Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Disarmament

Working paper submitted by the United States of America

The United States firmly supports implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all its aspects, including the Article VI commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama reaffirmed this goal, calling for renewed efforts to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The United States has taken and will continue to take practical steps in this direction, including: reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy; further reducing our nuclear stockpile; implementing the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START); pursuing U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); seeking a treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT); and pursuing actions and partnerships that can build further confidence in the nuclear disarmament process.
Nuclear Disarmament Actions

The United States believes that nuclear disarmament is a desirable and achievable objective and is best advanced through concrete, practical steps. This is the only realistic route to our shared goal, with successive steps building the trust, confidence, and opportunity for additional steps. This also recognizes that the goal of nuclear disarmament will not be achieved quickly and will require patience, persistence, and steady work to build the conditions and foster the necessary cooperation. As we make our way toward the end-goal, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and assure U.S. allies and partners that count on security commitments undertaken by the United States.

Nuclear arms reductions

The United States has been reducing its inventory of nuclear weapons for more than four decades. By September 2014, the U.S. nuclear stockpile was reduced by approximately 85 percent from its Cold War peak of 31,255 warheads in 1967. Our report to the 2015 RevCon shows the stockpile has now been reduced to 4,717 warheads with an additional 87 warheads removed from the stockpile since our report to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting. An additional 299 weapons have been dismantled over the last year, and approximately 2,500 warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. The United States has also unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear warheads by more than 90 percent. At this NPT Review
Conference, the United States has announced that President Obama will seek funding to accelerate dismantlement of retired U.S. nuclear warheads by 20 percent.

The New START Treaty, now in its fifth year since its entry into force, continues to be successfully implemented. When the Treaty’s central limits come into effect in February 2018, the operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation will be capped at their lowest level since the 1950s. Under the Treaty, the United States and Russia must limit their strategic forces to no more than 1,550 operationally deployed accountable strategic warheads and 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments by February 2018. As of March 1, 2015, the United States had 1,597 operationally deployed accountable strategic warheads on 785 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

In his 2013 Berlin speech, President Obama made clear the United States is prepared to negotiate further reductions with Russia of up to one-third below the deployed strategic warhead levels established under the New START Treaty. The President also committed to work with NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO has further stated that it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia. Progress requires a willing partner and we encourage Russia to join us in negotiating these next steps toward meeting our Article VI commitment.
The Review Conference could:

- Recall the cessation of the Cold War nuclear arms race, welcome the continuing reduction of nuclear weapons, and call for further efforts by all Parties towards nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

- Welcome the ongoing and successful implementation of the New START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and continue to encourage further negotiations on reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed – recalling the U.S. offer to pursue further nuclear force reductions in negotiation with Russia.

- Reaffirm the call on all nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to undertake concrete disarmament efforts; welcome their affirmation to pursue further progressive and practical steps to reduce nuclear weapons, to include reductions of all types of nuclear weapons. These steps should be taken with “a view” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and is based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.

- Recognize efforts undertaken by the NWS to report on nuclear reductions and their various undertakings in the sphere of nuclear reductions and disarmament, and call for continued reporting in this regard.

- Recognize that nuclear arsenals should be maintained at the lowest levels needed to meet security requirements.
• Call upon Parties to work together to build the conditions for peace and security necessary to facilitate even more progress on nuclear disarmament.

Addressing Nuclear Weapon Risks

The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlined the U.S. approach to reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. It makes clear the U.S. policy that the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The NPR announced that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

Underpinning U.S. efforts to advance nuclear disarmament is our clear understanding and recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. It is for this reason that the United States is committed to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our military strategy. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review underscores that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners, and that it is in the U.S. interest, and that of all other nations, that the now nearly 70-year record of nuclear weapon non-use be extended forever.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review makes clear the United States will not pursue new nuclear warheads and that life extension programs for U.S. nuclear warheads will not support new
military missions or provide for new military capabilities. U.S. Stockpile stewardship and management activities are intended only to sustain existing designs, modernize their safety, improve security and use control features, and modernize facilities to support these efforts. We are increasing our investments to ensure the safety and security and to replace aging infrastructure and capabilities that will allow for the reduction in the number of warheads required to be maintained as a hedge against technical problems with deployed warheads. U.S. nuclear weapons incorporate safety design features that minimize the possibility of nuclear detonation because of accidents, inadvertent errors, or acts of nature.

As a further step to reduce nuclear risks, the United States has taken significant steps since the Cold War’s end to reduce the alert status of our nuclear forces. We will continue the practice of “open-ocean” targeting of all ICBMs and SLBMs so that, in the highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the missile would land in the open ocean, and we are committed to practices and actions that maximize the decision time available to the President in the event of a crisis.

