Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference.

Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. The Conference recognizes that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty is a common responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty and remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

2. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, in accordance with article I of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek nor receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

4. The Conference recalls that the non-nuclear-weapon States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.

Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference.

6. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of all the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty’s vital contribution to peace and security.

7. The Conference emphasizes that responses to concerns over compliance by nuclear-weapon States and by non-nuclear-weapon States with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

8. The Conference recalls the commitment by all States parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

9. The Conference underscores the necessity of the full implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

10. The Conference emphasizes the importance of promoting the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in the process of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs**

11. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by all States parties of their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

12. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the importance of the full implementation by all States parties of article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference.

13. The Conference reaffirms the need for the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and to completely implement their nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps and the plan of action on nuclear disarmament, that were agreed by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
14. The Conference reaffirms that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

15. The Conference notes the agreement by the nuclear-weapon States on a common reporting framework and the submission of their national reports at the third session of the Preparatory Committee held in 2014 and at the 2015 Review Conference, pursuant to the relevant actions of the conclusions and recommendations agreed at the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference welcomes the further information provided by some nuclear-weapon States with respect to the number of nuclear weapons in their national inventories.

16. The Conference notes the meetings of the nuclear-weapon States held in Paris (2011), Washington (2012), Geneva (2013), Beijing (2014) and London (2015), which fostered dialogue and common approaches amongst themselves to strengthen the Treaty and the continuation of this process and related bilateral efforts. The Conference notes the submission of a glossary of key nuclear terms, which does not alter the definitions or meanings of any nuclear terms in international treaties, international commitments or national laws or regulations.

17. The Conference recognizes and welcomes the steps taken to implement the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the significant reductions in deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, as well as their dismantling nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

18. The Conference also notes the fulfilment as declared by the United Kingdom of its commitment made in 2010 to further reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons, as well as the completion of its planned reductions in the number of operationally available nuclear warheads. The Conference notes the reaffirmation as declared by China to keep its nuclear weapon capabilities at the minimum level required for national security and of its policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons at any time. The Conference further notes the actions taken as declared by France on nuclear disarmament, including the completion of reductions by one-third of the air-borne component of its nuclear forces and the irreversible dismantlement of its production facilities for fissile material for nuclear weapons.

19. The Conference reaffirms the importance of all States applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.

20. The Conference notes with concern that despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral nuclear arms reductions, the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States still amounts to several thousands and many hundreds remain on high alert. The Conference stresses in this regard that reductions in deployments and in operational status are welcome but cannot substitute for the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons as required under article VI.
of the Treaty. The Conference notes concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States regarding programmes for the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons as well as the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapon systems.

21. The Conference recognizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

22. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States or their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI, and affirms the importance of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

23. The Conference reiterates its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.

24. The Conference acknowledges the devastation that would be visited upon all humankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.

25. The Conference notes the growing interest during the 2010-2015 review cycle of non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The Conference notes the conferences that were held in Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014) and Vienna (December 2014), which added to the knowledge of non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society of the catastrophic consequences of any nuclear weapon detonation and the associated risks posed by nuclear weapons.

26. The Conference notes the various joint statements delivered at the Review Conference that addressed humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, including by Austria on behalf of [159] States parties on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and by Australia on behalf [26] States parties on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference also notes the statements by the nuclear-weapon States and by Japan on behalf of [76] States parties on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The Conference further notes the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.

27. The Conference notes the Pledge presented at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons by Austria and supported by [93] States parties, including the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which met at the level of Heads of State or Government.

28. The Conference affirms that the use of nuclear weapons would have immediate and long-term consequences, which are significantly graver than many States parties previously understood. The Conference notes that those States parties consider that no State or international organization could adequately address the humanitarian emergency caused by such use.
29. The Conference recalls the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996.

30. The Conference expresses its concern that since the 2010 Review Conference the Conference on Disarmament has not commenced substantive work on any agenda item in the context of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

31. The Conference notes the high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on nuclear disarmament held on 26 September 2013 and the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/68/32 on Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament.

32. The Conference notes the efforts and discussions pursued within the United Nations General Assembly related to revitalizing the multilateral disarmament machinery, including the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/66 on revitalizing the work of Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.

33. The Conference also notes the adoption of United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/56 on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which established an open-ended working group.

34. The Conference takes note of the work of the group of governmental experts, established pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/53 on a Treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

35. The Conference welcomes that [183] States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and that [164] States, including 36 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have deposited instruments of ratification. In this respect, the Conference welcomes the ratification of the CTBT since the 2010 Review Conference by Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq and Niue.

36. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date, recalling the responsibility of all State signatories to promote that Treaty.

37. The Conference further reaffirms the importance of the CTBT as a vital multilateral instrument for nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference recognizes the importance to promote and achieve the entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. The Conference welcomes the efforts by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission toward the completion and provisional operationalization of the on-site inspection regime and encourages it to build upon the achievements at the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 in Jordan.

38. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference
recalls United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and the relevant protocols established pursuant to nuclear-weapon-free zones, recognizing that treaty-based unconditional and conditional security assurances are available to such zones.

