Address by

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before

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the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. President,

It gives me great pleasure address this important Conference in my capacity as the head of the delegation of Egypt, which is honoured to Chair the Non-Aligned Movement, and to start by extending congratulations to you and to the members of the Bureau for your election to lead our work towards the desired success, which all our peoples aspire to, aiming at providing security and stability and dedicating our efforts for development and construction. I would like to start by associating Egypt with the statements made on behalf of NAM, NAC, The African Group and the Arab Group.

There is no doubt that our Conference today convenes in a conducive atmosphere, amidst increased international realization that our efforts needs to be intensified to eliminate nuclear weapons and to eliminate the increasing reliance on them as a basis for achieving deterrence or security. This is emphasized by several initiatives that emerged recently calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, which represent a positive development with a potential to strengthen nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, based on the honest and balanced implementation of the legal commitments stipulated in the Treaty and the final documents of previous Review Conferences...the commitment of nuclear-weapon-States to the realization of comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament....and the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon-States not to seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

In order to bring about a more conducive international environment for nuclear-weapon-States and non-nuclear-weapon-States to implement their commitments, it is essential to concentrate on the three main pillars upon which the Treaty was founded, side by side with assuring the realization of universality of the Treaty and the immediate implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and of the 2000 Review Conference outcome both complementing international efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the non-proliferation treaty regime.

Our success in this regard, Mr. President, requires halting attempts to change the delicate balance upon which the Treaty was founded or to change the course or nature of the review process. The implementation by nuclear-weapon-States of their obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament, including through the
implementation of the new START agreement, for which we congratulate the United States and the Russian Federation, does not consequently commit non-nuclear-weapon-States to accept any additional obligations, other than those stipulated in the Treaty neither in the field of non-proliferation nor in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Accordingly, the increasing interest by non-nuclear-weapon-States Parties to the Treaty to make use of the developmental benefits of nuclear energy is a legitimate right to all such States – each and every one – in implementation of Article IV, and should not be taken as a basis to impose additional restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon-States, under the pretext of proliferation prevention, especially in the fields of verification and safeguards, such as requiring accession to the Additional Protocol as condition for supply of nuclear material, or establishing an international fuel bank that would codify the negative practices of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, or to impose new restrictions on the exercise by States Parties of their inalienable right to withdraw from the Treaty.

If there are some concerns related to increasing demands of non-nuclear-weapon-States to produce nuclear energy for developmental purposes, we have to admit that the experience of forty years since the Treaty has entered into force has shown that only one State withdrew from the Treaty and developed nuclear weapons. But that State did not exploit the provisions of the Treaty, rather than exploiting conflicting political positions that led to the failure by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council to address this issue.

Here, I have to emphasize that the verification system which we accepted in the Treaty, to be implemented under the IAEA supervision, is structured on material evidence as a basis for assessment, without politicization, selectivity or double standards. It is also based on the non-interference in internal affairs of States, particularly in evaluating their developmental objectives, assessing their needs of enriched uranium to realize these objectives or to affect States’ ability to enrich uranium and the place where such enrichment should take place. This decision is a national sovereign decision taken by each country depending on its own consideration. In this regard, developing countries - especially NAM States – reject politically motivated artificial classifications, leading to classifying States to
those who are responsible, receiving all the benefits even if they are outside the Treaty, and those who are not responsible, who would be deprived from these benefits even in the absence of any material evidence of its violation of the Treaty.

This applies mostly in regions where one state or more remain outside the Treaty, especially in the Middle East and North and South Asia, which are gradually looked at - in the view of some – as Parties of questioned loyalty to the Treaty, simply because they seek to achieve development for their peoples through the use of nuclear energy and its applications. At the same time, these “some” do not want to exert any effort to overcome the primary cause which might lead any State from those regions or elsewhere to reach a conviction that the Treaty is no longer capable of meeting its security concerns or responding to its developmental needs. This primary cause is the lack of universality of the Treaty.

I particularly mention here the region of the Middle East, Mr. President, and specifically our failure to implement the Resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, although fifteen years have passed since its adoption, and despite the fact that this resolution has been one of the principal bases for the indefinite extension package of the Treaty and remains the only resolution adopted from the past seven Review Conferences regarding a regional situations, in acknowledgement of its dangerous nature and its relevance to international peace and security.

Therefore, the need is doubled today for the effective and comprehensive implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, especially after fifteen years during which no effort was exerted by the three cosponsors of the Resolution to assure its implementation, despite the fact that those states have submitted the draft resolution, cosponsored it and pushed for its adoption. In that light, Egypt presented a number of proposals over the last three Preparatory Committees aimed at beginning the implementation of the Resolution through ensuring the accession of Israel to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon-State and submitting all its nuclear facilities to full-scope IAEA safeguards, in order to achieve the universality of the Treaty in the Middle East. The proposals also aim at launching real negotiations between all States of the region, without exception, on the Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. These are proposals which enjoy the
full support of the States members of the League of Arab States and States members of the Non-Aligned Movement. We welcome any constructive effort to push forward negotiations on this issue, thus addressing the increasing concerns expressed by the Arab States since 1995, through a comprehensive approach to be incorporated in the final review document of this Conference.