The Review Conference could:

- Acknowledge the international interest in the catastrophic consequences that could accompany the use of nuclear weapons, and emphasize that this concern underpins efforts and commitments toward nuclear disarmament and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states or non-state actors.
• Affirm that it is in the interest of all nations that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

• Welcome efforts by the NWS to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies, and encourage further efforts by NWS to make public statements regarding the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies.

• Welcome commitments by the nuclear-weapon States not to target each other with nuclear weapons and to pursue nuclear postures that maximize decision time for leaders in the event of a crisis.

• Welcome the commitment to deepen arms control and strategic stability interaction and dialogue through the P5 process or other means.

• Welcome steps taken and call for further steps to build confidence and lower the possibility of any potential use of nuclear weapons, including accidental use, by giving the highest priority to ensuring the safety and security of their nuclear weapons.

Transparency, Verification, and Irreversibility

The United States strongly supports the principle that compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements must be monitored and diligently enforced. We are second to none in the transparency we apply to our nuclear complex and our disarmament efforts. We also believe that information sharing and confidence-building measures contribute to stability and security by enhancing predictability, and that transparency is essential to building trust and confidence to create the necessary foundation for further disarmament. The rigorous and
extensive verification provisions of the New START Treaty testify to the importance of transparency and effective verification in providing predictability and stability in international relations. Through our respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the United States and Russia have exchanged more than 8,300 notifications on the numbers, locations, movements, and eliminations of U.S. and Russian strategic forces covered by the Treaty. However, even as we advance New START Treaty implementation, the United States will not ignore Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and calls on Russia to return to compliance so that we can avoid a revival of past dangers.

Increasing transparency through information exchanges and confidence building measures is an important aspect of efforts to advance the NPT’s Article VI goals. Bilateral exchanges under the New START Treaty are one example, but unilateral actions are also valued. The United States has been a leader in this regard. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference for the first time, then again at the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, and once more here at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States released publically additional data concerning the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. In that spirit of transparency, the United States Government continues to explore the technical steps needed to ensure irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency as essential building blocks for further nuclear disarmament, and is considering ways to collaborate with other States Parties to the NPT in this undertaking.

Verification will become increasingly complex at lower numbers of nuclear weapons, while requirements for accurately determining compliance will dramatically increase. This challenge
must be addressed now. To that end, the United States, working with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, has launched the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. The Partnership, which held its inaugural meeting in March 2015, brings together nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states to more fully understand the myriad technical complexities of verifying nuclear disarmament, and to develop solutions going forward.

Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the five recognized nuclear-weapon States under the NPT (or “P5”) continue to engage regularly to discuss issues relating to strategic stability as well as to address their commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan and to review progress towards fulfilling them. All five states have now hosted a P5 Conference; the February 2015 Conference in London began a new cycle. Through this process, the P5 agreed on a common framework for national reports submitted to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting; completed a first edition of a P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms that is facilitating dialogue on nuclear-related issues; enhanced technical work related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspection techniques and technologies and minimizing the impact of xenon emissions from medical isotope production on the CTBTO’s verification network. The United States seeks to deepen the process of P5 engagement, consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the Action Plan.

In recognizing these efforts, the 2015 Review Conference could:

- Welcome the reports submitted by the NWS in a common framework, and encourage continued reporting in this regard, to include reporting by all NPT Parties.
• Welcome public declarations by some NWS of their respective total numbers of nuclear weapons, and also reports on progress made towards dismantling retired nuclear weapons, and encourage further efforts in this regard.

• Encourage those nuclear-weapons states that have not publicly declared their total number of nuclear weapons or reported on progress toward dismantling retired nuclear weapons to take such steps.

• Welcome the efforts of the NWS to further enhance transparency, including their most recent conference in London and the release of the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, and encourage the NWS to build on and expand their current efforts to further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence as providing a necessary foundation for further progress on disarmament and nonproliferation, including through their regular meetings at policy and expert levels.

• Recognize the contribution toward Article VI goals through work being done on nuclear disarmament verification, including through bilateral work between the United States and the UK, between the UK and Norway, and the newly launched International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which brings together NWS and NNWS to develop solutions to verification challenges, and encourage further efforts in this regard.

• Promote initiatives in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education, including continued efforts to educate the next generation of policy and technical specialists, the use of new information and communications technology, as well as collaboration among governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and the private sector.
Nuclear testing

The United States has continued to work to build support for ratification of the CTBT, making the case that the Treaty will serve to enhance domestic and collective international security. While preparing for U.S. ratification, the United States welcomes the eleven ratifications since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continues to encourage all states that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty and to work for its early entry into force.