39. The Conference notes the urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to consider effective, universal, non-discriminatory, unconditional, legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, including an internationally legally binding instrument, and recognizes of the need to fully honour and uphold all existing security assurances given unilaterally and multilaterally.

40. The Conference welcomes efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities that will contribute to providing assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, including the new and continuing initiatives pursued by Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The Conference notes additional proposals for concrete and practical measures for disarmament verification.

41. The Conference welcomes the increased and positive interaction with civil society during the review cycle and greater engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

42. The Conference recognizes that accelerated efforts are required to implement article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference, particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, including through the specification of concrete benchmarks and timelines as set forth in the present document:

1. The Conference emphasizes that deep concerns pertaining to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons are a key factor that should continue to underpin efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and that awareness of these consequences should lend urgency to efforts by all States leading to a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference affirms that, pending the realization of this objective, it is in the interest of humanity and the security of all peoples that nuclear weapons never be used again.
2. The Conference calls for the pursuit of all effective measures for the full implementation of article VI.

3. The Conference reaffirms the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.

4. The Conference calls upon all nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking, to reduce further and eliminate, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, all types of nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of location, including through negotiations as well as unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

5. The Conference encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to commence negotiations at an early date to achieve greater reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons with a view to concluding such negotiations as soon as possible. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the Russian Federation and the United States of America addressing all issues related to strategic stability in the nuclear disarmament process.

6. The Conference encourages the nuclear-weapon States to engage over the course of the next review cycle, with a view to achieving rapid reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons.

7. The Conference calls upon all States concerned to continue to review their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies over the course of the next review cycle with a view to reducing further the role and significance of nuclear weapons therein.

8. The Conference urges the nuclear-weapon States to continue undertaking all efforts necessary to comprehensively address the risks of unintended nuclear detonations, including, but not limited to, protection of command and control systems against potential cyber threats.

9. The Conference encourages the consideration of further practical measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.

10. The Conference encourages the nuclear-weapon States to build upon and expand their efforts to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence, including by intensifying their discussions on definitions and terminology related to nuclear weapons, with a view to facilitating and accelerating nuclear disarmament.
11. Welcoming the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States in a common reporting framework, the Conference encourages further detailed reporting. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to provide regular reports on their nuclear disarmament-related undertakings in accordance with actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 action plan and further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to continue their engagement on a standard reporting form and to report to the 2017 and 2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee, encouraging them to take into account the following items, without prejudice to national security: (i) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (ii) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (iii) the measures taken to reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (iv) the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; (v) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; (vi) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; (vii) the amount of fissile material for military purposes. The Conference agrees that the 2020 Review Conference and the 2017 and 2019 sessions of the Preparatory Committee should allocate specific time to review the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States.

Towards the fulfillment of action 20 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference calls upon States parties to increase the quality, quantity and consistency of their reports as a contribution to enhanced transparency and to report on their efforts to implement all aspects of paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”.

The 2020 Review Conference will review the progress made in implementing this reporting mechanism and consider next steps in this regard.

12. Recalling action 6 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

13. Recalling action 7 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, to immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.

14. The Conference encourages all States concerned to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to review any related
reservations and interpretive declarations over the course of the next review cycle with a view to their withdrawal. The Conference encourages the parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States to continue to engage constructively in order to resolve outstanding issues.

15. In reaffirming actions 10 to 14 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference calls upon the eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to take individual initiatives to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay and without waiting for any other State to do so. Pending the entry into force of that Treaty and against the backdrop of, inter alia, widespread concerns regarding the impact on health and the environmental consequences resulting from nuclear tests and, in particular, the effects on children’s and women’s health, all States commit to cease and refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action, including those at former nuclear test sites, that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and to maintain moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions. The Conference recalls that the CTBT will provide an effective disarmament and non-proliferation measure by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

16. Recalling action 15 agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, to immediately begin negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. These negotiations should take into account in particular all substantive work undertaken during the past review cycle.

17. The Conference encourages all States, including in cooperation with international organizations and civil society, to pursue and intensify efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, taking into account the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of verification, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, including through the new and continuing initiatives pursued under the leadership of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification initiated by the United States of America.

18. In light of the 70th year since the end of the tragic devastations of World War II, the Conference encourages all States, including in cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, local governments, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the private sector, to continue and intensify efforts in the field
of disarmament and non-proliferation education to raise awareness of the public, in particular of younger and future generations, as well as of leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including through interactions with and directly sharing the experiences of the people and the communities affected by nuclear weapons to know their humanitarian impact. The Conference also encourages all States to make use of new information and communication technology in these efforts.

19. The Conference recommends that the United Nations General Assembly establish at its seventieth session an open-ended working group to identify and elaborate effective measures for the full implementation of article VI, including legal provisions or other arrangements that contribute to and are required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. The legal provisions could be established through various approaches, including a stand-alone instrument or a framework agreement. Without prejudice to the prerogative of the United Nations General Assembly to determine the methods of work of its subsidiary bodies in accordance with its rules of procedure, the Conference recommends that the open-ended working group conduct its work on the basis of consensus. The Conference encourages all States to engage in this open and inclusive process.