United States Delegation Comments on NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/CRP.1 provided to the Chair on May 18, 2010

Please note that the sections before “Work of the Committee” are not included, since we have no change in those sections.

Work of the Committee

6. The Committee held [__] plenary meetings between 10 and 21 May 2010. An account of the discussions is contained in the relevant summary records (NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/SR.[__]). Subsidiary Body 2 of Main Committee II held
[__] meetings between 11 and [__] May. As the meetings of Subsidiary Body 2 were closed meetings, there are no official records of those meetings. Main Committee II and Subsidiary Body 2 also held informal meetings and consultations during that period. The Chairman of Main Committee II was assisted by the Vice-Chairmen in coordinating the informal consultations convened to examine various proposals and documents submitted to the Committee. After an item-by-item consideration of the agenda items allocated to it, the Committee, both at its formal and informal meetings, proceeded to a detailed discussion of the proposals and documents before it; the results of the discussions are outlined in paragraph 7 below. The various views expressed and proposals made are reflected in the explanatory records of the Committee and in the working papers submitted to it. Those summary records and working papers form an integral part of the report of the Committee to the Conference.

II. Conclusions and Recommendations

7. At the [__] meeting of Main Committee II, on [__] May 2010, the Committee took note of the report submitted to it by the Chairman of Main Committee II. The Committee agreed on the following formulations for the Final Document of the Conference:

Reaffirmation of commitments

1. The States parties reiterate their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty and the decisions and resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and [__] in the continuing importance of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

2. The Conference stresses that adherence to, and compliance with, the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the Treaty are the essential basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation and commerce and that implementation of IAEA safeguards makes a vital contribution to the environment for the development of an international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. The Conference notes that the integrity of the Treaty depends upon full respect by all States parties of all their obligations under the Treaty.

4. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty is vital in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons thereby providing significant security benefits. The State parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty can achieve this goal, and they urge all States not parties to the Treaty, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols consistent with the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)).

5. The Conference reaffirms the fundamental importance of full and strict compliance by all States with the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements, and recognizes that non-compliance undermines the integrity of the Treaty and violates the trust parties place in it for their security.

Comment [61]: Overly vague. We implement the Treaty not its objectives.

Comment [62]: Confirming to proposed change in MC1 text.

Comment [63]: The IAEA cooperates with non-NPT parties, therefore adherence to the NPT is not a prerequisite for IAEA technical cooperation.

Comment [64]: The current text of the compliance section does not reference specific states. Therefore, we believe that this section should not reference specific states with respect to adherence.
6. The Conference reemphasizes the importance of access to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with Article XII.C of the Statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153(Corrected), and the role of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in addressing upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and obligations ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by the IAEA.

7. The Conference reaffirms that the IAEA is the sole competent international authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

8. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty by promoting further confidence among States and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and nuclear cooperation.

9. The Conference reaffirms that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential for peaceful nuclear cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

10. The Conference also reaffirms its endorsement of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. The safeguards-strengthening measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol provide the IAEA with, inter alia, enhanced information about a State's nuclear activities and complementary access to locations within a State.

11. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.

12. The Conference reemphasizes the role of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)), which provides that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissile material or
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13. The Conference underlines the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States parties to maintain the highest standards of physical protection as an element to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

**Nuclear weapons free zones**

14. The Conference recalls the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and underlines the importance of the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.

15. The Conference reaffirms that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to the general and complete disarmament, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

16. The Conference recalls the declaration of Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status and supports Mongolia's policy to institutionalize its nuclear-weapon-free status, and expresses the hope that it would be realized in near future.

**Review of the operation of the Treaty**


18. The Conference notes with satisfaction that 165 States have brought into force safeguards agreements with IAEA in compliance with Article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty.

19. The Conference expresses its concern about possible undeclared nuclear facilities, material, and activities associated with IAEA's investigations of safeguards noncompliance in some States and calls for the cooperation of all States concerned. The Conference welcome the positive signs taken by other states to come into compliance with their NPT obligations.

