhere to their unilateral declarations of 1995 and be ready to enter into negotiations on legally binding negative security assurances;

(e) The Review Conference should outline new disincentives against withdrawal from the Treaty. The role of the Security Council is essential in this respect;
(f) States Parties must be able to deal with cases of non-compliance while recognizing the statutory role of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors;

(g) The Review Conference should strengthen the institutional machinery of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for example by instituting formal annual meetings of the States parties supported by a standing bureau and adequate secretariat services;

(h) The bureau of the annual meetings should be authorized to convene special meetings of the States parties during the following year in the case of an emergency, unless it is more appropriate for it to be handled by IAEA and the Security Council.