Mr. Chair,

Norway has aligned itself with a number of working papers which address the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT. We would therefore take this opportunity to highlight some issues of particular concern to Norway.

As stated in our general statement last week, Norway agrees with the UN Secretary General that it is up to Iran to restore its international credibility. Iran must comply with international demands to suspend sensitive parts of its nuclear programs, show full transparency and enter genuine negotiations with the view to reach an acceptable outcome for all parties concerned. In this respect it should be recalled that no one denies Iran its right to peaceful uses. This has been demonstrated on a number of occasions. For instance Norway has allocated funds to IAEA’s nuclear safety projects in Iran.

Norway has condemned the nuclear tests carried out by the DPRK. It is essential to re-start the diplomatic process with the view to bring the DPRK back to the NPT regime. The people of the DPRK have suffered enough. The leaders of the DPRK must bring the people out of international isolation.

(Check against delivery)
The IAEA must be fully equipped with the necessary financial, political and legal tools to carry out its safeguards mandate, Norway has consistently advocated enhancing resources to the agency and underlined the key role played by the agency as a guardian of the nonproliferation regime. Norway would like to see the legal basis strengthened for the IAEA to carry out its crucial task.

State parties to the NPT must agree on a standard point of reference for the safeguards regime, which should at least be the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Norway does not share the view that the additional protocol is a constraint on us, the non-nuclear states, to get access to nuclear technology and equipment for peaceful uses. Such confidence will facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation in accordance with Article IV of the treaty.

The additional protocol should be universalized as part of the evolving safeguards regime. It is only through the additional protocol that a state party can graduate to integrated safeguards, which is the next level of safeguards cooperation between a state party and the agency. In a nuclear weapons free world, integrated safeguards should become the norm.

Attempts in Vienna to further strengthen the IAEA capability to carry out its safeguards and verification mandate have unfortunately not resulted in any recommendations. Now we should explore how the IAEA expand its data collection capabilities, modernize its Analytical Laboratory and further strengthen its network of independent laboratories.

In the process of eliminating nuclear weapons, it is important to further enhance the safeguards cooperation between nuclear weapons states and the IAEA. In this process all nuclear activities should be brought under IAEA control and monitoring.

Enhanced safeguards and addressing existing stocks of military fissile materials are closely interconnected. This demonstrates to the fullest that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are serving the same aim.

An early entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a FMCT are imperative to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. These two instruments are important to prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation.
Norway will in a separate statement address the issue of regional nuclear weapons free zones and our ambition to make progress for such a zone in the Middle East. Today I would just like to underline that one main avenue for moving closer to a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, is through improved safeguards. Another essential factor would be to make the CTBT legally binding for all countries in the region.

Mr. Chair,

Last month the Nuclear Security Summit agreed on a forward looking declaration and program of work with the view of securing all sensitive nuclear materials within four years. It was encouraging to note the broad consensus on the need to further strengthen the role of the IAEA in this important field. Norway announced a substantial contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

Norway also welcomed the call for full accession to relevant multilateral conventions and the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 by calling for adopting and enforcing adequate national legislation. In this respect the importance of export control should be recognized.

Norway was particularly pleased to see that the process of converting civilian research reactors from using highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium is gaining a renewed momentum. Four years ago Norway hosted an international symposium on minimizing the use of HEU in the civilian sector. A key observation was that conversion is doable, which has been demonstrated through recent practical measures. Elimination of HEU in the civilian sector would further facilitate a safe and secure development in accordance with article IV of the treaty.

Lastly, the issue of international cooperation on nuclear fuel cycles may be considered as a non-proliferation tool, but from our perspective such cooperative arrangements are basically aimed at facilitating peaceful uses and my delegation will address this issue in Main Committee III.