20. The Conference notes that all nuclear-weapon States have now brought into force additional protocols to their voluntary offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol
that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol.

21. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements have been successful in providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol provides, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that these measures have been introduced as an integral part of IAEA’s safeguards system.

22. The Conference notes that strengthening measures provided for under both comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocols are now used routinely by the IAEA, and thus significantly increase the ability of the IAEA to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in all non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference also notes the efforts of the IAEA to strengthen safeguards to increase its ability to detect undeclared activities, and supports the implementation of such measures.

23. The Conference notes the conclusion reached in 2003 by the IAEA Board of Governors that the small quantities protocols, which hold in abeyance the implementation of certain provisions of the comprehensive safeguards agreement, constitute a weakness in the safeguards system. The Conference further notes that the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in 2005 to modify the standard text of the small quantities protocol and to change the eligibility criteria for such a protocol.

24. The Conference welcomes the important work being undertaken by the IAEA in the conceptualization and the development of State-level approaches to safeguards implementation and evaluation, and in the implementation of State-level integrated safeguards approaches by the IAEA, which results in an information-driven system of verification that is more comprehensive, as well as more flexible and effective. The Conference welcomes the implementation by the IAEA of integrated safeguards in 43 States parties.

25. The Conference notes that bilateral and regional safeguards play a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between neighbouring States, and that they also provide assurances concerning nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference considers that bilateral or regional safeguards could be useful in regions interested in building confidence among their member States and in contributing effectively to the non-proliferation regime.

26. The Conference notes with appreciation that many research reactors are discontinuing the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in favour of low-enriched uranium fuel.

27. The Conference acknowledges the important role of the national and international export control frameworks for nuclear material, equipment and technologies, especially those that are sensitive. The Conference underlines that effective and transparent export controls are central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation.
28. The States parties note the useful role that the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines can play in guiding States parties in setting up their national export control policies.

29. The Conference recognizes the non-proliferation and security benefits of the minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications and welcomes the IAEA efforts to assist countries which, on a voluntary basis, have chosen to take steps to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear applications. The Conference also notes the contribution to non-proliferation of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative for removal of highly enriched uranium from research reactors, and their conversion into research reactors operating with low enriched uranium.

30. The Conference emphasizes the important role of the IAEA in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation. The Conference welcomes the work being undertaken by the IAEA in developing the Nuclear Security Series. The Conference acknowledges the important contribution of the IAEA in assisting States in meeting appropriate security standards and calls on States to take full advantage of the IAEA's advisory services in that regard.

31. The Conference welcomes the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States parties to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. The Conference welcomes the IAEA activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information, including the continued maintenance of its illicit trafficking database. The Conference recognizes the need for enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Nuclear weapons-free zones

32. The Conference welcomes the steps that have been taken since 2005 to conclude nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards attaining the objective of global disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.


34. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Semipalatinsk Treaty) on 21 March 2009. The Conference considers that the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia constitutes an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the environmental rehabilitation of the territories affected by radioactive contamination.
35. The Conference welcomes the decision of the United States of America to pursue ratification of or ratification of relevant protocols to the African and South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and the intention to conduct consultations with the parties to the nuclear-weapons-free zones in Central and South East Asia, in an effort to resolve remaining issues and sign relevant protocols.

36. The Conference positively notes the results of the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia held on 30 April 2010 in New York as an important contribution to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Forward looking Action Plan

37. The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all possible efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

38. The Conference underlines that the objective related to international security issues, including disarmament and non-proliferation, should be achieved through dialogue and cooperation among States, through improvement of international nuclear non-proliferation regime and in accordance with United Nations Charter, and the Treaty, and the IAEA Statute. States parties further note that all efforts should be deployed to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime, through multilaterally agreed solutions. In this context, States parties underline the role of the IAEA as the established multilateral mechanism under the Treaty to address implementation of safeguards issues agreements and the Agency’s ability to address other relevant verification questions.

