Statement of
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On behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties

before
Main Committee II

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. Chairman,

I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties. The Group wishes to congratulate you for the assumption of the Chairmanship of this important body and pledges its full cooperation with you and other members of the Bureau in order to ensure that the work of this Committee is successful.

Item 16 of the Agenda of the Conference refers to “Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000”. This clearly means we must take account of the past operation of the Treaty in order to chart the way forward to bring about its full implementation. This also clearly means that we are not only reviewing the Treaty but also the decisions and resolution of 1995 as well as the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.

The NAM has high expectations and shall work with you to agree on a strong and coherent outcome. The Group has already presented a comprehensive working paper rich in content with regard to issues within the mandate of this Committee.

NAM States Parties invite Main Committee II to closely consider NAM working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.46) and stands ready to constructively interact with all States to that end. In this context, NAM believes that agreement should be reached in this Committee to ensure that the final document of this Conference reflects the following:
**On Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones:**

**With regard to principles and Objectives:**

1. To welcome the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world.

2. To welcome the ongoing consultations between ASEAN and Nuclear-Weapon States on the Protocol of the South-East Asian Nuclear-weapon-free Zone and urges Nuclear-Weapon States to become parties to the Protocol of the Treaty as soon as possible.

3. To welcome the entry into force of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and Central Asia and to stress the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and the Central Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status by all States in their respective regions and by all the concerned States, as well as signature and ratification by Nuclear-Weapon States and other relevant States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories as envisaged in Article VII of the Treaty.

4. To reiterate the crucial need for practical steps aimed at achieving speedy establishment of a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East without any further delay.
5. To welcome the talks by Mongolia with its two neighbors to conclude the required legal instrument institutionalizing Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

With regard to Action Oriented outcome:

6. To confirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty as well as Mongolia’s nuclear weapon-free status represents a positive step and important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

7. To urge Nuclear-Weapon States that, having signed or ratified some of the relevant protocols to a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone, have done so with reservation or unilateral interpretations that affect the denuclearization status of that zone to modify or withdraw such reservations or unilateral interpretations.

8. To highlight the importance of holding the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to the treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones and Mongolia and its contribution to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

On the Middle East:

With regard to outcome related to Principles and Objectives:
9. To intensify the efforts aimed at establishing a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in the Middle East and call for cooperation and consultation among States Parties in order to identify and adopt necessary practical steps to achieve that goal in implementing the 1995 Resolution on Middle East and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

10. To stress that the adoption of Resolution GC(53)/RES/16 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and Resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities by the IAEA General Conference are another manifestation of the threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and remain the main obstacles to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

11. To express concern that Israel continues to refrain from acceding to the NPT despite the accession of all other States in the region.

12. To reaffirm the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (Part I), which “calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.”

13. To recall that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis of which the NPT was indefinitely extended, without a vote in 1995,
and that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.

14. To reaffirm the 2000 Review Conference Final Outcome which underscored the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

15. To stress that the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT should contain concrete and practical recommendations concerning the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, including a commitment by each State Party to the Treaty to strictly prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the NPT and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. States parties to the NPT should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.

With regard to Action Oriented Outcome:

16. To focus substantially the activities of the 2010 Review Conference on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-
free zone in that region in accordance with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East; and that States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the three Treaty depositaries and sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, should report on steps they have taken to promote the undelayed establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and the realization of goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

17. To recommend the establishment of a Standing Committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East and to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees.

18. To call upon States Parties to the NPT to provide appropriate support in order to facilitate the implementation of the IAEA General Conference Resolutions GC(53)/RES/16 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities.

19. To call upon States Parties to the NPT to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfer to Israel.

20. To reiterate the commitment of all States Parties to the NPT to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-
party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguard.

21. To support the efforts of NAM’s States Parties in the Middle East in pursuing the earliest implementation of the 1995 resolution on Middle East and invite the Conference to closely consider the proposals put forward by States Parties of the region in this regard.

**On Safeguards and Verification:**

**With regard to outcome related to Principles and Objectives:**

22. To reaffirm that the IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States Parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfillment of their Treaty obligations; with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

23. To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations.
24. To confirm that obligation under article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programs, provide credible assurances enabling States Parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV. Therefore, States Parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States Parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

25. While expressing full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA, strongly rejects attempts by any State to politicize the work of the IAEA, including its technical cooperation program, in violation of the IAEA Statute, and stresses that any undue pressure of interference in the IAEA, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the IAEA, should be avoided.

26. To emphasize that the States Parties to the NPT should consult and cooperate in resolving their issues with regard to implementation of the NPT related safeguards agreements within the IAEA framework.

With regard to Action Oriented Outcome:

27. To reiterate that the IAEA’s work with regard to safeguards and verification needs to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and full scope safeguards agreements.
28. To request all States that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards.

29. To request that all Nuclear-Weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full scope safeguards. This should be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the NPT and IAEA statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of Nuclear-Weapon States’ obligations with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty in a manner inconsistent with the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by consensus at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

30. To consider the strengthening of the IAEA’s system for the protection of confidentiality of safeguard-related information.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, NAM States Parties remain committed to constructively engage in a collective effort to ensure that all such elements are given due consideration by the Committee.

Thank you.