The United States will soon commemorate 23 years since it committed to refrain from nuclear explosive testing. The United States has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing during this time and has no intention of resuming such tests. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reiterated that the United States no longer requires nuclear explosive testing to ensure the safety and effectiveness of our remaining nuclear weapons, relying instead on our long-standing Stockpile Stewardship Program. The United States has condemned the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) nuclear explosive testing conducted since the last Review Conference, and calls upon all states, including the DPRK, to refrain from nuclear explosive testing.

In addition to using enhanced national technical means to monitor for nuclear explosions, the United States has continued to robustly support the completion of the monitoring and verification regime under the CTBT, including the International Monitoring System, supported by the International Data Centre, and the On-Site Inspection (OSI) elements of the verification
regime. The United States is proud of its support for the recent successful OSI Integrated Field Exercise (IFE-14) conducted in Jordan and Austria. The United States has continued to work closely with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) on the design and procurement plans for the reinstallation of the hydroacoustic station in the Crozet Archipelago in the Indian Ocean. The United States has provided $25.5 million to underwrite the project, and provided voluntary contributions totaling more than $23 million for other projects to accelerate development of the CTBT’s verification regime.

The Review Conference could:

- Welcome the eleven new ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) since the 2010 Review Conference (Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq, and Niue), including one Annex 2 State (Indonesia), and urge all States that have not done so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty, to universalize the Treaty and bring it into force as soon as possible.

- Welcome work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) to fully develop the verification regime of the CTBT, including the successful On-Site Inspection Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) conducted in 2014 in Austria and Jordan, which demonstrated that an on-site inspection of a suspected nuclear explosion event can be successfully carried out. Note that the International Monitoring System for the CTBT is 83% complete, and call upon all participating States to support such work, to include providing the necessary resources to expeditiously complete the CTBT verification regime.
• Encourage all relevant states to reaffirm support for, or put into place, respective moratoria on nuclear weapon explosive tests or any other nuclear explosions, recognizing, however, that moratoria do not have the same legal force.

• Reaffirm the commitment reflected in Action 11 of the 2010 Action Plan, to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty.

• Recognize the contribution of the Conferences convened in accordance with Article XIV of the CTBT on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the eighth such Conference held in September 2013; look forward to the ninth such Conference to be held in New York in September 2015.

**Fissile material**

For many years, the United States has been unilaterally dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads and taking other measures to reduce its nuclear arsenal, in addition to fulfilling requirements set out in international agreements. Meanwhile, the United States has not produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons since 1964 or produced plutonium for weapons since 1988.

In 1994, 174 metric tons of HEU was removed from the U.S. weapons program. In 2005, the United States announced that an additional 200 metric tons of HEU would be removed, which would be enough for more than 11,000 nuclear weapons. To date, the United States has down-
blended 146 metric tons, equivalent to 5,800 nuclear weapons, of its own stocks of HEU to low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel.

The United States has worked with Russia for a number of years to eliminate excess stocks of fissile material that could be used in nuclear warheads. Under the highly successful 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement, 500 metric tons of Russian weapons-origin HEU, which is equivalent to roughly 20,000 nuclear warheads, has been down-blended into LEU for use in U.S. nuclear power plants. The final shipment of down-blended LEU from Russia to the United States was completed in 2014.

In addition, more than 60 metric tons of plutonium was removed from U.S. defense stocks, of which 34 metric tons was included in the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (PMDA). In July 2011, the United States and Russia brought this Agreement and the 2006 and 2010 Protocols thereto into force. The amended Agreement commits each country to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium, enough in total for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. Disposition will be subject to international monitoring and will transform the material into forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons.
A verified end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is the next logical multilateral step towards disarmament and an essential step toward a nuclear-free world. We seriously regret that negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) have yet to be initiated. The United States participated constructively in the United Nations’ Group of Governmental Experts established by UN General Assembly Resolution 67/53, and hopes that its consensus report will also provide an impetus to the CD.

The Review Conference could:

- Reaffirm the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) as the next logical multilateral nuclear disarmament step and express strong disappointment that the CD has yet to initiate negotiations on an FMCT.

- Welcome the consensus conclusion of UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT (established pursuant to UNGA A/RES/67/53) and express the hope that its report will provide impetus to the early commencement of negotiations at the CD on the basis of the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein (CD/1299).

- Welcome the existing moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and call for all who have not declared such a moratorium to do so.

- Recognize the successful completion of the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement, under which 500 metric tons of Russian HEU from nuclear weapons was blended down to LEU and used as fuel in U.S. nuclear power plants. Welcome the ongoing implementation of the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, under which all weapon-grade
plutonium produced since 1995 by these now-shutdown reactors remains outside of military programs.

- Call upon the NWS to reaffirm that fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for nuclear weapons will not be used in nuclear weapons, and welcome further such efforts as soon as practicable.

- Welcome the entry into force of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, under which the United States and Russia will each dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium subject to international monitoring.

**Security Assurances**

The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review announced that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, a negative security assurance. This revised assurance underscores the important security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT. The United States also made clear in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our allies and partners. The United States prefers to conclude legally binding negative security assurances in the context of relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones.
The United States and the other NWS have also offered positive security assurances, focused on providing assistance to States victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. In 1995 the UN Security Council adopted resolution S/1995/984 taking note of the unilateral assurances given by the NWS to NNWS Parties to the NPT and recognizing that the NWS will bring such a matter to the attention of the Security council and seek Council action to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to the State victim. For its part, the United States stated that: “The United States intends to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the [NPT] that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.” At that time, the United States also noted that: “The United States affirms its intention to provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or the object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.” (S/1995/263)

The Review Conference could:

• Welcome the reaffirmation by the NWS to their commitment to existing negative security assurances regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons;

• Welcome the reaffirmation by the NWS to their commitment to existing positive security assurances regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons;

• Request the NWS to consider additional steps that could be taken in accordance with the UN Charter, to come to the assistance of any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that is a
victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, with a view to addressing consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

- Welcome continuing efforts by the NWS to conclude legally binding negative security assurances in the context of nuclear weapon free zones.

**Non-nuclear disarmament and arms control efforts**

NPT Article VI contains an undertaking “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” In that context, we would also like to note significant demonstrations of the U.S. commitment to disarmament in the fields of biological, chemical and conventional weapons.

The United States is a global leader on biological weapons disarmament. The United States announced in 1969 that it would unilaterally dismantle its biological weapons program, and we played a leadership role in negotiating the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Since then, we have led efforts to strengthen implementation of the Convention and address the changing nature of BW threats. As we look toward the Eighth Review Conference, the United States supports a more ambitious approach focused on strengthening implementation of national measures to address threats of proliferation and bioterrorism and building confidence that parties are complying with their obligations.
The United States continues its strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The United States also remains fully committed to the universality of the CWC, the non-proliferation of chemical weapons and to working to ensure that there will be no re-emergence of chemical weapons. Toward that end, we welcome the removal and destruction of more than 98% of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile which was made possible by the extraordinary effort of the international community and the UN-OPCW Joint Mission. While we recognize this achievement, we remain deeply concerned that Syria has failed to fully declare and destroy its entire chemical weapons program. It remains important that all remaining contradictions and questions regarding Syria’s CW program are fully clarified in good faith and yield tangible results. We strongly condemn any continued use of chlorine gas as a chemical weapon by the Assad regime as the use of any toxic chemical as a chemical weapon is a violation of the CWC.

The United States has continued to take a leading role within the international community in conventional arms control efforts. The three conventional arms control pillars in Europe, the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Treaty on Open Skies, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), remain the foundation for conventional military transparency and confidence in the Euro-Atlantic region. Notwithstanding Russia’s decision in March 2015 not to participate in the CFE Treaty’s implementing body the United States continues to implement its treaty commitment and
remains committed to working with NATO and other partners to modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe.

The United States has contributed to conventional weapons disarmament efforts in other ways as well. In June 2014, the United States announced that we will not produce or otherwise acquire any anti-personnel landmines that are not compliant with the Ottawa Convention in the future, including the replacement of such munitions as they expire in the coming years. In September 2014 the United States further announced that we will align U.S. activities outside the Korean Peninsula with the key requirements of the Ottawa Convention. The United States remains a global leader in conventional weapons destruction, having provided over $2.4 billion in assistance to over 90 countries since 1993.

The way ahead

The United States is making significant and far-reaching strides to implement Article VI of the NPT, and U.S. actions are under way at home and with the other P5 countries to put in place the building blocks for further progress. The implementation of President Obama’s Prague agenda and the 2010 NPT Action Plan is well under way. Much progress has been achieved, yet much remains to be done.

The United States will continue to work step-by-step toward fulfilling our obligations under Article VI and our commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan across all three NPT pillars.
The United States will also continue to urge other Parties to the Treaty to do the same. As Article VI makes clear, all Parties to the Treaty have a role to play in disarmament.