39. The Conference reiterates the call by previous Conferences for the application of IAEA safeguards to all source or special fissile material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.

40. The Conference notes underscores the importance of addressing all compliance challenges. These challenges pose a significant test for the Treaty and need to be met firmly in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards system. In addition, intense international concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation, including to non-State actors, has added to the importance of the Treaty-based nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference recognizes the threat posed to international peace and security by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need for strict compliance by all States with their non-proliferation obligations, including compliance with their IAEA safeguards agreements and relevant IAEA Board of Governors and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Conference supports the IAEA’s efforts to resolve safeguards implementation issues associated with States’ safeguards agreements.

41. The Conference underscores the importance of the IAEA exercising fully its authority to verify the declared use of nuclear material and facilities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements; views the additional protocols as an effective and efficient tool for the IAEA to obtain a much fuller picture of the
existing and planned nuclear programs and material holdings of the non-nuclear-weapon States; and notes that the entry into force and implementation of additional protocols in non-nuclear-weapon States is of vital importance for IAEA to be able to provide credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of non-nuclear-weapon States' nuclear programmes.

42. The Conference notes that 19 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, and urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay. The Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA continue his efforts to further facilitate and assist these States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of such agreements.

43. The Conference recognizes that, under comprehensive safeguards agreements, the IAEA has the right and the obligation to verify that State declarations on nuclear material and nuclear activities subject to safeguards are not only correct but are also complete, reaffirms the requirements of modified Code 3.1 to the Subsidiary Arrangements of comprehensive safeguards agreements, noting that these cannot be unilaterally abrogated; acknowledges the right and obligation of the IAEA, consistent with applicable safeguards agreements, to investigate activities in NPT non-nuclear weapon States parties that could be associated with the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons; and affirms the right and the obligation of the IAEA to use fully its inspection authorities to obtain access to all relevant locations, information, and individuals, including through the use of special inspections as provided in safeguards agreements.

43. bis The Conference urges all NPT parties to work to prevent nuclear proliferation, not only by complying with the Treaty but also by actively cooperating to impede and dissuade additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. In this regard, NPT Parties should support measures to address non-compliance.

44. The Conference stresses that, as decided by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1995, the IAEA safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements is designed to provide for verification by the IAEA of the correctness and completeness of States' declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

45. The Conference encourages all States parties to conclude additional protocols and to bring them into force as soon as possible, and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

46. The Conference recognizes the need for IAEA to further facilitate and assist States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and welcomes efforts to implement a plan of action to encourage wider adherence to comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference also calls on the States parties to identify specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

47. The Conference also recognizes additional protocols as an integral part of the IAEA's safeguards system and affirms that a comprehensive safeguards
agreement, together with an additional protocol, represents the verification standard that best fulfils the objectives of Article III of the Treaty, and urges all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. The Conference also notes that the additional protocol represents an excellent confidence building measure.

48. The Conference urges all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible and to bring into force additional protocols in order to provide maximum transparency.

49. The Conference notes that implementation of integrated safeguards by the IAEA can only proceed after the IAEA has drawn the broader safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material in a State party remains in peaceful activities.

50. The Conference notes the foreseen increase in the IAEA's safeguards responsibilities. It further notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system is functioning and calls upon all States parties to continue to ensure that the IAEA continues to have all necessary diplomatic, technical and financial support of the IAEA in order to ensure so that the IAEA is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities.

51. The Conference underscores the need for all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for placing of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in a manner which ensures that such material remains permanently outside military programs.

52. The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of the IAEA resources and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

53. The Conference affirms that every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by Article III of the Treaty.

54. The Conference requests that the IAEA continues to identify the financial and human resources needed to meet effectively and efficiently all of its responsibilities, including its safeguards verification responsibilities. The Conference therefore strongly urges all States to ensure that the IAEA is provided with these resources.

