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Conferencia de las Partes 2010 encargada del Examen del Tratado sobre la
No Proliferación de las Armas nucleares (TNP)

Naciones Unidas, Nueva York
5 de mayo del 2010

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2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

United Nations, New York
5 May 2010
Mr. President:

Allow me, on behalf of my country, to offer our most sincere congratulations both on your election as President of this Conference and on the difficult and methodical preparatory work that you have been doing for months and that we hope will be crowned with success. We also commend all the members of the Bureau and particularly our dear colleague and friend Thomas Markram, the Secretary-General of this historic multilateral exercise.

The Eighth NPT Review Conference is opening in a much more propitious climate than the preceding one. We have seen how the Powers with the greatest share of responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security have retaken the lead, advancing proactively in the implementation of the disarmament pillar.

Chile wishes to acknowledge the important practical steps taken recently by these Powers, including the conclusion by the United States and the Russian Federation of a new START Treaty, the latest Nuclear Posture Review of the United States, which in effect devalues the role of nuclear weapons in the American strategic design and contains new negative security assurances, and the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, whose results will indirectly promote more flexible exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to the NPT to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As the President of Chile, Sebastián Piñera, stated at the Nuclear Security Summit, my country endorses the paradigm of the indivisibility of security, which gives all States—whatever their size or power—a share of responsibility for the preservation of international security as a whole. This means that, as States parties to the NPT, we all have the obligation to claim and exercise our share of responsibility for the success of this Review Conference, displaying flexibility and intelligence to accommodate the legitimate positions of all in order to reaffirm the legitimacy and relevance of this instrument, which despite prophecies of doom is still the cornerstone of the system of collective security.

In order to achieve this goal, Chile—which in general endorses the views expressed by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries—proposes that:

- We should respect the acquis of the Treaty review process, which represents a continuum that should inspire future Conferences;

- We should creatively assume the legacy of past Conferences, combining its political legitimacy with the new developments emerging from the present situation. Thus we do not need to renegotiate earlier agreements—for example, the 13 practical steps—but should find updated arrangements for implementing them;
• We should realistically agree on plausible actions for the disarmament pillar, generously acknowledging the progress made, which although partial is not to be under-estimated;

• We should support the Secretary-General’s five-point plan and, in particular, lay the foundations for preliminary discussion of a Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

• We should highlight those past practices that can represent a turning point in the conceptual appreciation of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of Chile, the reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear weapons is particularly important. Our country strongly supports the proposal made by New Zealand, as coordinator of the de-alerting coalition;

• We should arrange for the speedy commencement of negotiations on the treaty for the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for military purposes;

• We should reaffirm the need for the speedy entry into force of the CTBT;

• We should forcefully proclaim the practical importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as an intermediate stage towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, urging their expansion to the northern hemisphere;

• We should highlight the importance of Mongolia’s self-proclamation as a nuclear-weapon-free State. The precedent set by Mongolia has huge political potential which must be exploited and emphasized;

• We should give priority to a formula allowing us to advance in the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. This formula could include inter-sessional monitoring mechanisms;

• We should objectively identify and firmly condemn the existing risks of proliferation, seeking effective prevention mechanisms;

• We should strengthen the international safeguards system by achieving universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol;

• We should reaffirm the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the legitimate exercise of which requires full compliance with the obligations contained in articles I, II and III of the Treaty;

• We should establish an institutional base for the Treaty, taking as a starting-point the proposal made by Canada and co-sponsored by Chile, which should make provision for significant participation by civil society;