STATEMENT OF
THE GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED STATES PARTIES

Delivered by
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Nations in Geneva

Main Committee I

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. Chairman,

I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties. The Group wishes to congratulate you for the assumption of the Chairmanship of this important body and pledges its full cooperation with you and other members of the Bureau in order to ensure that the work of this Committee is successful and up to our expectations.

Item 16 of the Agenda of the Conference refers to “Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000”. This clearly means we must take account of the past operation of the Treaty in order for us to be able to chart the way forward to bring about its full implementation. This also clearly means that we are not only reviewing the Treaty but also the decisions and resolution of 1995 as well as the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.

The realization of the objective of a world free from nuclear weapons is the NAM States Parties' highest priority. The NAM States Parties have struggled hard to attain a world devoid of nuclear arms for a long time. Every step forward to that end should be consolidated and used as a building block to advance toward the final goal for comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament.

NAM takes note of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the Russian Federation as a step in the right direction. Such reductions, although a positive development, remain below the international community's expectations which anticipate more concrete uniform and systematic nuclear disarmament effort involving all Nuclear Weapon States, and within the multilateral framework in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty. We encourage Nuclear Weapon States to bring about such reductions applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability at a significantly faster pace.

The group has high expectations and shall work with you to agree on a strong and coherent Plan of Action on Nuclear Disarmament within a specified timeframe. In addition to the comprehensive working paper with a rich content on nuclear disarmament, the Group also submitted a working paper on Elements for a
Plan of Action on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons aimed at bringing about the full implementation of Article VI as well as the unequivocal commitments undertaken by Nuclear-Weapon-States at the 2000 Review Conference. While the Group will introduce the Elements for a Plan of Action in the Subsidiary Body on Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances, allow me to highlight its key elements:

The Plan of Action aims at the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe over three phases. The first phase, which extends from 2010 to 2015 contains measures aimed at reducing the nuclear threat as well as measures aimed at nuclear disarmament. The second phase, which extends from 2015 to 2020, includes measures aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals and promoting confidence between States. The third phase, which extends from 2020 to 2025 and beyond, includes measures aimed towards the consolidation of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

NAM States Parties invite Main Committee I to closely consider both NAM working papers and stands ready to constructively interact with all States to that end.

In addition, the Group believes that agreement should be reached in this Committee to ensure that the final document of this Conference reflects the following elements as necessary:

**On Nuclear Doctrine and Nuclear Sharing**

1. To note with deep concern security doctrines of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), including the “NATO Alliance Strategic Concept”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.

2. To reaffirm that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Party to the Treaty. Emphasize, in this context, the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II.

3. To stress the importance of reaffirmation by Nuclear-Weapon States of their obligations, and full implementation of Article I, and refrain from nuclear
weapon sharing, with other states under any kind of security arrangements, including in the framework of military alliances.

4. To stress the importance of reaffirmation by non-Nuclear-Weapon States of their commitments to the full implementation of Article II and to refrain from nuclear weapon sharing with Nuclear-Weapon States, non-Nuclear-Weapon States, and States not Party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements in time of peace as well as in time of war, including in the framework of military alliances.

**On Nuclear Disarmament**

5. To reconfirm that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate; as endorsed both at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference.

6. To reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by Nuclear-Weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

7. To voice concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space, in which the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and further nuclear proliferation.

8. To agree that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes, and the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies undermine disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

**On Nuclear Testing**

9. To reaffirm that the only way to rid the world of the threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. To support the objective of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

11. To realize the objective of the CTBT, the commitment of all States Signatories, especially the five Nuclear-Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament is essential. The five Nuclear-Weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.

On Security Assurances

12. To recall that at the 2000 Review Conference, States Parties to the Treaty had agreed by consensus, that legally binding security assurances by the five Nuclear-Weapon States to the non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

13. To reiterate that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some Nuclear-Weapon States, including certain States’ nuclear posture reviews, contravene the security assurances provided by Nuclear-Weapon States and violate the commitments undertaken by them at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT.

14. To reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be effectively assured by Nuclear-Weapon States that there will be no use or threat of use of such weapons. Efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

NAM States Parties remain committed to constructively engage in a collective effort to ensure that all such elements are given due consideration by the Committee.

Thank you.