55. The Conference considers that the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. The allocation of resources should take into account all of the IAEA's statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer. Nonetheless, the Conference recognizes the importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in improving State's nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards practices and
their ability to meet their safeguards obligations. The Conference also welcomes the efforts of the IAEA to assist its Member States in strengthening their national regulatory controls of radioactive materials. In support of these efforts, the Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for these IAEA programmes.

56. The Conference further notes that the IAEA's safeguards system has to be able to respond to both existing and future verification challenges, and that it is necessary for the IAEA to further develop a robust, flexible and adaptive international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with the IAEA.

57. The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that they are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.

58. The Conference takes note of the work of the Zangger Committee in providing guidance to the States parties to meet their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, and invites all States parties to adopt the Understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any nuclear cooperation.

59. The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force an additional protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions.

60. The Conference calls upon States parties to eliminate undue constraints that might impede transfers to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force, refrain from imposing any undue restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology in conformity with Articles I, II and III to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.

61. The Conference calls upon all States parties to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low-enriched uranium.

61. bis The Conference notes that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (and reiterated in Security Council resolutions 1673 (2006) of 17 April 2006 and 1810 (2008) of 25 April 2008) requires all States to establish appropriate effective controls over materials related to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and, to this end, to establish appropriate effective physical protection measures, and appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts, to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit trafficking and brokering in nuclear weapons-related materials. Furthermore, the Conference recognizes the need for all States to reinforce their efforts on improving existing control mechanisms, and calls upon all States to reinforce their efforts to improve existing national control mechanisms.
61. In this regard, the Conference welcomes the International Symposium on Nuclear Security held by the IAEA in Vienna from 30 March to 3 April 2009, as well as the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, April 12-14, 2010, and affirms that States, consistent with their respective international obligations, should take responsibility for maintaining effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control, and for preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes. It emphasizes the importance of robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security and calls on States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary.

62. The Conference calls on all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4(Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

63. The Conference welcomes the adoption in 2005 of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention to ratify the amendment as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also calls on all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

64. The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidelines on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

65. The Conference takes note of UNSC Resolution 1887 and calls upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard.

66. The Conference notes the entry into force in 2007 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as the thirteenth multilateral legal instrument dealing with terrorism and urges all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention as soon as possible. The Conference also welcomes the establishment of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims at developing a partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis, consistent with obligations under relevant international legal frameworks.

**Nuclear weapons-free zones**

67. The Conference underlines that the respect for the nuclear-weapons-free zones by nuclear-weapon and neighboring states constitutes an important nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitment. The Conference further stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-
weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapons-free zones in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories as envisaged in Article VII of the Treaty.

68. The Conference calls upon the nuclear weapon States that, having signed or ratified any of the pertinent protocols to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapons-free zones with reservations and unilateral interpretative declarations, which affect the process of disarmament of any zone, to reconsider their position.

69. The Conference underlines the importance of steps to bring into effect the security assurances provided by nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaties and their protocols.

70. The Conference stresses the need to foster cooperation and enhanced consultation mechanisms among the existing nuclear-weapons-free zones through the establishment of concrete measures in order to fully implement the principles and objectives of the relevant nuclear-weapons-free zone treaties and to contribute to the implementation of the Treaty regime.

71. The Conference underscores the importance of the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, where they do not exist, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East.

72. The Conference urges the States concerned to resolve any outstanding issues regarding functioning of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines.

[Placeholder]

Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution

Regional Issues

73. The subsidiary body on "regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution" held (...) meetings within the overall time allocated to Main Committee II. In the first two meetings of the subsidiary body, States Parties expressed views with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution and (...). Concerns were expressed about the lack of implementation of the Resolution.

The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

74. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognises that the Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The
Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.

[Placeholder for the report on substantive proposals of States Parties on regional issues, including implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East]