Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by Sweden

Introduction

1. As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the section entitled “Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs”, in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed on “regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996”. Sweden would hereby like to submit its report to the 2010 Review Conference.

2. Since the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007, Sweden has actively participated in the work on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This has been done, for example, through the European Union, together with the States in the New Agenda Coalition, with the States in the Vienna Group of 10 and with other like-minded States. Disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy, and Sweden is a staunch supporter of efforts aimed at advancing progress in this field.

3. In the annual statement of Government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, stated on 17 February 2010 that “Our goal remains a world without nuclear weapons”.

4. In an address given at the Global Zero summit on 2 February 2010, Foreign Minister Bildt stated, inter alia, that the international community had arrived at a critical point, where it could either take decisive steps forward in further reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons, eventually taking the world closer to the goal of a world free of those weapons, or face the very serious risk of the non-proliferation regime eroding and paving the way for a development that would significantly increase the risk of those weapons being used, with catastrophic and unforeseeable effects.
5. An agreement on further limits on strategic arms should be followed by talks aimed at reductions also in substrategic nuclear weapons. Pending the eventual elimination of the substrategic weapons, it would make sense for the remaining weapons to be withdrawn to central storage facilities. Strategic postures and military doctrines should make clear that the sole purpose of the remaining nuclear weapons should be strategic deterrence, and that under no circumstances would nuclear-armed States contemplate their first use. The United States of America and the Russian Federation should be prepared to take the lead in issuing such declarations. The importance of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was also stressed.

6. In a op-ed article in the *International Herald Tribune* on 2 February 2010, Foreign Minister Bildt, together with the Foreign Minister of Poland, Radek Sikorski, stated that they were looking forward to welcoming an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, they called for early progress on steep reductions in substrategic nuclear weapons. They called on the leaders of the United States and the Russian Federation to commit themselves to early measures to greatly reduce substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe as steps towards the total elimination of these types of weapons.

7. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Sweden, together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, sponsored resolution 64/57, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. In that resolution, the Assembly noted with satisfaction the renewed interest in nuclear disarmament on the part of international leaders expressed, inter alia, during the Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament held on 24 September 2009, reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts, and recalled the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with commitments made under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The resolution was supported by more than 169 countries, demonstrating broad support among regions for the nuclear disarmament pillar of the Treaty.

8. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Sweden supported a number of resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (64/26), a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (64/29), a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (64/44), renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons (64/47), the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* (64/55), towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments (64/57), the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (64/66) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (64/69).

9. Sweden is also committed to the effective implementation of the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union in December 2003.
Building further on this strategy, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union agreed in December 2008 on an action plan against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Furthermore, in December 2008 the Heads of State and Government of the European Union endorsed a declaration on international security, with a focus on issues related to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the prevention of terrorism.

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**Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference**

10. Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

11. Sweden ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 2 December 1998. Sweden has worked for the early entry into force of the Treaty bilaterally and through the European Union. Sweden has continuously supported the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna and its efforts to establish the international monitoring system for the verification of the Treaty. Sweden has promoted signatures and ratifications of the Treaty through démarches made by the European Union to a number of States. Sweden supported General Assembly resolution 64/69, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, in which the Assembly called for measures to enable the Treaty to enter into force. Sweden supports the article XIV conferences as important instruments contributing to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the holding of a seventh article XIV conference. Sweden supported the adoption at the sixth article XIV conference in 2009 of the Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

12. Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty.

13. Sweden has continuously supported the upholding of a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions by the nuclear-weapon States pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

14. Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

15. Sweden welcomes the adoption of the programme of work by the Conference on Disarmament in 2009, but regrets that the Conference has not been able to agree
on a programme of work in 2010, and that, as a consequence, negotiations have unfortunately not yet commenced on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Sweden believes that it is of paramount importance that the members of the Conference on Disarmament agree on a new programme of work as soon as possible. Sweden supported General Assembly resolution 64/29 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Within the European Union and together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, Sweden calls for the declaration, and the upholding, of existing moratoriums on the production of fissile material for military purposes pending the conclusion of a legally binding treaty.

16. Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

17. Sweden supports the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament. Sweden has proposed that discussions on nuclear disarmament take as their point of departure security policy doctrines and information exchange on current nuclear weapons capabilities and nuclear disarmament measures.

18. Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

19. Irreversibility is a fundamental principle for nuclear disarmament. Only irreversible reductions can assure that redeployment of nuclear weapons does not occur. Sweden continues to stress that the principle of irreversibility should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control measures, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

20. Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

21. Sweden continues to emphasize the importance of States living up to their commitments regarding the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The unequivocal undertaking to which the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves at the 2000 Review Conference is yet to be fulfilled.

22. Step 7: The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

23. Sweden welcomes the joint understanding by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States in July 2009, reaffirming their commitment to further reductions and limitations of their nations’ strategic offensive arms and to concluding at an early date a new, legally binding, post-START agreement. At the same time, Sweden calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to make steep reductions in their substrategic nuclear weapons, and
also to address non-deployed warheads, to make reductions irreversible, transparent and verifiable.

24. Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

25. Step 9: Steps by all nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all; further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals unilaterally; increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament; the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk of these weapons ever being used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

26. Sweden fully supports these steps and continues to promote advancements in their implementation. In particular, Sweden continues to press for progress regarding reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden believes that it is essential that non-strategic nuclear weapons be included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Non-strategic weapons are a global concern. Sweden will continue to work on this issue at the 2010 Review Conference. Sweden also continues to stress the importance of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies and increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, Sweden, together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.15) expressing concern about the emergence in recent years of new military doctrines emphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons, not only to defence but also to the offensive capabilities of States. At the second session, the New Agenda Coalition presented a working paper on transparency and confidence-building (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/ WP.26).

27. Furthermore, steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI serve as a confidence-building measure and should be strongly supported. The principle of transparency should be applicable to all disarmament and arms control efforts, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. It is also of particular importance that nuclear-weapon States diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, do not increase the number or types of nuclear weapons deployed and do not develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalizations for their use.

28. Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and
arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

29. Sweden encourages those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to conclude such arrangements.

30. Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

31. Sweden takes an active part in the work on disarmament of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as conventional weapons. Reference is made here to the relevant treaties and instruments that deal with these types of weapons.

32. Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

33. Sweden believes that reports on the implementation of the article and paragraph mentioned above enhance transparency and accountability and build confidence, and should therefore be encouraged.

34. Step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

35. Sweden continues to give strong support to IAEA and to a system of strengthened safeguards. The Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements represents the verification standard for Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards. Sweden therefore continues to urge all States to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols. Such a Protocol entered into force for Sweden, together with other European Union member States and Euratom, on 30 April 2004. Sweden is of the view that the Review Conference should take the decision that the Additional Protocol, together with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, represents the verification standard under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.