The 2010 Review Conference
of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons Treaty

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STATEMENT

by

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Statement of
of the Republic of Poland
(2010 NPT Review Conference)

Mr. President,

At the outset of my intervention let me congratulate you on the appointment as the President of the NPT Review Conference. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of the Polish Delegation’s full support and cooperation in the fulfillment of your important mandate. We hope for successful conclusion of the current review cycle under your leadership.

Poland fully associates itself with the statement delivered by Lady Ashton on behalf of the European Union.

Mr. President,

It is paradoxical that with the collapse of the bipolar world order, the nuclear weapons continue to play a significant role. Their importance has not diminished over time. In addition the international community witnessed attempts by some countries to acquire them. This observation leads us to a conclusion that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is still one of the greatest challenges not only to the NPT regime but also to the international security as a whole.

The fact that the United States and the Russian Federation took up the responsibility for reinvigorating the global nuclear disarmament efforts can be regarded as one of positive signs in the field of nuclear disarmament. It is also a proof of their leadership in this field. The post-START Treaty brings new quality to nuclear arms control and establishes an important link with the agreements reached in the early 90’s. It is also an important instrument in building confidence and achieving transparency, thus contributing to international stability and security. Poland views disarmament efforts also as an instrument of making nuclear weapons less attractive to potential proliferators.

These positive developments have already launched the debate on the future arms reduction treaty, which should set new ceilings not only on strategic weapons but also other types of nuclear weaponry, especially those designated as tactical or sub-strategic. The challenge of their reduction and elimination has not yet been the subject of any legally binding international agreement. The goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which we all share, cannot be met without addressing that issue head on. Large arsenals of sub-strategic nuclear weapons seem anachronistic in the post-Cold War world and increase the risk of proliferation by non-state actors. Instead of enhancing our security they make it more volatile. Therefore Foreign Ministers of Poland and Norway undertook a joint initiative of including sub-strategic nuclear arsenals in the arms control framework.
We suggest a step-by-step approach, not limited by any deadlines and thus flexible and realistic. This process embraces the accomplishment of three stages. The first two aim at enhancing transparency and introducing confidence-building measures. Today we should give them the highest priority. The last stage proposes reduction and elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in conjunction with general disarmament process. We hope that our initiative could serve as “food for thought” and constitute our significant contribution to the debate on nuclear disarmament.

Mr. President,

The risk of proliferation is also connected with the issue of security of sensitive nuclear and radiological materials. This threat is even more alarming if linked with uncontrolled spread of sensitive technologies and international terrorism. Poland, as a transit country, is directly interested in strengthening the international norms related to the aforementioned areas. Therefore Poland took part in the Nuclear Security Summit, called by President B. Obama in April. One of the issues discussed there was an important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the field of nuclear security and non-proliferation. Poland strongly supports all initiatives aimed at providing the IAEA with instruments it needs in order to carry out its important mandate. We call upon all states to co-operate with the Agency and introduce full transparency with regard to their sensitive nuclear activities. That means universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a safeguards standard.

We do not suggest any steps, which Poland alone has not made. In January 2009 the Polish Government took a decision to develop a Nuclear Power Programme. Our aim is to be as transparent as possible in establishing a nuclear energy sector in Poland and thus serve as a positive example on how to combine the expansion of nuclear facilities with the need to observe international non-proliferation norms. Poland has implemented the IAEA Additional Protocol and since 2006 has been covered by the integrated safeguards system. We will elaborate more on the Polish nuclear power programme in a separate statement in the Main Committee III.

Mr. President,

The preparations to the Review Conference have been accompanied by a number of positive contributions from around the globe, also calling for strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. They should serve as a reminder that the eyes of the whole international community are directed at New York, and expectations are high. This year we are to mark the 40-th anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s entry into force. Failure is not an option. Although it is said that the foundations of the non-proliferation regime have been shaken by new challenges, we must prove that the NPT is a firm cornerstone of this system. The best way is to avoid the 2005 scenario and to ensure positive results of the current Review Cycle. This is our common responsibility.

Thank you for your attention.