Subsidiary Body 1: Draft substantive elements

The Conference underlines the necessity of implementing fully article VI of the Treaty, Decisions 1 and 2 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Extension and Review Conference, the Final Document adopted by the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

The Conference agrees that understandings and concerns pertaining to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons should underpin and lend urgency to efforts by all States leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances.

The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

While acknowledging that some progress has been made in implementing disarmament commitments since the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference recognizes that greater and accelerated implementation efforts are required, particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, including through the specification of concrete benchmarks and agreed timelines.

The Conference reaffirms that significant steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace and security, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all.

The Conference recalls the commitment of all States parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons as well as the need for all States to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

The Conference affirms that effective measures for the full implementation of article VI can be multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral.
The Conference recalls that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

1. The Conference agrees that awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons should serve as a unifying factor and compel urgent action for the full implementation of article VI.

2. The Conference affirms the need for all nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking, and pending the establishment of a legal framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, to reduce further and eliminate, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, all types of nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of location, including through negotiations as well as unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

3. The Conference calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to commence negotiations at an early date to achieve greater reductions and transparency in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, with a view to concluding such negotiations prior to the expiration of the New START Treaty. The Conference acknowledges the importance of addressing issues pertaining to other types of related strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems with a view to facilitating and accelerating the nuclear disarmament process. The Conference further calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to engage the other nuclear-weapon States over the course of the next review cycle of the Treaty with a view to achieving rapid reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons.

4. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to cease the development of new nuclear weapons and the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapon systems that support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.

5. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet eliminated nuclear weapons from security doctrines to abandon, as soon as possible but not later than the 2020 Review Conference, concepts, doctrines and policies that envisage the first use of nuclear weapons and to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

6. The Conference calls upon nuclear-weapon States to ensure that their policies address fully all risks associated with nuclear weapons, which are greater than previously assumed, including, inter alia, those stemming from threats posed by non-state actors and by the vulnerability of command and control systems to cyber threats.

7. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference emphasizes the need to reduce rapidly, as an interim measure, the operational status of nuclear weapon systems, leading to a phased removal of all nuclear weapons from high alert levels, noting that such reductions would increase international stability and security while lowering the humanitarian risks associated with nuclear weapons.
8. The Conference encourages the nuclear-weapon States to build upon and expand their efforts to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence, including by intensifying their discussions on definitions and terminology related to nuclear weapons with a view to facilitating and accelerating nuclear disarmament.

9. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to provide annual reports on their nuclear disarmament-related undertakings and, starting in 2017, to include the following standard information on: (i) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (ii) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (iii) the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (iv) the measures taken to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; (v) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; (vi) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; (vii) the amount of fissile material for military purposes. The Conference agrees that each session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference should allocate specific time to review the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States.

10. The Conference calls upon non-nuclear-weapon States to increase the quality, quantity and consistency of their reports as a contribution to enhanced transparency.

11. Pending the establishment of the necessary legal framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, the Conference endorses the accelerated pursuit of various practical building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons that can be realized simultaneously, including through multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral and unilateral measures.

12. The Conference reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the humanitarian risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States, which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

13. Pending the urgent conclusion of an international legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, all States concerned are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to review and withdraw any related reservations and interpretive declarations by the 2020 Review Conference.

14. Bearing in mind the legacy of health and environmental consequences resulting from nuclear tests and the disproportionate effects on children's and women's health, the Conference calls upon the eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to sign and ratify that Treaty without waiting for any other State to do so. Pending the entry into force of that Treaty, all States commit to cease and refrain from any action that would defeat its object and purpose, to uphold moratoriums on nuclear test explosions and to close, dismantle or convert any sites used for nuclear test explosions.
15. The Conference urges States to commence immediately and to conclude rapidly substantive negotiations, before the end of the next review cycle, preferably in the Conference on Disarmament, on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the Conference calls upon nuclear-weapon States and all other relevant States to maintain or implement moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

16. The Conference encourages all States, in cooperation with international organizations and civil society, to pursue and intensify efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, including through the new and continuing initiatives pursued under the leadership of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification initiated by the United States of America.

17. Noting that a majority of States parties believe that a legal framework is necessary for the full implementation of article VI, the Conference encourages all States to engage, without delay, within the framework of the United Nations disarmament machinery, in an inclusive process to identify and elaborate the legal provisions required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. These legal provisions could be enacted through various approaches, including, inter alia, a stand-alone instrument, which could take the form of a nuclear-weapons-ban treaty or a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention that includes a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe; a framework agreement comprising mutually supporting instruments that would establish the key prohibitions, obligations and arrangements for time-bound, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament; or other arrangements.

18. The Conference encourages all States, in cooperation with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the private sector, to continue and intensify efforts to raise the awareness of the public, and younger and future generations in particular, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The Conference also encourages all States to make use of new information and communication technology in these efforts. In view of the 70th anniversary of the use of nuclear weapons, the Conference notes the proposal for world leaders, disarmament experts and youth to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to witness first-hand the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and to hear the testimonies of the survivors (Hibakusha).