Overview:

1. The NPT was devised to promote three main pillars in parallel, comprising nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate objective of the Treaty is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and conditions for its full realization depend on its full implementation along with the realization of its universality. Forty five years after the Treaty’s entry into force, following the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, that objective is far from realized and the poor implementation record of Treaty obligations continues to challenge its raison-d’etre requiring action to bring about the full implementation of the Treaty as an important requirement to its effectiveness, credibility and the realization of its collective objectives.
2. In this context, the Treaty was originally created with a 25 years duration, during which Nuclear-Weapon States were expected to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and realize the objectives stipulated in Article VI. The Nuclear-Weapon State status was seen under the Treaty as a transitional status. All the obligations under the Treaty represent an integral package of commitments, the implementation of which, along with relevant decisions adopted at Review Conferences, would collectively contribute to its effectiveness and the realization of its objectives.

3. The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted as part of the indefinite extension package highlighted the essential foundation that the goals of universality and nuclear disarmament represent for the indefinitely extended Treaty, its effectiveness and credibility.

4. Furthermore, the 13 Practical Steps by all Nuclear-Weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament remain unimplemented, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference remain valid in the context of the unequivocal undertaking by Nuclear-Weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and in implementing obligations under the Treaty. While Action 5 of the 2010 Plan of Action clearly refers to the implementation of Nuclear-Weapon States of the 13 Practical Steps, no progress has been realized in that regard to date.

5. The Plan of Action adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, identified specific actions that Nuclear-Weapon States have to take in order to promote nuclear disarmament, including Actions 20 and 21, on reporting on implementation and transparency measures. Along with other relevant Action Points, these remain to be implemented.
6. Like each of the other main pillars of the Treaty, implementation of commitments in the field of Nuclear disarmament had to be linked to progress in other more overarching goals, namely Treaty Universality, a crucial objective to which the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty was linked.

7. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing elements where each of such objectives would be of limited value if implemented without the other.

8. Through Conferences convened in Oslo, Norway, in March 2013, Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and in Vienna, Austria, in December 2014, the humanitarian consequences process managed to bring to the attention of the international community, more than any other time, that nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains not only a core obligation of Nuclear-Weapon-States under the Treaty, but also an urgent requirement of international humanitarian law and action that is to be expected from the civilized international community in the 21st century.

9. The Government of Egypt has thus strongly endorsed the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention which would aim at the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, under effective multilateral verification and control. The 2010 Plan of Action mentioned the Convention as a viable route to nuclear disarmament and the 2015 Review Conference needs to build on this. If necessary, a first step towards that objective can be the negotiation of a Treaty banning the manufacture, possession, transfer and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

10. In this regard, the role of the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body within the United Nations system is to be preserved and
utilized. It is of notable importance that the Conference on Disarmament, while moving forward on a legal instrument banning and/or seeking to totally eliminate nuclear weapons, should begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, within an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

11. In order for an FMCT to contribute to nuclear disarmament, it should cover all existing fissile material stocks and should create conditions under which Nuclear-Weapon States will not be able to produce further nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**Actions required by the Conference:**

The Conference should Review the implementation of obligations of Nuclear-Weapon States in the field of nuclear disarmament, under the Treaty, taking into account relevant obligations adopted at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences and decide on necessary measures for the full implementation of Treaty obligations. In this context, the Conference should:

1. Recall existing nuclear disarmament obligations emanating from the Treaty, as well as related measures agreed at Review Conferences, that are yet to be implemented, reaffirm such obligations and recognize that lack of implementation undermines the effectiveness of the Treaty, its credibility and the potential for the realization of its eventual universality.
2. Reaffirm the mutually reinforcing relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, confirming that progress on nuclear non-proliferation remains unsustainable without parallel progress in nuclear disarmament.

3. Confirm that the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 was not in any way foreseen so to freeze the then existing lack of implementation of obligations in nuclear disarmament, and reconfirm that the implementation of such obligations remain guided by the overall package of resolution and decisions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including in particular the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which highlighted nuclear disarmament, Treaty universality and the non-cooperation with non-NPT States in the nuclear field as essential principles for the indefinitely extended Treaty.

4. Reconfirm the importance of the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking of Nuclear-Weapon States in the field of disarmament, including the 13 practical steps, which have to be implemented consistent with such undertakings.

5. Note with regret that the elements of the 2010 Plan of Action on nuclear disarmament remain far from implemented, and call for their implementation without any further delay.

6. Welcome the humanitarian consequences process, confirming its recognition of the unacceptably hazardous, fully indiscriminate nature of any possible use of nuclear weapons, either by design or error, and noting that the existing capacity of the international community to address any consequences of a use of nuclear weapon remains very limited.

7. Express regret for the slow pace of nuclear disarmament efforts, and recognize the unprecedented urgency of the total elimination of nuclear disarmament as reflected by the
findings of the humanitarian consequences process. Understanding that the current slow-paced step-by-step approach, without a specified timeframe, exposes the international community to potentially unactable humanitarian risks, and thus Calls upon all Nuclear-Weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament with a much faster pace, larger scope and within a given timeframe identified to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. Recall decisions taken within previous Review Conferences on diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that such weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, noting that Nuclear-Weapon States have achieved little progress in this regard, and that actions were needed on their behalf, individually and collectively, including in the context of military alliances, to eliminate practices of nuclear sharing and to realize that nuclear deterrence runs contrary to their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty as well as to its overall aspirations. Call on Nuclear-Weapon States to fulfill their obligations in this domain.

9. Realize the urgency of launching negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament, on a Treaty banning nuclear weapons, as a first step, in efforts to initiate negotiations, in the Conference, on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, which would aim at the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, under effective multilateral verification and control.

10. Recognize the importance of reaching an agreement on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work by the Conference on Disarmament, which while moving forward on a legal instrument banning and/or seeking to totally eliminate nuclear weapons, should begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, allowing the consideration of all issues comprehensively and effectively.

11. Affirm that in order for an FMCT to effectively contribute to its nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, it must cover all existing fissile material stocks, placing such materials under safeguards, in order to prevent any further production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.