Working paper on nuclear disarmament for Main Committee I

Recommendations submitted by New Zealand on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition

In the pursuit of the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference, including the unequivocal undertaking and the practical steps on nuclear disarmament, and at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including the decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the resolution on the Middle East, as integral parts of that Conference, the New Agenda Coalition reaffirms and augments its positions and recommendations (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/11, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/16, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/9, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.1, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.10 and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.13), to Main Committee I of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons through the following recommendations:

1. To agree that all States should spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. To call upon all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament that were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference.

3. To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.

4. To call for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
5. To welcome the importance of maintaining the momentum towards the early establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to build the verification regime.

6. To agree to urgently strengthen efforts towards both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the resumption in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

7. Pending the conclusions of such negotiations to call for the upholding and maintenance of a moratorium on fissile material production for military purposes and the establishment of a regime for transparency and accountability and an appropriate experts group.

8. To stress the need for all five nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

9. To call for the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament.

10. To underline the imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear disarmament measures and the need to develop further adequate and efficient verification capabilities.

11. To agree that the nuclear-weapon States take further measures to de-alert and deactivate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles and to withdraw nuclear forces from active deployment pending the total elimination of these weapons.

12. To agree that the nuclear-weapon States take further action towards increasing their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapon arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures and in this context to recall the obligation to report as agreed in step 12.

13. To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear weapon States parties, which could either be in the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or as a protocol to the Treaty.