2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Working paper submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Poland and Turkey for consideration at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

I. Preservation of the integrity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime

1. The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirm the vital role the Treaty plays in promoting international peace and security and underline the importance of full compliance with all its terms.

2. Recent challenges to the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime have underlined the importance of working actively towards universal adherence and full compliance with the Treaty’s provisions. A strong commitment by all parties to the goals set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference can contribute to ensuring the continued vitality of the Treaty.

3. Universal adherence to the Treaty is a core objective. We call on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede unconditionally to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons States. In this context, our countries stress the importance of the request by the States parties to the President of the 2000 Review Conference to convey formally the views of the States parties on the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty to all non-States parties and to report their responses to the States parties. We deem such efforts to be a valuable contribution to enhancing the universal adherence to the Treaty.

4. The announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty raises important challenges to the credibility and the functionality of the Treaty. We continue to urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return to full compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty, including its safeguards agreement with IAEA.
5. In the context of an announced withdrawal from the Treaty, we reiterate the role of the United Nations Security Council in maintaining international peace and security and call for further definition of that role.

6. In view of the recent challenges, and taking into account the experience gained through more recent disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation treaties, ways and means should be explored to strengthen the institutional framework of the Treaty, thereby providing opportunities for States parties to consult on an annual basis. In order to deal effectively with non-proliferation compliance challenges, we look forward to discussing the establishment of an open-ended special committee on verification and compliance under the authority of the IAEA Board of Governors. Such a committee could usefully contribute to identifying new ways to exercise existing legal authorities to uncover and prevent prohibited activities.

7. We support Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), calling for effective measures by all States to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. In this context we also support the Proliferation Security Initiative.

II. Safeguards and verification

8. We stress the obligation for the non-nuclear-weapons States to conclude safeguard agreements in accordance with article III of the Treaty. In this context, we consider the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) combined with the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), to be the verification standard under the Treaty. We strongly urge all States parties to conclude and implement such a protocol without delay, thereby enhancing confidence in compliance.

III. Accountability and transparency

9. We confirm the importance of measures aimed at increasing accountability and transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. In addition to the transparency measures already agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, we urge the nuclear-weapons States to commit themselves to provide periodically the aggregated number of warheads, delivery systems and stocks of fissile materials for explosive purposes in their possession. The nuclear-weapons States should provide this information in the form of regular reports under step 12 (article VI, para. 15) of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

10. To enhance regular reporting by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, we emphasize the necessity for States parties to report to each session of the Preparatory Committee and to the Review Conference, as appropriate.

IV. Fissile material

11. A fissile material cut-off treaty constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Having recognized the desire to conclude a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, we call for the immediate commencement of negotiations without preconditions.

12. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, we call upon all States concerned to declare or reaffirm a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to take transparency measures related to production and stocks. Such steps could include verification activities at less sensitive facilities to gain verification experience in order to ease the implementation of the treaty and to confirm production moratoriums. These steps would undoubtedly be conducive to preparing the ground for expedient negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and would, in their own right, be a useful interim contribution to nuclear non-proliferation.

13. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to conclude and to implement arrangements to place their fissile material, designated as no longer required for military purposes, under the IAEA verification regime. In particular, we call upon the early completion of the trilateral initiative between the Russian Federation, the United States of America and IAEA. We furthermore encourage other nuclear-weapon capable States to enter into such arrangements, as an important step in the direction of international control of excessive stocks of fissile materials and deeper multilateral reductions of nuclear arsenals.

14. To ensure that excess stockpiles of fissile material remain outside the military nuclear cycle, the principle of irreversible disposition should prevail. In this respect, we consider IAEA monitoring to be necessary. Trial visits and inspections could be considered as confidence-building measures.

15. Cooperative threat reduction programmes have proven to be an effective tool for reducing post-cold war nuclear threats and pre-empting new ones. We encourage the exploration of ways to expand such cooperation for the secure handling and control of nuclear material with a wider international participation.

16. Strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations will also help to prevent possible terrorist use of fissile material. Noting the IAEA plan of action, we urge States parties to support the additional measures proposed therein. In this respect, we particularly underline the importance of:

(a) Strengthening, effective implementation and consequent enforcement of national export controls and the application of the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, when considering exporting sensitive nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies;

(b) International coordination of national export policies and the need for all States parties to follow the understandings of the Zangger Committee and guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, when considering exporting sensitive nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technologies;

(c) Early conclusion of revisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material aimed at the strengthening thereof at the Amendment Conference, and its subsequent universal implementation. We call upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the convention.
V. **Peaceful uses**

17. We recognize that the inalienable right of all States parties under article IV constitutes one of the fundamental provisions of the Treaty. While maintaining an overall commitment to this article, adherence to and compliance with the non-proliferation and verification requirements of articles II and III should be regarded as a precondition for the cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

18. Adherence to the Additional Protocol and abstention from nuclear fuel cycle cooperation with States that are in non-compliance with their IAEA safeguards agreements are requirements for a stable, open and transparent international security environment in which peaceful nuclear cooperation can take place and can be enhanced.

19. We welcome early discussion of the report of the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and underline the importance of better ensuring that nuclear fuel cycles will be exclusively used for peaceful purposes.

VI. **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

20. We consider the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to be of the utmost importance. We therefore urge all States parties that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify this Treaty, without delay and without conditions. A special responsibility in this endeavour lies on the annex II States, and especially the nuclear-weapon States among them. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, we call upon all States with nuclear capabilities to abide by a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, of which the importance is confirmed at the 2000 Review Conference.

VII. **Negative security assurances**

21. We are convinced that legally binding security assurances provided by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and advocate the commencement of negotiations to this end. Pending legally binding assurances, we call upon the nuclear-weapon States to abide by their unilateral security assurances.

VIII. **Non-strategic nuclear weapons**

22. The further reduction and ultimate elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, as called for in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, constitute an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. We call upon all States possessing non-strategic nuclear arms to include their reduction and ultimate elimination in the overall nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
23. We furthermore encourage the Russian Federation and the United States of America to fully implement the unilateral reductions already announced in the Presidential initiatives of 1991 and 1992 in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner. We call upon the Russian Federation and the United States to report regularly on the implementation of these initiatives and to codify them in a gradual and timely manner, including appropriate verification measures.

IX. Nuclear disarmament

24. We consider the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI, as one of the major achievements of the 2000 Review Conference. In this respect irreversibility is a core principle.

25. While welcoming the steps nuclear-weapon States have taken so far to reduce their nuclear arsenals, we encourage the nuclear-weapon States to continue their efforts in this respect. In this context, we welcome the conclusion of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. While again recalling the importance of the principles of irreversibility and transparency, we consider this Treaty to be an important step in the field of international security, disarmament and non-proliferation.

26. We advocate a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

27. We support the reinforcement of nuclear-weapon-free zones and their extension to other regions of the world, in conformity with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines.

28. Finally, we encourage the establishment, without further delay, of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament.