STATEMENT

by the Delegation of the Russian Federation
at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
on the Second Set of Issues (Non-Proliferation and IAEA Safeguards)

New York, 3-28 May 2010
Mr. Chairman,

To achieve the efficient functioning of the non-proliferation regime is one of the priority tasks on the way to our common goal of freeing the world from nuclear weapons in accordance with the NPT objectives.

A key element in ensuring a reliable implementation by non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT of their non-proliferation obligations (Article II of the Treaty) is the application of the IAEA safeguards in accordance with Article III of the Treaty. This is an essential pre-requisite for cooperation in the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy and an inter-state confidence-building measure.

The IAEA today is the only international organization with unique technological and expert capabilities for control over the implementation by the States of their non-proliferation obligations. Russia consistently supports the IAEA verification activities, relies on the Agency’s authority and technical expertise in applying safeguards, and trusts the conclusions it makes.

According to the IAEA, its safeguards are being applied today in 163 countries throughout the world, with 160 of them being Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The safeguards cover 1,113 power plants and 158,670 significant quantities of nuclear materials.

Since its creation the system of IAEA safeguards has been subject to continuous improvement, adapting to emerging difficult situations in the field of non-proliferation, such as detection of undeclared activities and non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreements. The Agency progressively built up its verification expertise and relied on scientific and technological research in the field of nuclear material measurements and information processing.

As for the undeclared nuclear activities, as a result of the implementation in 1997 of the Programme “93+2” the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) to be used as a model for protocols additional to the agreements on comprehensive safeguards under the INFCIRC/153. As a
consequence, the IAEA was enabled to check the accuracy and completeness of the statements on nuclear activities made by a State.

At the same time, conclusion of the Additional Protocol remains a purely voluntary act. This reduces the possible maximum extent of control in non-nuclear-weapon states and, in some cases, does not allow for making the conclusion that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities.

In this context it is of great importance to achieve universality of the Additional Protocol. Russia calls on the States that have not yet signed or ratified it, to do this as soon as possible. The Russian Federation ratified the Additional Protocol in 2007 (the Federal Law No. 227-FZ of 2 October 2007).

The Additional Protocol should become one of the factors to be taken into account when considering the possibilities for nuclear exports. At this stage Russia is ready to consider it as one of the obligatory conditions when transferring sensitive nuclear technologies and equipment. We believe it reasonable to make relevant recommendations for the final document of the Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

Today, the IAEA and its safeguards system face new challenges. The expected upswing of civil energy in the world and globalization of trade in nuclear equipment and nuclear materials lead to a significant increase in the number of nuclear power plants and nuclear materials that should be covered by the IAEA safeguards.

In this context Russia supports the IAEA efforts aimed at increasing technological and economic efficiency of the safeguards system, including legal, organizational and technical aspects.

Russia has been actively cooperating with the Agency for 26 years in providing technical support for the safeguards by implementing a relevant national programme. Under this programme the IAEA is provided with assistance in carrying out the analysis of environmental samples in Russian laboratories, training inspectors and personnel on accounting and control of nuclear materials in Russian
specialized institutions, developing new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities, analyzing information from publicly available sources.

For the countries that signed and ratified the Additional Protocol the IAEA develops the so-called integrated safeguards that ensure a comprehensive approach to the application of safeguards. A large-scale introduction of integrated safeguards is of great importance for technological and economic efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system as a whole.

Mr. Chairman,

Considering a widespread development of atomic energy throughout the world and emergence of new countries that have not possessed such energy before, the risk is increasing of proliferation of technologies that can be used for producing weapon-grade nuclear materials.

Russia together with other G8 States has developed and introduced, at the legislative level, rigid but objective criteria regulating transfer to non-nuclear-weapon States of the most sensitive nuclear equipment and technologies such as enrichment of uranium and chemical processing of spent fuel. The main criteria is the compulsory participation of the importing State in the NPT. We are working in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to achieve the universality of these criteria.

The Russian national export control system is based on control lists and export regulations of listed items which are established in conformity with the principles of the NSG and Zangger Committee. We positively assess the work done by the NSG and Zangger Committee that proved in practice the possibility to establish coordinated procedures of control over nuclear exports on non-discriminatory basis, draw up a list of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies subject to control, as well as principles of their transfer to non-nuclear countries.

We consider useful further work to achieve universality of the NSG and Zangger Committee arrangements as well as their control lists in the process of nuclear export and implementation of projects in the field of peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Enhancing efficiency of national export control systems is the most important means of combating nuclear material and technology trafficking, preventing unauthorized transfers of controlled nuclear materials and technologies.

Russia stands for a consistent implementation by all countries of the provisions of UN SC Resolution 1540 aimed at combating WMD black market, preventing such weapons and materials associated with their production, technologies and their means of delivery falling into the hands of non-state actors, and first of all, terrorist organizations. We are vigorous participants in the work of the UN SC Committee established to ensure effective implementation of provisions of Resolution 1540.

A lot has been already done until now in developing the so-called international “insurance net” aimed at preventing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists. National monitoring systems established to detect unauthorized transfer of nuclear materials are being constantly updated; requirements to nuclear safety are being constantly adjusted.

Further progress in this direction will be ensured by the agreements reached at the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in Washington in last April.

Mr. Chairman,

Russia takes part in the IAEA programme to fight illegal trafficking of nuclear materials. In this connection it is necessary to note the importance of the IAEA systemic efforts towards strengthening the regime of nuclear safety in the world. We take note of successful implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Safety Plan for 2007-2009.

Currently the IAEA works on the basis of the 2010-2013 Plan with a focus on strengthening of nuclear safety in order to prevent potential incidents of nuclear terrorism. While emphasizing the priority of physical protection of nuclear materials, it is also necessary to ensure security and safety of radioactive materials and sources.

The most important areas of work include the development by the IAEA of a series of publications on physical nuclear security, including “Goals and
Fundamental Principles of Physical Nuclear Security”, as well as the IAEA recommendations on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear plants. The preparation of these documents is carried out with active participation of Russian experts.

Training of experts in physical protection is of great importance. Russia organizes IAEA physical protection training courses in the Obninsk Interdepartmental Special Training Centre on a regular basis. Since 2001, eighteen IAEA training courses, attended by 300 foreign specialists, have been held. A regional training course on the physical protection of research reactors was held in the Tomsk Polytechnic University.

Particular attention should be given to the programme on the maintenance of the IAEA database on illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. Russia actively participates in the data exchange process and submits to the IAEA official information on incidents that occurred in its territory.

Russia made a crucial decision to make, starting with 2010, a significant voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. We expect this contribution to facilitate further strengthening of physical security regime.

Mr. Chairman,

The Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, put forward by Presidents of the Russian Federation and the US in 2006, is an essential contribution to the realization of this goal. Today, the Initiative is acquiring global dimension. 79 states and four observer organizations (IAEA, EU, Interpol, UN Office on Drugs and Crime) became its participants. We are satisfied with the implementation of this Initiative that is a positive example of interacting in today’s world in order to counter emerging challenges and threats. This initiative is open for accession to all other States that share its common goals and are committed to fighting nuclear terrorism. Russia attaches great importance to the forthcoming Sixth Plenary Meeting of States Parties to this Initiative which will take place in Abu-Dhabi in June 2010.
Such key international documents, developed with our country's active participation, as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Amendment to the Convention, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted at the initiative of Russia, serve as a basis for the interaction. The Russian Federation has ratified the above-mentioned conventions, including the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We believe that its entry into force will make it possible to considerably strengthen the international nuclear security regime. We call upon States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify it as soon as possible.

We support the IAEA programme designed to reduce the level of enrichment of nuclear fuel for research reactors in the IAEA Member-Countries to less than 20 percent. Over the past years this programme achieved considerable results, and it became possible to convert many reactors from HEU to LEU. At the same time the most powerful research reactors that consume the greatest amount of HEU have not yet been converted.

We believe that the work to return from third countries fresh and spent HEU fuel from reactors of the Russian and American design back to the country of origin is an important sphere for cooperation directed towards higher level of nuclear safety and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We carry out this activity in cooperation with the United States and with the participation of the IAEA. The greater part of the work has been completed. The programme to repatriate HEU fuel to Russia covers 14 States. We plan to continue this activity. At this Conference we have circulated a joint Russian-Romanian working paper entitled “Repatriation of all Russian-origin fresh highly enriched uranium as well as spent fuel from Romania”.

Mr. Chairman,

We remain convinced that only a systematic approach to the implementation of non-proliferation obligations of the Parties to the NPT will allow to ensure confidence in the peaceful nature of national nuclear programmes, respond
appropriately to new challenges and threats, and prevent undeclared nuclear activities. Under current circumstances, considering new challenges and threats encountered by the world community, the role of the IAEA as a unique international organization ensuring necessary balance between progress in peaceful uses of atomic energy and compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime runs even higher.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.