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STATEMENT BY

H.E. Mr. Paul van den IJssel

Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
to the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation Nuclear Weapons
Cluster II

NEW YORK, 10 May 2010
Mr. Chairman,

At the outset let me congratulate you on your election as Chairman of Main Committee II. We assure you of our full support as you guide us in our work over the coming weeks.

Mr Chairman, the Netherlands fully endorses the statement made by the Presidency of the European Union. From a national perspective, we would like to add the following observations.

The Netherlands supports the rights of states to develop peaceful nuclear energy. However, more than ever before NPT-states need to think about ways of tackling the challenges that come with the “nuclear renaissance”. How to ensure that the development of nuclear energy meets the necessary non-proliferation requirements? Transparency is key. It is key in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and it is key in building confidence. Indeed lack of transparency, and therefore lack of confidence, is one of the central issues in the two crises presently challenging the NPT regime. We think the importance of transparency should be reflected in the outcome document of this Committee.

The issue of transparency takes me to my next point: the strengthening of verification standards at large and the universalization of the Additional Protocol in particular.

The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is the foundation of the international verification system. It is essential in verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. However, this Agreement does not allow the IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. In our view, a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement therefore needs to be supplemented by an Additional Protocol.
Indeed, this Protocol provides increased confidence in a State’s compliance with Article II of the Treaty. The Netherlands therefore considers the AP to be an integral part of the IAEA’s safeguards system and would like to see this reflected in the outcomes of this conference.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear export controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing States' Party obligations under Article III of the Treaty. They are an additional barrier in preventing that goods transferred will be used in a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or acts of nuclear terrorism. The Netherlands is committed to uphold the highest standards of export controls and committed to full transparency in that field.

Many State Parties referred to the necessity to strengthen the NPT review process and thereby the NPT-regime. In that context it is our view that targeted institutional reform along the lines laid down in working paper 4 is desirable. This reform could enhance the effectiveness of the review process and thus contribute to the progress we seek on substantive issues facing the NPT now and in the future.

Two last points.
We should maximise our effectiveness to combat nuclear terrorism. The Netherlands welcomes recent initiatives to do so, as the NSS or GICNT. We believe the NSS meeting in Washington was a success and should pave the way forward on this issue.

The Netherlands has been and still is actively involved in bringing into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In that regard we welcome the announcement of Indonesia to initiate its ratification process. To conclude, I would like to invite you all to a side-event, an expert presentation on verification capabilities of the CTBT, on the 19th of May.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman