Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (resolution 64/26). In addition, Canada co-sponsored the resolution entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (resolution 64/47) and voted in favour of the resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world” (resolution 64/57). Canada encourages further consultations between the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States in the Middle East with a view to convening a forum on the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and on the relevance of this for the Middle East.

2. Canada has called for the universal and full adherence and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by States in the Middle East. At IAEA, Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the General Conferences of the Agency in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support that resolution in 2007, 2008 and 2009, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensual approach. Canada welcomes the fact that signatory States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective safeguards agreements, thereby demonstrating greater openness and transparency. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored the resolution on that Treaty (resolution 64/69) at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and has also encouraged the three Annex 2 signatories in the region (Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel) to ratify the Treaty in a coordinated manner as a confidence- and security-building measure. Such a measure was included in the Final Declaration at the September 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that took place in New York.
3. Canada shares the serious international concerns about the scope and nature of Iran’s past and ongoing nuclear programme. Although Canada recognizes that Iran has a right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, that right also comes with responsibilities. Canada is deeply disturbed by Iran’s decision to further enrich its nuclear material in defiance of Security Council resolutions. These latest moves bring Iran considerably closer to possessing weapons-grade material. Canada also notes with concern that Iran continues to take actions inconsistent with its safeguards obligations, including failure to inform the Agency in a timely manner about construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and proceeding to feed low-enriched uranium into the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant without allowing sufficient time for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures. Most troubling of all is the assessment in the latest IAEA report that “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”. We note that Iran has lost the confidence of the Board of Governors of IAEA and the Security Council through its two-decade history of concealing nuclear activities. In the light of this history, as well as Iran’s failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) and the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of IAEA in November 2009 (GOV/2009/82). Those resolutions clearly state the international community’s desire for a negotiated diplomatic solution which respects Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We welcome efforts of the P5+1 in this regard and encourage Iran to engage constructively. Canada also urges Iran to cooperate fully and comply with the international obligations set out by the Security Council, provide “all requested information, clarifications and access” identified by IAEA as deficient, and fully implement the Additional Protocol. Only through cooperation, transparency and renewed implementation of its Additional Protocol can Iran begin to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We continue to encourage Iran to avail itself of the opportunity to conclude an agreement regarding the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which would provide an important confidence-building opportunity as well as address humanitarian concerns.

4. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and also about possible nuclear cooperation between Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. While we recognize the difficulties that the Agency has faced conducting its investigations in view of the physical circumstances it found at the Dair Alzour site, we also note the very serious potential proliferation threat that would be posed by an undeclared nuclear reactor of the kind that appears to have existed at the site. With this in view, we urge Syria to cooperate immediately and fully with the IAEA investigation by providing all additional information and access as requested by IAEA in order for the Agency to complete its assessment. The finding of particles of anthropogenic nature uranium at both the Dair Alzour and Miniature Neutron Source Reactor sites is another matter of concern. Canada notes that since Syria has no reported inventory of natural uranium, the presence of such particles calls into question the completeness and correctness of Syria’s declarations concerning nuclear material and facilities. These are very serious findings and it is
only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA that Syria can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

5. Canada has called on all remaining States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of the Canadian Government, which include Canada’s voting record on the resolutions referred to above in paragraph 1 at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly. It also conforms with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which requires States to take steps to ensure that non-State actors cannot manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. These steps include, inter alia: adopting robust national legislation to prohibit the possession, manufacture or trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, in particular for terrorist purposes; developing appropriate, effective export, trans-shipment and border controls on weapons-of-mass-destruction materials if these do not exist; and maintaining effective physical protection and accountancy of such materials.

6. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.