Mr. President,

This Conference represents a pivotal juncture in the history of the Treaty, and an opportunity, maybe the last that must be seized, to restore the Treaty’s credibility undermined by double standards, as an international framework for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For that to materialize, certain challenges must be decisively confronted through the outcome to emerge from the Conference, some of which I briefly summarize as follows:

1- Despite the conclusion by the United States and the Russian Federation of a new agreement for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the two countries, the implementation of the objectives of the Treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament remains below expectations, and the 13 practical steps do not enjoy the respect of nuclear-weapon-States and their implementation and that of consequent agreements remains far from any extent of verification by non-nuclear-weapon-States, especially in the area of dismantling weapons and disposal of the resulting fissile material as well as verifying the announced numbers of dismantled weapons. This re-affirms the need to readdress the issue of nuclear disarmament in the international multilateral framework and not to settle for direct negotiations restricted to nuclear-weapon-States only. It also confirms the need for creating a legal framework to eliminate nuclear weapons through the conclusion of an international legally binding convention to eliminate nuclear weapons in a specified timeframe.

2- Nuclear-weapon-States continue to adhere to nuclear weapons within the context of inflexible military doctrines which do not change to correspond to the new stated policy by their leaderships. Those doctrines continue to rely on nuclear deterrence, and even continue to place nuclear weapons at the
service of non-nuclear-weapon-States members in military alliances and under the umbrella of nuclear sharing. If military doctrines stipulate that nuclear weapons are a basis for ensuring security and peace for nuclear-weapon-States and their allies, then what prevents non-nuclear-weapon-States from taking those weapons as a basis for the same purpose, except if the purpose was to maintain the discriminatory nature of the Treaty which must be overcome through every effort possible.

3- Despite the fact that progress on nuclear disarmament did not materialize as much as the progress achieved in nuclear non-proliferation, non-nuclear-weapon-States did not receive any legally binding security assurances to date, assuring them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them pending the realization of general and complete nuclear disarmament.

4- The inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon-States in accordance with Article IV remains quantitatively and qualitatively undermined in the field of technology transfer from developed to developing countries. Some contribute to that through imposing unwarranted restrictions against the acquisition by non-nuclear-weapon-States Parties to the Treaty of nuclear material and equipment necessary to develop their peaceful nuclear programs.

5- Instead of upholding the strict implementation of all articles of the Treaty to address the imbalance in its implementation and non-compliance by the nuclear-weapon-states, some still provide illogical attempts to reinterpret Article X on withdrawal which represents an inalienable right of each State if the Treaty fails to fulfill its security in accordance with paragraph two of Article X.

6- The intervention of the United Nations Security Council in the implementation of States Parties of their commitments in accordance with the Treaty, despite the fact that the Treaty is a legally binding framework ratified by the Parliaments of States Parties and thus non of its bases or
means of implementation can be altered except within the contractual framework of the states parties.

7- The absence of any institutional organizational framework for the Treaty and the absence of any clear reference to follow-up its work in the intersessional periods in comparison with other Treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Finally, Mr. President, the success of our Conference will depend on reaching a comprehensive package that restores balance and credibility to the Treaty, based on the strict implementation of commitments by both sides....by the nuclear-weapon-States through engaging in serious negotiations in the multilateral framework which would result in legally binding commitments within a given timeframe for general and complete nuclear disarmament.... by nuclear-weapon-States also to exert the necessary pressure necessary to achieve the universality of the Treaty, through the accession of the States remaining outside it, as non-nuclear-weapon-States, and to prevent the repetition of exemptions provided contrary to the Treaty provisions.... by nuclear-weapon-States - especially the three depository States – to strive in all seriousness towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the initiation of negotiations between States of the region in a conference to be convened in 2011 along with the establishment of a standing committee from the Bureau of the Conference to prepare for, supervise and follow-up the conference.

No doubt that the sincere implementation by nuclear-weapon-States of their Commitments in this regard will open the way to non-nuclear-weapon-States for further commitment to the Treaty provisions...through not seeking to develop nuclear weapons...to more commitment to provisions of verification and safeguards under the IAEA supervision...to more freedom in developing peaceful nuclear programs necessary to address their developmental objectives...to more commitment towards not seeking to withdraw from the Treaty.
All that requires a true review of the Treaty and the documents of previous Review Conferences, with a view to achieving an integrated vision encompassing all those and many other commitments, to be included in a comprehensive review document reflecting our collective interests and overcoming our collective concerns at the same time. We have full confidence in our ability to achieve that, if intentions were sincere, and visions are true. Egypt will exert its utmost effort to realize a fair and comprehensive package as a basis for a new phase of a collective international effort towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

Thank you Mr. President