NEW ZEALAND

2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
3-28 MAY 2010

MAIN COMMITTEE II:
GENERAL DEBATE

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7 MAY 2010

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
Mr Chairman

New Zealand believes that an effective non-proliferation regime is essential for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. In this context the Non-Proliferation Treaty confers a set of interrelated and mutually-reinforcing obligations and rights on States Party.

As Main Committee II reviews the provisions of the Treaty related to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguards, we need to be clear that accountability is a key element of the NPT regime, and this is reinforced by the Treaty's safeguards system. This provides assurances of compliance and creates the stable international environment necessary to allow for the full realisation of the Treaty's goals.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA) has a key role to play in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It provides robust verification and assurances that nuclear activities undertaken by member states are purely for peaceful purposes, and that nuclear material is not being diverted. The IAEA has traditionally achieved this through its compliance and verification activities and through the implementation of national Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

But much has changed since the NPT system was first established. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement on its own is no longer adequate in providing the Agency with the necessary authority to do this. The Additional Protocol is the key tool in this regard and forms the contemporary verification standard, and we believe that it should always feature as a condition in any new supply arrangement. We note that the majority of states have accepted the Additional Protocol as the verification standard.

New Zealand supports the calls made in the G10 paper presented by Australia, for member states to fully cooperate with the IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements. New Zealand also strongly urges all States Party which have not yet done so – particularly those with significant nuclear activities – to conclude and to bring into force an Additional Protocol without delay.

Mr Chairman

In the international arena we face an increasing number of complex verification challenges which could damage the international non-proliferation agenda. These need to be acknowledged and addressed.

Like others, New Zealand remains concerned about the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

We appreciate the IAEA's ongoing efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding Iran's past nuclear programme. But we, along with many other
members of the international community, continue to have concerns about the nature of its nuclear programme, and the possible military dimension to it.

Mr Chairman

We note that Iran has still not provided the Agency with the necessary information and access to be able to address their concerns, and we support the calls made in the G10 papers for all states to fully cooperate with the IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements, and in expeditiously addressing anomalies, inconsistencies and questions identified by the IAEA, to assist them in informing annual safeguards conclusions with respect to the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations.

It is essential that Iran comply without delay with all IAEA Board of Governors decisions and UN Security Council resolutions. It is New Zealand’s view that these are mandatory obligations and that all states must comply with the international obligations. In particular, Iran must suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities. We also call on it to implement fully its NPT obligations as they were agreed between Iran and the IAEA, including its modified code 3.1 obligations, and to bring into force its Additional Protocol and all other transparency and access measures requested by the IAEA.

For Iran, these steps are especially important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the confidence deficit created as a result. New Zealand strongly supports a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear programme based on Iran’s compliance with IAEA and UNSC requirements. Iran must, however, play its part to realise this outcome and to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

Mr Chairman

New Zealand is also very concerned at the ongoing situation in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, the DPRK. We note that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programmes remain a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as to the peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. We note the expressions of grave concern by many States Party concerning the actions of the DPRK and deeply regret the DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty. We join other members of the G10 in condemning the nuclear tests carried out by the DPRK in October 2006 and May 2009, and support their call for the DPRK to comply with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, to return to the six party talks, and to honour the commitments it has already made under these talks, and to recommit itself to the NPT.

Mr Chairman

New Zealand also notes that, in the need to ensure that nuclear material is not being diverted away from peaceful purposes, robust export controls, and other
international partnerships, play a key role in preventing the possible misuse of nuclear-related exports for developing nuclear weapons or explosive devices. They are also central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation. It is up to all states to ensure that these export control regimes continue to work effectively, and that they continue to support the wider international non-proliferation framework.

New Zealand stresses that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Party to the Treaty. New Zealand also supports the G10 call urging all States Party to ensure that their nuclear related exports do not assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that they are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the NPT.

Similarly, New Zealand notes the important role the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction plays in enhancing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material in the former Soviet Union. New Zealand continues to be a contributor to the G8 Global Partnership and is currently working with donors to assist with projects established under the G8 Global Partnership. We would encourage other States Party to also consider making contributions to the G8 Global Partnership.

Mr Chairman

New Zealand believes that the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones is a powerful symbol demonstrating commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation. We are a member of the Rarotonga Treaty, which establishes a nuclear weapons free zone in the South Pacific.

Nuclear weapons free zones can act as a disarmament measure, providing an incentive for nuclear-armed or aspiring states to pull back from the nuclear option. They can also provide much needed confidence and contribute significantly to non-proliferation efforts. For example, in Article IV of the Rarotonga Treaty, which addresses peaceful nuclear activities, each party undertakes to "support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system"

New Zealand looks forward to the time when we have comprehensive coverage of this sort in all parts of the globe, including the Middle East. We call on all NPT States Party to cooperate and work together to support the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones across the world.

We look forward to engaging in a full discussion on these and other Committee II issues as the debate unfolds.

Thank you Mr Chairman