The NAC is of the view that Paragraph 1 of Part I of the 2000 Outcome Document would be a valuable addition as the introductory paragraph of the Report of the Committee. It accurately captures and relays the views expressed by the overwhelming majority of States during our deliberations pertaining to the full implementation of the Treaty and the relationship between its 3 pillars. The inclusion of this language would thus make Paras 5 and 6 of Part A redundant.

The NAC would like to seek clarification on the meaning behind the language contained in Para 9. It is new language, and we are unclear as to its content and what it exactly prescribes.

The NAC calls for additional stronger language on the particular case of the DPRK, in line with what we have suggested in our Working Paper 8, namely Para 5.

The NAC views positively the reference to a time bound framework for nuclear disarmament as contained in Para 5. This we believe is a sound reflection of the demands made by the overwhelming majority of States during our deliberations in order to concretely advance the objective of a world free from nuclear weapons. The exact details of this time bound framework need to be worked on.

The NAC sees that Paras 16 and 17 contain language that is beyond the scope of our Treaty, and we ask for their deletion.

On a general note, the NAC would like to see language pertaining to military nuclear doctrines of States and Regional Alliances. It is worth recalling that the NAC has addressed those and other related issues on numerous occasions in our Working Paper 8, particularly Paras, 2,6,10,11 and 13, and we encourage the Chair to examine the language suggested in Working Paper 8 with a view to incorporating it in the Report of Main Committee I.

Mr. Chair, this part unfortunately falls far short of our expectations, and in fact seems to be a step back from the recognition in UNSC RES 984 of the legitimate interest of NNWS to receive security assurances, and from the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference that legally binding security assurances by the five NWS to the NNWS Parties to the Treaty strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as the call on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Rev Con on this issue (Para 2 Article VII). On this issue we believe strongly that a reference to the
necessity of providing legally binding negative security assurances is needed in this Part.

Section II

- The NAC would see value in this Review Conference welcoming also the adherence of new States Parties to the Treaty that have occurred since 2000, (and not just limited to 2005 onwards) given the importance we attach to Treaty universality.

Subsidiary Body I

- The NAC finds that the structure used is highly useful and beneficial and lends itself to a positive engagement based on an action oriented and practical approach.
- On a general note the NAC would like to see specific Actions pertaining to the role of nuclear weapons in Military Doctrines of States and Regional Alliances. We recall in that regard the language used in our Working Paper 8 on the matter, particularly Paras 2,6,10,11 and 13.
- We also find it amiss that the role of the CD is restricted to handling only two of it’s four core issues, and that there is no action related to nuclear disarmament in the CD. We encourage you Mr. Chair to rectify this omission in the text before us.
- Action 7 seems to indicate that the international conference that would be convened by the SG in 2014, will be based solely on the outcome of the NWS consultations as prescribed in Action 6. The NAC is of the view that the SG should certainly take into account those consultations, but not base the entire conference on their outcome.
- In so far as negative security assurances are concerned, we recall Paras 21 & 22 of our Working Paper 8, and also the NAC Working Paper 61 presented at the 2005 Review Conference on the subject which contained a draft protocol on negative security assurances.
- The NAC would like to see stronger language on Action 10, this is an important matter that requires our urgent attention, and we therefore ask you Mr. Chair to incorporate our Para 16 of NAC Working Paper 8 which we believe, as a cross regional grouping, better captures the importance of the matter.
- In so far as Actions 20 and 21 are concerned, we recall Paras 8 and 9 of our Working Paper 8 on the subject, in particular in reference to the importance of irreversibility and verification in dealing with fissile materials.
- The NAC views Actions 23-26 positively and commends the Chair on his accurate reflection of the discussions that took place on Confidence Building Measures and Transparency.

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